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INTRODUCTION-
"[The Mental Health Compulsory Assessment and Treaunent Bill] is a Bill that reflects 
the best about the community, in that it does responsibly draw a line between the 
interests of the community and the interests of the person who is seriously mentally 
doorderedl 
Until relatively recently in New Zealand and other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions the balance between these competing rights has weighed 
heavily in favour of society's right to confine mentally disordered 
persons; exposing the mentally ill to potential violation of their civil 
rights at the expense of the perceived need to confine and treat them. 
Public consciousness of the problem has been raised in recent years by 
intense media interest in the plight of the mentally ill, and the depiction 
of nightmare scenarios such as that in the controversial film "One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo's Nest", in which a patient was given a frontal 
lobotomy without his consent, and the book "Faces in the Water". In the 
legal context, the combination of paternalism and derision with which 
mentally ill people were regarded was reflected in the titles of various 
mental health statutes prior to 1969, sµch as the Lunatics Act 1894 and 
the Mental Defectives Act 1911, and in the descriptions given to 
mentally ill people in colloquial parlance, such as "loonies" (touched by 
the moon) and "nutcases". Campbell, Gillett and Jones describe the 
problem thus: 
" .. psychiatric patients are often stigmatised as being somehow tainted in the essence 
of their identity as persons, and not just as affected by an incidental condition. "2 
Small wonder then that the late 1970s and early 80s witnessed a wave of 
reform in mental health legislation around the Common Law world, 
designed to accord ordinary civil rights to mentally ill persons and more 
closely regulate the circumstances in which they could be compulsorily 
detained and treated by the State. In the United Kingdom a new Mental 
Health Act was passed in 1983, and reforming legislation was passed in 
many of the Australian jurisdictions in the late 1980s. New Zealand's 
1 The Rt Hon Helen Clark, Third Reading of the Bill, New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates, 2 June 1992, p 8457 
2 Practical Medical Ethics. p 131 
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turn came in 1982, when a scandal involving the compulsory 
adminstration of Electro-Convulsive Therapy to a patient in a secure 
ward at Oakley Psychiatric Hospital provoked a public outcry about the 
treatment of psychiatric patients, and led to the formation of a 
Committee of Inquiry into procedures at Oakley. The Committee 
published a comprehensive report in 1983, which made a number of 
important recommendations relating to mental health care in general. 
This in turn led to the formation of a Taskforce on mental health law 
reform, which began the comprehensive task of overhauling the Mental 
Health Act 1969. Nine years later in 1992 the reform has finally reached 
fruition with the enactment of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 in June 1992. 
Unlike its predecessor, the Act deals solely with compulsory treatment -
reflecting perhaps the overriding concern about the ease .with which 
people were committed under the Mental Health Act 1969, and the 
erosion of their ordinary civil rights while subject to detention under the 
Act.3 
Whether one is as sanguine as the member for Mt Albert about the 
merits of the new mental health regime, it must at least be recognised 
that the Act is a step forward in both the jurisprudence and the practice 
of mental health care, in that it defines more stringently the criteria for 
committal of mentally disordered persons, and explicitly provides for 
3 Hon Katherine O'Regan, NZ Parliamentary Debates, 12 March 1992, p 6860. 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn', chs 15,16 and 17. The Taskforce on Mental Health Law Refonn set up in 1982 recommended that a comprehensive code of patient rights, covering both voluntary and involuntary patients, be included in the new legislation. 
Statistics in 1984 indicated that only about 21 % of admissions to psychiatric 
institutions were pursuant to a committal order under the Mental Health Act 1969, although the statistics for admissions pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act and the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act would undoubtedly be higher. Furthennore, there is evidence of abuse of voluntary patients. According to Dawson they are sometimes administered psychotropic (mind altering) drugs without their consent There is no statutory authority for this - any authority must be derived from Common Law powers to treat people in emergencies - see 'The Process of Committal', p 37. In 1977 there was a case where a 13 year old Niuiean Boy being held in solitary confinement at Lake Alice Hospital as a voluntary patient was subjected to ECT 
(Electro Convulsive Therapy) without his consent Neither his parents nor the Social Welfare Department who was responsible for him were notified. See'Mental Health Law Refonn', John Dawson, p 324 
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patient rights for the first time in the history of mental health law in New 
Zealand.4 
The new Act deals with a broad range of issues relating to mental health 
care, including the treattnent of 'special patients ' who are referred by the 
criminal justice system and the treatment of children. The focus of this 
paper however is upon civil committal 5 under the Act, in terms of the 
criteria for compulsory treatment and the procedures by which mentally 
disordered persons can be subjected to compulsory treattnent Attempts 
will be made to assess whether the committal regime addresses the 
concerns associated with previous legislation, whether it will operate 
sucessfully in practical terms, and whether it strikes the appropriate 
balance between patient and community rights. The discussion will 
focus particularly upon the new definition of 'mental disorder' in the 
Act, and jurisprudential issues associated with committal of the mentally 
ill. 
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR COMMITTAL · THE 
DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISORDER 
Under the new Act a person can be subjected to compulsory treatment 
only if they are "mentally disordered" within the meaning of s 2 of the 
Act .. 
Section 2 defines 'Mental Disorder' as: 
an abnonnal state of mind (whether of a continuous or intennittant nature), 
characterised by delusions , or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or 
cognition of such a degree that it -
(a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; or 
4 See comments of Katherine O'Regan during the 2nd reading of the Bill, 12 March 
1992, NZ Parliamentary Debates at p 6861: "Several key themes run through the 
reforms: an increased emphasis on the need to protect patients' rights, appropriate 
appeal and review procedures, provision of treatment in the least restrictive 
environment. treatment of psychiatric patients like any other patient wherever 
possible, integration of mental health services with gcnetal services, and multi 
disciplinary participation in decision on the care and treatment of patients. 
5 The term 'committal' is no longer strictly appropriate in view of the de emphasis 
on detention under the new Act and the ability of the Family Court to order 
community treatment However, where the tenn is used in the paper it refers to any 
kind of compulsory treatment order in respect of a mentally disooiered patient 
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(b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of him or herself. 
In addition to these criteria the court must determine whether in all the 
circumstances of the case 
it is necessary to make a compulsory treatment order.6 No person can be 
subjected to assessment under the Act by reason only of that person's: 
(a) political, religious or cultutral beliefs 
(b) sexual preferences 
(c) criminal or delinquent behaviour 
(d) substance abuse 
(e) intellectual handicap 7 
The decision to commit a person to a mental institution has always 
involved considerations broader than simply that the patient is mentally 
disordered - it is a fundamental premise of liberal societies that no 
person shall be deprived of their liberty without compelling reasons,8 so 
while the fact that someone is mentally ill makes it desirable that they 
receive treatment, it does not in itself justify compulsory detention and 
treatment by the State. This entails that committal decisions are not 
based purely on medical factors,9 but require delicate legal judgments 
about the social implications of permitting a mentally disorded person to 
remain at large in the community. 
To this end, the involvement of the judiciary is pivotal in committal 
decisions. 10 
Given that a mentally disordered person's right to freedom rests 
ultimately in curial hands, an adequate legal definition of mental disorder 
becomes crucial. The requirements of a statutory definition were 
described by the Taskf orce in the following terms: 
6 Section 27(3) of the Act 
7 Section 4 of the Act 
8 This principle is grounded in the ancient writ of ~us corpus - no one has the 
right to detain another person without specific legal authority. See The Process of 
Committal' at p land J.S Mill 'On Liberty': "The only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is 
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant" 
9 See Toe Process of Committal', Dawson, p 5: "To a considerable extent committal 
is a medico-legal process" 
10 The Mental Health Act 1969, s 21, Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treaunent) Act 1992, ss 27 & 28 
"We believe the statutory language must give sufficient meaning to committal 
standards to prevent their arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, to provide 
adequate guidance to those who enforce the standards and warning to those liable to be 
detained under them, and to pennit meaningful review of decisions made. Committal 
criteria must accurately delineate the type, extent and immediacy of those harms 
which the statute is designed to prevent as well as those kinds of evidence which 
must be considered in making the committal decision" 11 
From that definition of the requirements, it is submitted that two factors 
are important in any definition of 'mental disorder' -
1. Conceotual Clarity 
The purpose of the conceptual clarity requirement is principally to 
ensure that Judges making committal decisions under the Act can 
exercise independent judgment, and are not forced to defer to the 
opinion of doctors and psychiatrists in making committal decisions. It is 
acknowledged that uncertainty and disagreement as to what constitutes 
mental disorder is inherent in the mental health system.12 The problem 
is alleviated to some extent by the development of international 
diagnostic guidelines, which set out specifically the range of symptoms 
11 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn', p 55 
l2 The comments of the Hon Helen Clark in NZ Parliamentary Debates, 12 March 
1992 at p 6860 are particularly pertinent in this regard: "to some extent how the 
definition is applied will reflect the clinical judgments, practices and standards of the 
day. That is something that cannot be clearly defined in a statute". See also 'Towards 
Mental Health Law Reform', p 36, The Process of Committal' Dawson at p 149 and 
'The Reality of Mental Illness' (1986) M Roth and J Kroll, p 79. The conditions 
which most often pose problems for psychiatrists are psychopathia and neurotic 
disorders. 
associated with each illness, 13 but the interface between mental illnesses 
and personality disorders is still unsettled. 14 As Gostin points out: 
"It is when psychiatry enters the grey area of personality disorder or neurosis, or 
when it claims an ability to identify an illness which is not apparent to the rest of 
us, that it is most vulnerable as a profession" 15 
For this very reason however legislation is the place to address such 
conflicts, 16 if not by explicitly detailing mental disorders covered by the 
Act, by at least excluding conditions which are clearly not intended to be 
covered by the Act, such as neuroses or personality disorders. 17 The list 
of exclusions in s 4 of the Act goes contributes in some measure toward 
a clarification of the types of conditions intended to be covered; 
according to Mellsop, the terms used in the definition (such as "disorder 
of mocxi") have an accepted meaning in psychiatry, and thus would be 
13 The first serious attempt to reduce diagnostic unreliability was the promulgation 
by the American Psychiatric Association of DSM-ill in 1980 - the 'Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual' . For each disorder there are general descriptions followed by more 
specific diagnostic criteria. For a more extensive discussion of the system see 
'Psychiatric Trends: Developments in Diagnosis in Psychiatry', GW Mellsop, [1983) 
NZ Medical Journal 1010. 
Mellsop claims that the ICD-10 system has an accuracy rate of 80%. See also the 
International Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition (1992). The new diagnostic 
system is discussed in 'Reliability of the Draft Diagnostic Criteria for Research of 
ICD-10 in Comparison with ICD-10 and DSM-III-R', GW Mellsop et al, (1991) 
Acta Psychitr Scand 332-335. 
14 The U.K Mental Health Act includes psychopathia as a mental disorder but the 
New :zeaiand Act does not 
15 'The Ideology of Entitlement: The Application of Contemporary Legal 
Approaches to Psychiatry' in 'Mental illness: Changes and Trends', Bean (ed), pp 27; 
38 
l6 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform' at p 36 - "[t]he idea that defining the 
boundaries of mental disorder should be left within the realm of medical expertise is 
further attacked on the ground that psychiatric diagnoses are far from reliable ... while 
diagnostic reliability may be increasing, it is far from clear that psychiatrists are able 
to diagnose mental disorder with an accuracy sufficient to satisfy the requirement that 
persons should not be deprived of their liberty except on the basis of thoroughly 
reliable evidence" 
1 7 Although some psychiatrists would like to see such disorders covered by mental 
health legislation, there seems little point in doing so, as many are not susceptible to 
psychiatric treatment. "The distinction between a mental illness and a personality 
disorder would appear to be that personality disorders are not 'organic', in the sense of 
being a disease that overlays the person's normal personality" - M Roth, 
'Psychopathic (Sociopatliic) Personality' in Bluglass and Bowden (eds) 'Principles and 
Practices of Forensic Psychiatry'. The Auckland District Law Society in its 
submission to Select Committee on the Bill recommended that personality disorders 
be excluded from the definition. 
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interpreted consistently by psychiatrists perfroming assessments under 
the Act. 18 
However, it it is submitted that in view of the fact that the committal 
process has been opened up to involve mental health professions outside 
orthodox psychiatry the need for a clearer statutory definition is more 
pressing. 19 For example, the definition of mental disorder could require 
those interpreting it to have regard to the International Classification of 
Diseases. 
The U.K Mental Health Act draws a distinction between the criteria for 
admission for assessment, and those for admission for treatment. While 
'mental disorder" (the criterion for assessment) is defined widely to 
potentially include personality disorders, admission for treatment 
requires "mental disorder, severe mental impairment, psychopathic 
disorder or mental impairment"W It is submitted that the approach in the 
new Act has simply been to sidestep the issue. The definition of mental 
disorder does not enable those applying the Act to clearly determine 
what constitutes mental disorder or to attempt a diagnosis of the 
condition; it simply outlines a range of symptoms which may or may not 
constitute mental disorder.21 The consequence of this lack of clarity will 
be that the ultimate decisionmaker under the Act (the Family Court 
Judge) will defer inordinately to medical opinion - faced with a 
definition that is unusably wide.22 It is submitted that in all cases where 
compulsory treatment is being proposed a diagnosis of the condition 
l8 Graham Mellsop is the Professor of Psychiatry at Wellington Clinical School of 
Medicine. The authcr had discussions with him on 11 September 1992. 
19 Section 7(b) of the Act provides that the Director may appoint any registered 
health professional to the position of responsible clinician if in the opinion of the 
Director he has the relevant training and competence in treating the mentally ill. 
20 Mental Health Act 1983, s l. The Butler Committee in the U.K defined 'Mental 
illness' as: "a disorder which has not always existed in the patient but has developed 
as a condition overlying the sufferer's normal personality" - Report of the Committee 
on Mentally Abnoonal Offenders. 
21 See 'The Process of Committal' , Dawson in 'Mental Health: A Case for Reform', 
Legal Research Foundation Seminar at p 49 - 'In practice the key to committal is 
diagnosis, through which behaviour is constituted as mental discrder liable to control 
by the Mental Health AcL .. [t]he doubtful cases are those in which no clear diagnosis 
is expressed". 
22 This was one of the major problems with the 1969 Acl See the comments of the 
Taskforce, 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform' at p 55: "the committal decision is 
left largely to the medical profession by default". See also 'The Process of 
Committal', Dawson, in 'Mental Health: A Case for Reform', Legal Research 
Foundation at p 42, in which Dawson points out that committal hearings are 
characterued by an overabundance of medical evidence, and medical certificates which 
are formally correct are never rejected by judges. 
should be mandatory. In Victoria the Mental Health Review Board has 
laid down guidelines for the decision as to whether a person is 'mentally 
disordered'. These include consideration of expert evidence and 
reference to diagnostic manuals. 23 
The approach adopted in the New Zealand act fails adequately to 
maintain the distinction between the "mad" and the "bad" .24 While it is 
not legitimate to commit people simply on the basis of mental illness, 
neither is it legitimate to commit people who are not mentally ill and 
have committed no crime. As Mason McCall and Smith point out: 
" .. [i]t is .. axiomatic that a person who is dangerous but has not yet committed a 
crime is entitled to his liberty whatever his potential for future harm may be. We are 
left then with a paradox - why would so few people argue against the prophylactic 
detention of a dangerous person who is suffering from a mental illness? The answer 
must be that the illness itself may provide a basis for asserting that certain forms of 
violent or irrational conduct may be reasonably anticipated. "25 
They further state that: 
" .. the boundaries of mental illness should not be drawn so widely as to embrace 
forms of behaviour which are no more than non-conformist Compulsory admission 
should be limited to conditions which amount to an illness that can be said to 
compromise the mental health of the sufferer"26 
2. Should Personality Disorders he Included in the 
Definition of 'Mental Disorder'? 
Thus far the discussion has proceeded on the basis that personality 
disorders are not a form of mental illness, cannot be treated adequately 
in mental institutions and should therefore be excluded from any 
definition of 'mental disorder' .27 The ICD-10 diagnostic system, which 
23 See 'The Process of Civil Commitment under the Mental Health Act 1986', Neil 
Rees, p 255. 
24 See comments of Katherine O'Regan in the Second Reading of the Bill at p 6860: 
"the line between the mad and the bad is extremely fine". 
25 'Law and Medical Ethics', p 391. 
26 Ibid, p 399. 
27 The World Health Organisation ICD defines 'personality disordec' as: "Deeply 
ingrained maladaptive patterns of behaviour ... [t]he personality is abnormal either in 
the balance of its components, their quality or expression, or in its total aspect 
Because of this deviance or psychopathy the patient suffers or others have to suffer, 
has been adopted by the Psychiatric Association in New Zealand, 
includes personality disorders. Similarly, the view that personality 
disorders should not be included has been challenged recently by the 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria, which has argued that 
amendments to the 1986 Victorian Mental Health Act are needed to 
ensure that persons with 'anti social personality disorders' are caught by 
the definition.28 Section 8 of the Victorian Act authorises a hospital to 
detain a person only if they "appear to be mentally ill". Thus, the 
definition does not appear to enable those with personality disorders to 
be detained. According to the Commission, there is considerable debate 
as to whether personality disorders are mental disorders.29 The 
Commission was particularly concerned to ensure that persons with 
psychopathia were subject to the Act 
A recent decision of the Mental Health Review Board - The Appeal of 
KMC, indicates that in the absence of specific words to that effect, 
parliament will be presumed not to have intended personality disorders 
to be excluded. The Board stated: 
" People with personality disorders have been patients in the State's psychiatric 
hospitals for many years and we believe that if Parliament had intended that people 
with personality disorders were not to be regarded as having a mental illness for the 
purposes of this Act it would have said so explicitly" 
Although this decision apparantly related only to 'borderline personality 
disorders' (such as psychopathia), its implications for the New Zealand 
legislation are significant. It would effectively require any ambiguity in 
the definition of 'mental disorder' (which in the writer's view is created 
primarily by the use of the broad term 'disorder') to be construed in 
favour of including personality disorders. This view is reinforced by the 
Victorian Commission which stated that in its view the South Australian 
legislation, which defines mental illness as 'any illness or disorder of 
the mind, would include persons suffering from personality disorders. 
and there is an adverse effect on the individual or society .. ". Mellsop described the 
distinction to the writer as follows - personality disorders arc a quantitative deviation 
from normal, in that the person concerned is normally like that, whereas diseases 
have a clear onset and are a qualitative deviation from nonnal. 28 'The Concept of Mental Illness in the Mental Health Act 1986', Report No 3 of 
the Commission, April 1990. 
29 See for example 'Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders' (DSM 
1m, 1987, American Psychiatric Association; 'Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry' 
(1985), R Gregory, pp 104-130, for a summary of the debate. 
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If this view were correct it would signal a breakdown in the distinction 
between 'mad' and 'bad', and change the nature of mental institutions to 
become more paternalistic and less treatment oriented (at least in cases 
where the institution was not equipped to treat that kind of personality 
disorder). 
There are personality disorders other than psychopathia about which 
there is much less agreement that they should be included in the 
definition. These conditions were described by the Commission as 
'antisocial personality disorders', and are at present excluded under s 
8(2)(1) of the Victorian Act. For instance, the Royal Australian and 
New Zealand College of Psychiatrists is against such inclusion: 
" There are some persons with very severely disordered behaviour which is so bizarre 
and dangerous that the community tends to perceive them as 'mad'. Most 
psychiatrists however would not consider these persons to be suffering from a mental 
illness. Some psychiatric techniques including counselling and occasionally 
pharrnacotherapies may have a limited influence on such people .. [but] (t]here is 
certainly no place for the long term hospitalisation of such people which may 
sometimes amount to preventive detention under the guise of treaunent. Within a 
hospital these persons divert attention from patients in greater need of care and often 
disrupt the treaunent of other patients ... (s]taff are ill equipped to cope with violence 
that does not respond to standard psychiatric interventions. Scarce resources are 
consumed unprofitably while the morale of the institution declines as the treaunent 
team come to see themselves as warders rather than therapists"30 
Other commentators have expressed contrary opinions. For example, 
Kaplan and Sadock state: 
" Patients with personality disorders continually demonstrate to mental health 
professionals the limits of their expertise ... (p]sychiatry nevertheless cannot ignore 
personality disorders. Although psychiatrists until recently were reluctant to 
acknowledge it, those with perosnality disorders are functionally more disabled than 
the neurotics psychiatrists prefer to treaL Obviously, psychiatry must learn to 
understand the personality disorders better than it has done in the past"31 
30 Submission to the Social Development Committee. 
31 'Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry' (4th ed), 1989, p 1352. 
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In the writer's view the two quotations encapsulate radically different 
views about the role of psychiatry in the treatment of disordered 
persons. The argument in favour of including personality disorders 
advocates a change in the very nature of psychiatry, such that 
psychiatrists must learn to become counsellors in addition to ministers 
of medicine. The argument against inclusion embodies a more realistic 
conception of the role and scope of psychiatry, and recognises that there 
are limits to the kinds of disorders which will respond to conventional 
psychiatric expertise and the nature of mental institutions at present. 
Unless a complete overhaul of psychiatric practice in New Zealand is 
envisaged by the new Act, it would seem more realistic to specifically 
exclude personality disorders from the definition and enable them to be 
dealt with by those with the appropriate expertise - psychologists and 
counsellors. The desirability of persons with personality disorders 
receiving treatment appropriate to their condition is not an argument in 
favour of using a compulsory treatment process designed for the 
mentally ill to compel them to receive inappropriate treatment in 
inappropriate institutions. 
In the Commission's view the fact that many personality disorders 
cannot be treated by conventional psychiatric medicine is not an 
argument against committing persons with these disorders for care in a 
mental institution as opposed to treatment.32 However it is submitted 
that incarceration in a mental institution may discourage such persons 
from seeking counselling or behavioural therapy on a voluntary basis, 
and may traumatise them unnecessarily. The absence of adequate 
information and resources for treating personality disorders highlights 
the need for government health authorities to put resources into that 
area. rather than extending the ambit of mental health legislation to cover 
such persons. 
The exposure of the committal process to mental health professionals 
other than psychiatrists will exacerbate the confusion as to which 
disorders are covered by the Act. The Health Department in Victoria 
expressed the view that mental health legislation should not attempt to 
define the concept of mental illness; a task best left to psychiatrists. 
However, unless there is a set of guidelines universally agreed upon by 
persons exercising powers under the Act it is submitted that the 
definition needs to be as specific as possible. If the legislature is intent 
32 Supra n 27, p 8. 
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on including personality disorders in the definition a solution may be 
found in the explicit adoption of ICD-10; the International Classification 
of Diseases, which sets out the personality disorders which are regarded 
as mental disorders and the diagnostic criteria for these.33 
The Commission was of the view that including personality disorders in 
the definition of 'mental illness' would not unduly extend the power to 
commit and detain under the Act becuse there were sufficient safeguards 
relating to the need for the person to be a danger to themselves or 
others. This, with respect, misses the point. The power to commit and 
detain is unduly extended where it covers a class of people who will not 
respond to psychiatric treatment, cause disruption and trama in 
psychiatric institutions and are best dealt with elsewhere.In view of the 
controversy in Victoria over this issue it is submitted that the New 
Zealand definition should be clarified so as to expressly exclude 
personality disorders from the compulsory treatment process. 
Concerns about committal of persons who were merely 'eccentric' led to 
the establishment of an 'anti psychiatry' movement in the United States 
in the late 1970s, whose proponents held that there was no such thing as 
mental illness - that what purports to be mental illness is just socially 
deviant behaviour, and psychiatry is an instrument of control imposed 
by the ruling classes to control deviants whose 'radical voices' threaten 
the existing social order.34 While the voice of the anti psychiatry 
movement has now become somewhat subdued, it must be borne in 
mind that there is a fine line between legitimate coercion and mind 
control. 
In summary, the mental health system, which is geared towards medical 
treatment of mental conditions is not the appropriate way of dealing with 
people who are simply violent or difficult35 The focus of the definition 
on symptoms rather than .conditions allows for the possibility that these 
kinds of people may become subject to the Act,36 and opens up an 
33 See discussion in supra n 29. 
34 See for example The Myth of Mental Illness', T Szatz, New York 1961; 
'Schizophrenia and the Theories of Thomas Szatz' (1976) British Journal of 
Psychiatry 129. 
35 This view is endorsed by Prof. Graham Mellsop, who says that the mental health 
system is not equipped to deal with the kinds of therapy required for personality 
disorders. 
36 For a recent example of just such a case see Bravenboer v Finlayson & Anor. 
High Court Auckland Registry. M 1216185, 9 April 1987. Ms Bravenboer. a law 
student at Auckland University, has been causing difficulties in the Law Faculty and 
with her family over exam time. At the behest of an administrative assistant in the 
Faculty she went to see a doctor at Student Health who, after a consultation with her, 
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enormous grey area in respect of conditions such as Alzheimer's 
Disease,37 Anorexia Nervosa and various kinds of obsessive behaviour. 
3. Should Intellectual Handicap be Excluded from the 
Definition of Mental Disorder? 
A similar issue raised recently by Dawson is whether the exclusion of 
intellectual handicap as a sole justification for committal can be 
justified.38 Dawson noted that the definition purports to include 
'disorders of cognition' - the paradigm of which are intellectual 
handicaps, and yet excludes them in s 4 of the Act. It seems beyond 
contention that the exclusion of intellectual handicaps stems primarily 
from s 1(3) of the U.K Mental Health Act 1983, and from intense 
lobbying by groups such as the IHC Association. The issue is whether 
such exclusion is desirable, given the frequent inability of intellectually 
handicapped persons properly to look after themselves and conduct 
independent lives in the community, and the problems and injustices 
inherent in dealing with such persons through the prison system. 
Despite these undoubtedly valid reservations, it is submitted that the 
same considerations which militate against personality disorders being 
included also militate against the inclusion of intellectual handicap. 
Without a radical revision of the concept of mental illness and an 
overhaul of the institutional structures attending this concept, it is 
difficult to envisage how an intellectual handicap, which usually stems 
from birth and forms the basis of a person's normal personality, can be 
termed a 'mental disorder', and treated within the conventional mental 
health structures with conventional medical responses. Situations such 
as the locking of the "shame ward" at Kingseat Hospital in 1987 are 
testament to the inability of the mental health system to cope with 
filed an application in the District Court to have her committed. largely on the basis 
of hearsay from Faculty members. Neither of the doctors certifying the plaintiff, nor 
the psychiatrist or the judge at the hearing thought that the plaintiff was mentally 
disordered. In a recent (as yet unpublished) article by Sylvia Bell of the Mental Health 
Foundation on the new Act the author ack:nowleges that the definition of mental 
disorder may not be as narrow and "water tight" as the Foundation had thought 
37 For instance in a recent case in Queensland - Re Warby and the Mental Health 
Services Act 1974-1989, Supreme Court of Queensland, 9 May 1991 No 41.)1 it was 
held that a woman suffering from Alzheimers Disease was not 'mentally ill' within 
the meaning of the Act 
38 Comments of John Dawson at a seminar on the new Act held at Buddle Findlay 
on 29 September 1992. 
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intellectual handicap.39 Many such handicaps cannot be cured by 
psychiatry - what is required is intensive special learning programmes 
and the more modem concept of mainstreaming to encourage the 
handicapped to realise their fullest potential. In the writer's view such 
realisation could not occur within the mental health system as it exists at 
present without a massive infusion of funding and a decisive move 
away from the medical/ psychiatric model of mental health towards an 
all encompassing notion which includes intellectual handicaps and 
psychological problems. While the Act may be seen to be encouraging 
this type of shift, the practical responsibility for mental health care will 
remain in the hands of those most qualified to administer it - doctors and 
psychiatrists. 
4. Explicit Statement of Social Goals 
The Act outlines for the first time in the history of mental health law the 
rationale for committal - that a person is dangerous to themselves or 
others or is incapable of looking after themselves. These criteria will 
become particularly important in the committal process, because the 
logical consequence of the focus in the definition on symptoms and 
behaviour rather than diagnosable conditions is that committal decisions 
will focus on whether a person is dangerous to themselves or others, 
not simply whether they have a diagnosable mental illness. The 
dangerousness requirement is a major step forward from the 1969 Act, 
which simply stated that a person could be committed if: 
the District Court Judge is satisfied that the person is mentally disordered and requires 
detention in a hospital either for his own good or in the public interest«> 
There were no guidelines as to when it would be in the public interest to 
detain and treat a person, and therefore committing Judges were given 
almost unlimited discretion to decide upon the criteria for committal.41 
39 The reference is to the practices and procedures adopted at Villa 16 at Kingseat. a 
special ward for intellectually handicapped adults which achieved notooety in 1987 
when inhumane practices such as open toilets, sharing clothes and patients sitting on 
cold concrete floors came to light 
40 Mental Health Acts 24(1) 
41 As John Dawson points out in his paper The Civil Committal Process' in 
'Mental Health: A Case for Refonn', Legal Research Foundation, judges in 
committal hearings seldom pay more than scant regard to the statutay definition of 
l :, 
Under the new Act consideration will need to be given at two stages of 
the process - the assessment by the Responsible Clinician and the 
hearing before a Family Court Judge, to whether the person is 
dangerous, and evidence of this will need to be adduced. 
s. Dao2ecousness 
The image of the mentally ill as crazed and dangerous pervades the 
public consciousness both here and overseas; two well publicised 
incidents being the attempt on President Reagan's life by the paranoid 
John Hinckley, and the escape of John Lennon's killer from a hospital 
in Hawaii, from which he fled to New York and gunned down the 
famous Beatie. 
Dangerousness as the criterion for compulsory treatment originated in 
the strict climate of civil libertarianism prevailing in the United States in 
the 1970s. Many jurisdictions moved from aparens patriae approach to 
civil committal, in which all that was required was a need for treatment 
and a refusal to get treatment, to a much more resticted approach 
whereby a patient had to be dangerous to themselves or other before 
they could be committed.42 It is submitted that dangerousness as a 
criterion is a vast improvement on the 1969 Act in which there was no 
requirement that a patient be dangerous - it is vital that mentally ill 
people should be left at liberty unless they are harming themselves or 
others. However, the inclusion of a dangerousness criterion creates a 
number of problems; the most significant being the difficulty in 
predicting whether a person is likely to be dangerous. As Dershowitz 
points out: 
mental discrdec. This lack of rigour is perhaps a consequence of the inefficacy of the 
definition they are forced to work with. He points out that varying rationales are put 
forward for committal. Some judges favour a "treatability standard"; being prepared to 
bend the definition to encom~ such conditions as substance abuse and personality 
disorders if they consider that the person requires treatment. and others preferring to 
restrict committal to persons who are dangerous to themselves or others (see pp 47-
51 ). In about half of the committal hearings he observed during 1984 Dawson noted 
that patients were committed with no refernce being given to to whether they were 
dangerous. 
42 See 'Civil Commiunent An Overview', Mark Mills, March 1986 ANNALS, 28; 
'A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the 
Mentally Disordered', Morse, CalifLaw Rev 70:54-106 (1982). 
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" .. psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors .. it seems that psychiatrists are 
particularly prone to one type of error - over prediction. In other words, they tend to 
predict antisocial conduct in many instances where it would not in fact occur."43 
Smith and Meyer argue: 
"Civil commiunent ultimately must depend on the ability accurately to predict who 
is dangerous. Otherwise, it is little more than a lottery" 
Studies have shown that psychiatrists overpredict dangerous conduct by 
a ratio of at least five to one.44 There are a number of reasons for the 
inaccuracy of predictions, including the absence of literature on 
prediction methodology, and the failure of psychiatrists to follow up 
patients and get feedback on their decisions.45 Another significant 
reason for over prediction in the United States has been psychiatrists' 
fear of being held liable for harm to the public resulting from a wrong 
prediction that a patient was not dangerous. This 'duty of care' to the 
public was imposed in the landmark decision of Tarasoff v Ree;ents of 
the University of California46 , in which it was held that a 
psychotherapist owed a duty of care to an identifiable person to warn 
him of imminent harm as a result of a patient's actions. It is unclear 
whether the ratio of the case extends to a duty to the general public not 
to make a wrong prediction of dangerousness, but assuming that were 
so the implications for a responsible clinician making decisions under 
the new Act would be considerable. Every time he made a decision not 
to commit a person or to release a patient he would be exposing himself 
to potentially enormous liability. The temptation in light of these 
obstacles is to dispense with the dangerousness criterion and adopt 
some other, more 'rational' basis for committal. However, in the 
writer's view the preservation of civil liberties depends upon the 
adoption of the dangerousness criterion. The solution to the practical 
difficulties is to remove the responsibility of predicting dangerousness 
from individual psychiatrists and place it upon a multi disciplinary body 
such as the Mental Health Review Tribunal or by at least two 
43 'Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways', Dershowitz, 51 
Jud.ictature 370 (1968) 
44 'The Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals', Rubin, 27 Arch. 
Gen. Psychiatry 397 (1972). 
45 Ibid. 
46 529 P 2d 553 
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psychiatrists working in tandem. Although psychiatrists may be able to 
indicate whether a certain illness predisposes a patient to violence, this 
information must be considered in conjunction with numerous other 
factors which psychiatrists may not be equipped to decide on. The 
American Psychiatric Association has stated: 
" .. 'dangerousness' is neither a psychiatric nor a medical diagnosis, but involves 
issues of legal judgment and definition as well as issues of social policy. Psychiatric 
expertise in the prediction of 'dangerousness' is not established and clinicians should 
avoid 'conclusory' judgments in this regard."47 
It is submitted that the response outlined above would enhance the 
accuracy of the prediction and spread responsibility for errors in a more 
equitable fashion. An argument against the reasonableness of a 
tribunal's decision on dangerousness would meet with much less 
success than an argument that an individual psychiatrist has breached a 
duty of care owed to the public. 
From the public's point of view the dangerousness criterion fails to 
provide an adequate safeguard against the violence of mentally ill 
persons - the backlash against civil libertarian standards resulted not 
only from a perception that many mentally ill people were gravely 
incapacitated and would not seek help voluntarily, but from a realisation 
that the mentally ill people who did not meet the committal threshold 
were committing crimes and being dealt with by the criminal justice 
system. 48 In the writer's view although the adoption of the 
dangerousness criterion is a big step forward, it must not be so 
restrictive that a mentally ill person has to threaten murder or suicide 
before they can be committed. There is a danger that the "seriousness' 
requirement for dangerousness goes too far in this direction; New 
Zealand should take heed of the U.S experience and temper civil 
libertarianism with a measure of caution. It is submitted that if the illness 
criterion is satisfied, a belief that the person is likely to be dangerous 
shouldbe sufficient for committal. 
A second problem with the dangerousness criterion in the definition is 
that it lacks specificity as to the type of dangerousness that will warrant 
47 'Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual', Task Force Report (1974) 33. 48 See The Social and Medical Consequences of Recent Legal Reforms of Mental 
Health Law in the USA: the Criminalisation of Mental Disorder', Alan Stone in 
Psychiatry, Human Ri~ts and the Law, Roth and Blugrass (eds), 9. 
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committal. It is clear from the definition that only serious danger will be 
considered sufficient for committal, but judgments as to what constitutes 
"serious" are like y to vary considerably amongst individual 
decisionmakers. Given the difficulties associated with prediction, it is 
arguable that the definition should contain more detailed guidelines as to 
the factors which are relevant in predicting dangerousness (such as 
family history or past record of violence). The Taskforce recommended 
that the statute require evidence of past violence in order for a person to 
be committed.49 In the writer's view this standard is unnecessarily high, 
and would entail that a mentally ill person would have to demonstrate 
dangerous behaviour before they could be committed. There are good 
policy reasons against allowing such freedom, such as the need to 
protect society against dangerous persons. However it is clear that the 
definition must be interpreted with care, and there must be a genuine 
"likelihood" of dangerousness before a person can be committed. It is to 
be hoped that the courts will develop a coherent jurisprudence of 
committal that will precribe guidelines for the interpretation of concepts 
such as "serious" and "danger". 
6. "Seriously Diminishes the Capacity of (the Patient] to 
Take Care of Him or HecseJC' 
The wave of civil libertarianism and the strict new criteria for committal 
in the United States in the 1970s resulted in many patients in need of 
treatment being deprived of that treatment because they were not actively 
dangerous or suicidal. This in turn placed enormous pressures on 
families, who often had to look after severely incapacitated relatives, 
and the criminal justice system, which was forced to accommodate 
mental patients who were not considered dangerous enough to meet the 
committal threshold, but went on to commit crimes.50 
These problems led to the enactment in many states of provisions 
enabling persons who were gravely incapacitated to be committed in the 
interests of their own welfare and that of their families. 51 The definition 
49 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', p 67. 
so See 'Care and Treaunent of the Mentally ll1 in the United States: Historical 
Developments and Reforms', Morrissey and Goldman, March 1986 ANNALS 12; 24-
25. 
5l Washington State was at the forefront of these refonns - it had enacted a very 
restrictive committal statute in 1973 during the wave of civil libertarianism. After a 
number of murders an advocacy group - Washington Advocates for the Mentally Ill' 
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of 'mental disorder' in the New Zealand Act enables persons whose 
ability to take care of themselves is seriously diminished to be 
committed. This is a welcome move away from the strict libertarianism 
of the United States, but once again the lack of clarity in the Act as to 
what constitutes "ability to take care of' and "seriously diminished" is a 
concern. 
For instance, it is not clear whether "ability to take care of' related solely 
to physical aspects of a person's life such as eating and performing 
ablutions, or whether it extends to the person's financial situation and 
social abilities. Similarly, it is not clear whether the person's family and 
other support networks can and should be taken into account in 
determining whether they can take care of themselves. If such support 
could be take into account then the burden of caring for mentally ill 
persons would be placed on families and caregivers; depriving the 
mentally disordered person of the treatment he needed. The definition 
should not be interpreted so narrowly as to preclude large numbers of 
mentally ill people from being treated. The barriers to mentally ill people 
seeking treatment voluntarily - lack of money and motivation, are 
considerable, and thus the committal threshold should not be 
inordinately high. 
7. Treatabjlity? 
The definition also seems to incorporate an implied criterion that the 
illness must be able to be treated as the sine qua non of committal. 
Treatability of the illness as a criterion for committal has been adopted in 
a number of overseas jurisdictions; most notably the United States. In 
the 1975 Supreme Court decision of O'Connor v Donaldson52 Stewart J 
stated that: 
"A finding of mental illness alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up 
against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement" 
was set up to push for changes to the law. See 'Legal Intervention in Civil 
Commitment the Impact of Broadened Criteria', Durham and Pierce, (1986) 
ANNALS, 42. See also 'The Mentally Disabled and the Law', Brake! and Rock, 
Chicago 1971; 'Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill', 
Harv Law Rev 87:1190-1406 (1974). 
52 422 us 563 
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This view has been affirmed in New Zealand as recently as 1988 in the 
Mason Report on Psychiatric Services in which it was stated: 
"An offer of effective treatrnent must be the quid pro quo for society's right to confine 
mentally disordered persons .. "53 
The definition itself does not require that adequate treatment be 
provided, but s 66 provides that 
every patient has the right to receive treatment appropriate to his 
condition. Similarly s 29, deali1 g with Community Treatment Order 
provides (inter alia): 
A community treatment order shall require the patient to attend at the patient's place 
of residence .... for treaunent by employees of the specified institution, and to accept 
that treatment (emphasis added) 
It may be doubted whether s 29 authorises anything other than 
treatment Section 30, dealing with Inpatient Orders provides (inter alia): 
(1) Every inpatient order shall require the continued detention of the patient in the 
hospital specified in the order .... for the purposes of treatmenL and shall require the 
patient to accept that treatrnenL 
It is submitted that this implied requirement of treatability fails to 
accommodate the need for 'asylum'. Some mentally ill patients who are 
dangerous to themselves or others must simply be institutionalised to 
avoid harm. notwithstanding that their condition may not be susceptible 
to treatment. In such cases the rationale for committal is that the person 
is dangerous to themselves or others and must be removed from society. 
The criminal justice system is not the appropriate way of dealing with 
such people, and cannot provide them with the care they need. The U.K 
Mental Health Act 1983 also fails to accommodate the need for asylum; 
providing that an application for admission may only be made if the 
mental disorder is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate that 
the person receives treatment in a hospital. 54 The Victorian Mental 
53 At p 223 
54 Mental Health Act 1983, s 3(2)(a) 
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Health Act 1986 contains what are (in the writer's view), more 
appropriate criteria for committal. Section 8(1) provides: 
"A person may be admitted to and detained in a psychiatric inpatient service as an 
involuntary patient..only if -
(a) the person appears to be mentally ill; and 
(b) the person's mental illness requires immediate treaunent or care and that treatment 
or care can be obtained by admission to and detention in a psychiatric inpatient 
service; and 
(c) the person should be admitted and detained.. for that person's health or safety or 
for the protection of members of the public; and 
(d) the person is unable to consent to the necessary treatment or care for the mental 
illness; and 
(e) the person cannot receive adequate treatment or care for the mental illness in a 
manner less restrictive of [their] freedom ... " 
It is submitted that the inclusion of the two alternatives - treatment m: 
care is a recognition that in some cases a mentally ill person may have an 
untreatable condition, but may nonetheless need to be institutionalised. 
The definition in the New 2.ealand Act should be amended accordingly. 
8. The Victorian Definition · An Improvement on the New 
Zealand Act? 
The Victorian definition has other advantages over the New 2.ealand 
definition: 
First, its focus is upon mental illness rather than symptoms of mental 
disorder, and thus it requires certifying doctors to attempt a diagnosis of 
the condition. The Mental Health Review Board, which performs the 
vital function of reviewing initial decisions by doctors to commit 
patients (there is no court hearing), has developed its own guidelines for 
interpreting s 8. These include ensuring that the symptoms being 
exhibited by the patient conform to a recognised pattern associated with 
a mental illness. It is not enough simply to identify disordered 
symptoms55 In this regard it is submitted that the U.K Mental Health 
55 See 'The Process of Civil Commitment under the Mental Health Act 1986', Neil 
Rees, for a fuller discussion of the Victorian mental health system and the functions 
of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
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Act also places a more appropriate emphasis on diagnosing the condition 
rather than simply identifying symptoms. Section 1 (2) provides that 
'mental disorder' means, inter alia, mental illness. Furthermore, the four 
conditions justifying compulsory treannent - mental disorder, severe 
mental impainnent, mental impainnent and psychopathic disorder are 
described with a much greater degree of particularity than the definition 
in the New 2.ealand Act 
Secondly, the Victorian definition requires certifying doctors to consider 
whether adequate treatment can be provided 
Section 28 of the New 2.ealand Act, which ' 
considerations to be taken into account in rn. 
n an inpatient basis. 
out the general 
1g a compulsory 
treatment order, makes no reference to the need for adequate resources 
and treannent in relation to inpatient orders, although it does require that 
the court satisfy itself in making a community treatment order that 
adequate and appropriate treatment can be provided. 
Thirdly, the Victorian criteria expressly require the decisionmaker to 
consider whether the person has refused or is unable to consent to the 
necessary treatment The New 2.ealand Act contains no such 
requirement. It is important that consent to detention or treatment be 
sought wherever possible, and that an unwilling patient should be 
actively persuaded to accept treatment on a voluntary basis. The New 
2.ealand Act should require an applicant for a Compulsory Treatment 
Order to state that he or she has sought the consent of the patient to 
treatment on a voluntary basis, and there should be a continuing duty on 
the Responsible Clinician at all three stages of assessment to seek the 
consent of the patient to voluntary treatment 
II. COMMITTAL UNDER THE MENTAL 
HEALTH ACT 1969 
Under the Mental Health Act 1969 there were four ways in which a 
person could enter a mental institution: as a voluntary patient under s 16, 
by way of ordinary admission under s 19, pursuant to a Reception 
Order by the District Court under s 21, or by the exercise of police 
powers under s 35. 
(1) Voluntazy Patients (s 16) - Under s 16 the superintendant of the 
hospital to which a person had been admitted informally could apply for 
a reception order under s 21 either while the person was in hospital or 
up to 72 hours after their discharge, and could detain the person in 
hospital until the hearing or apprehend and detain them if they had left 
hospital. 56 
(2) Ordinary Admissions (s 19) - Where it was in the public interest or 
in the interests of the welfare of the person, any person could apply to 
the superintendant of a hospital to have the person admitted. the 
application had to be accompanied by two medical certificates. 
Emergency admissions could be carried on one certificate. 57 The 
superintendant was required to notify the nearest District Court of the 
patient's admission within 21 days, but until the hearing, was 
authorised to detain and treat the patient in the hospital. Applications of 
this kind were normally made by family and friends.58 
(3) Reception Orders - (s 21) - Anyone could apply directly to the 
District Court to have a person committed pursuant to an examination by 
the Judge and two registered medical practitioners and a committal 
hearing. The application had to be accompanied by at least one medical 
certificate. 59 
56 See The Process of Committal' at pp 95-99 for a more complete discussion of 
this procedure. The main reason for committal of voluntary patients under this 
section was to give hospitals more control over patients who were refusing treatment 
or behaving aggressively, and to "legalise" the administration of this treatment 
For this reason the procedure was used frequently at Canington Hospital after the 
Oakley Inquiry in 1983 into the death of a patient after ECT treatment 
57 S 19(4) Mental Health Act 1969. The criteria for emergency reception under this 
section were that the Superintendant of the hospital had to be satisfied that to refuse 
admission would cause hardship to the patient or any other person ind that it was 
impracticable to obtain a second certificate. In any case a second certificate had to be 
obtained within 72 hours after admission. There is evidence that this procedure was 
widely abused; parficularly at Carrington Hospital. See 'The Process of Committal' 
pp 83-85. Dawson states that the s 19(4) procedure was used in nearly half of alls 19 
admissions to Carrington Hospital in 1984, and in 80% of cases where the patient 
was examined by a police surgeon. The superintendant was required to notify the 
nearest District Court of the patient's admission within 21 days, but until the 
hearing, was authorised to give the patient care, treatment, training or occupation in 
the hospital. Applications of this kind were normally made by family members or 
friends. 
58 'The Process of Committal', p 22 
59 S 21(4) of the Mental Health Act Applications of this kind were usually made by 
Superintendants, the police and neighbours, and were used more often for male 
patients than for females. Under s 22 the District Court judge and two medical 
practitioners had to examine the patient in person. 
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Judges had the power to summon any witnesses to give evidence as to 
the mental condition of the person subject to the application, but this 
was seldom done in practice. 60 
(4) Application by the Police or the Medical Officer of Health (s 35) -
this was not in reality a separate committal procedure, but an 
authorisation for the police or the MOH to apprehend a person found 
wandering at large, whom he or she reasonably suspected to be mentally 
disordered, and to apply for their committal under s 21, or if detention 
or treaonent was urgently needed, to take that person to 2 medical 
practitioners to be certified and admitted to a hospital under s 19.61 
Any person committed to a hospital could be compulsorily treated under 
s 22. This included the administration of psychotropic drugs, ECT 
(Electro Convulsive Therapy) and placing patients in solitary 
confinement for long periods of time. 62 The reception order continued 
in force indefinitely until the person was discharged by the 
superintendant of the hospital. 63 Discharge could only occur in one of 
three ways: 
60 Mental Health Act 1969 s 22(3). See The Process of Committal' p139. Dawson 
points out that judges in committal hearings are inordinately deferential to medical 
opinion, and seldom call for further evidence or cross examination on any of the 
medical opinions given. 
6l SeeTowards Mental Health Law Reform' at pp 49-50. The Taskforce was very 
critical of the broad police powers under the Mental Health Act. on the basis that 
police officers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about mental disader to be 
arresting people on a "reasonable suspicion" of mental disordtt. They stated that the 
police should only have the power to apprehend people suspected of having 
committed, or being about to, commit a crime. Section 35 has been re enacted in s 
109 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) 
Act. despite the reservations of the Taskforce. 
62 For concerns about the use of compulsory treatment under the 1969 Act see' 
Mental Health Law Reform', Dawson at pp 323 & 324; The Process of Committal' 
Dawson, p 2 and the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures at Oakley 
Hospital and Related Matters', pp 96-98; Towards Mental Health Law Reform', eh 
15. 
In practice some hospitals; notably Kingseat. Carrington, Porirua and Wellington, 
did seek con~t 
before administering some types of treatment; particularly ECT. 
63 Mental Health Act 1969, s 28 
(1) If the superintendant was satisfied that the person was fit to be 
discharged64 
(2) By the patient applying to a District Court Judge for a review of their 
need for detention65 
(3) By the patient applying to the High Court for a judicial inquiry into 
their need for detention 66 
There was no automatic review of the patient's condition,67 and no legal 
provision for the patient to be detained anywhere other than a hospital 68 
although in recent years Judges have been moulding the provisions of 
the Act to order community treatment in cases where this has been 
deemed more appropriate. 69 Reformers of the legislation identified a 
myriad of problems with the 1969 Act; many of which ire too 
compendious to be detailed here. In short, the following emerged as the 
overriding concerns about the current regime; in pressing need of 
reform: 
(1) The power of hospital staff to administer treatment to 
committed patients without their consent. This was objected to 
from both a jurisprudential and a practical viewpoint. In ethical terms it 
was felt that mental patients should not be distinguished from anyone 
else in terms of their right to refuse consent to treatment - there should 
not be a presumption that mentally ill people were incompetent to make 
64 Ibid, s 73 
65 Ibid, s 73(3) 
66 As Dawson points out in 'The Process of Committal' at p 25, judicial review of 
the patient's condition was essentially a statutory, codification of the common law 
writ of habeus corpus. However, in practice the review procedure was rarely invoked 
by patients due to cost and lack of infonnation. It was usually only pursued it at the 
instance of the District Inspector on behalf of the patient Two examples of the 
approach to be taken ins 74 applications are lkJl...High Court Auclcland Registry, 
M 21181')(), 23 October 1990 and Re Cameron, High Court Auckland Registry, M 
30/89, 19 April 1989. 
67 Section 55 made provision for the Superintendant to keep every committed 
patient's condition under 
review, and consider as often as possible whether the patient ought to be discharged. 
This was to be done at least yearly in the first two years but was seldom complied 
with. 
68 For a discussion of this problem see 'Community Treatment Orders', Dawson, p 
415 and 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn', p 45 
69 Supra (Dawson) pp 416417. The practice of discharging committed patients into 
the community "on leave", while subject to compulsory treatment was probably ultra vires the Act Section 25 only authorised hospital staff to treat committed patients in 
hospital, not in the community. 
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choices about treatment 70 or that their right to consent was abrogated 
upon being committed. In practical terms it was felt that certain types of 
treatment which had serious or irreversible side effects were being 
adminstered to patients without their consent and without them being 
informed about the risks.71 
(2) That it was too easy to get a person committed under the 
Act - there were insufficient safeguards in the system. 
There were a number of concerns here: the inadequacy of medical 
certificates required for committal, 72 the inadequate definition of mental 
disorder, 73 the overuse of the emergency procedure under s 19, the 
wide police powers under s 35, and the cursory and superficial nature of 
the hearing itself - patients were seldom present at hearings to present 
their case, and therefore committal was usually ordered on the basis of 
the two certificates from medical practitioners required to have be 
produced to the Judge, rather than pursuant to the exercise of any 
independent judgment by the Judge. Hearings often took place on 
hospital premises with only the Judge and the psychiatrist present.74 
There was one instance in which the person being committed could not 
speak English and no interpreter was provided.75 
(3) No specific provision in the Act for community 
treatment. 
It was felt that the committal regime in the Act had failed to keep pace 
with clinical developments in the psychiatric field, in particular the 
70 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', p 231. See also s 5 of the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 which provides a presumption of 
competence, and s 22 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 which provides for a right to 
refuse medical treatment 
71 Supra n 33 
72 For a very comprehensive outline of the certification ~ and its inadequacies 
see 'The Process of Committal', eh 9. Some of the problems were: the certifying 
doctor never having met the patient previously in about 38% of cases observed by 
Dawson in 1984, inadequate length of examination (51 % were less than 30 minutes), 
inadequate examination facilities, lack of psychiatric experience of certifying doctors, 
po<r quality and legibility of information in certificates, frequent use of second or 
third hand hearsay, unclear diagnoses, and lack of involvement of family doctors. 
73 Supra n 22 
74 See The Process of Committal', eh 11 for a discussion of the inadequacies of 
committal hearings and their failure to comply with Natural Justice. 
75 See The Process of Committal' (abridged version) in 'Mental Health: A Case for 
Refonn' at p 40 
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presumption in favour of the "least restrictive treatment alternative" ,76 
and the move towards community care for the mentally ill both in New 
Zealand and overseas. 77 
(4) Inadequate appeal and review procedures for committed 
patients. The main concern here was the lack of effective periodic 
review of a committed patient's condition (particularly in light of the 
indefinite life of reception orders) 78 by a multidisciplinary tribunal,79 
and the practical difficulties associated with bringing civil and criminal 
actions against officials for breach of the Act, such as lack of legal 
representation, 80 a 6 month limitation period during which leave to 
bring an action could be sought,81 and protection from civil and criminal 
responsibility for persons acting in good faith under the Act. 82 It was 
felt that there was a need for a multi disciplinary review body along the 
lines of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in the U.I<. to reflect the 
eclectic nature of the committal decision. 83 
76 The Least Restrictive Alternative principle had its genesis in the United States, 
where it has been adopted by numerous state jurisdictions in their mental health 
legislation (Cahfomia and new York for example). It may also have the status of an 
independent doctrine under the U.S Constitution, which requires that states adopt 
means to accomplish any legitimate purpose which are least restrictive of 
fundamental rights. The principle has also been adopted in some Canadian 
jurisdictions (notably Ontario and Saskatchewan) and more recently, by New South 
Wales and Victoria. 
77 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', pp 109-115, 'Community Treatment 
Orders', J Dawson, and The Future of Community Care", an article by Helen Oark 
in the Dominion, 2 August 1989. 
78 Mental Health Act, s 28. See also The Process of Committal', pp 15 and 168. 
79 Many overseas jurisdictions (most notably the U .K and some Australian 
jurisdictions) have established such tribunals to adjudicate on the status of mental 
patients. In this respect, New Zealand was lagging behind the rest of the 
Commonwealth. 
80 Under the Mental Health Act there was no right to legal representation and thus it 
was seldom obtained by patients. See 'The Process of Committal', pp 116-117. Of 
the cases recorded by Dawson in 1984, the rate of legal representation at committal 
hearings was 1.6% (3.6%) at Carrington. 
8l Mental Health Acts 124(4). See 'Mental Health Law Reform' at p 324. The 
Health Department (in its submission to select committee) recommended repeal of 
this provision. 
82 Ibid, s 124 
83 See Towards Mental Health Law Refoon', eh 19. The Taskforce identified the 
following inadequacies in the current review structure: in s 22 reviews by District 
Court judges, the application for committal is simply 'rubberstamped" by the judge 
without legal representation for the patienL In s 55 reviews of committed patients by 
the medical superintendant the superintendant or officer delegated the review function 
has no guidelines as to the procedures to be followed, and practices may differ 
(5) Lack of ongoing care and supervision of committed 
patients. There was seen to be a lack of superintendence over 
committed patients by suitably qualified, fulltime personnel. While 
District Inspectors and Visitors were able to perform this function to a 
limited extent, there was seen to be a need for more comprehensive 
supervision and management of a patient's detention and treatment 84 
(6) Patient Rights. There was a serious concern that the rights of 
committed patients were, being eroded by the compulsory treatment 
regime under the Act In addition to the denial of the right to refuse 
consent to treatment,85 patients were having personal property, drivers 
licence and mail confiscated, and being denied access to visitors. 86 
There was seen to be a need for a comprehensive charter of patient 
rights; enforceable at the suit of any committed patient g'7 
The merits of the new regime must be assessed in light of these 
considerations. 
III.COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDERS - THE 
ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
Tne new system of Compulsory Assessment and Treatment Orders is a 
much more protracted process than under the Mental Health Act It has 
been divided into three distinct stages of assessment taking a minimum 
considerably depending on how well staffed and funded the institution is. 
Furthermore, the person carrying out the review is the very person who made the 
decision to admit the patient for compulsory treaUnenL Inquiries may be carried out 
by District Inspectors under s 58 but the District Inspector has no power do anything 
other than make recommendations in a report to the Director. 
84 See comments of Katherine O'Regan, Third Reading of the Bill, NZ 
Parliamentary Debates, 2 June 1992 at p 8456 and Helen Clarlc at p 8458. 
85 For a very comprehensive discussion of the jurisprudential objections to 
compulsory treaUnent see 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', eh 15. 
86 Up until the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act was passed in 1988 
(repealing Part 7 of the Mental Health Act) the property of committed patients 
automatically vested in the Public or the Maori Trustee and patients had no control 
over their money or posse~ions whatsoever. See Towards Mental Health Law 
Reform', eh 16 for concerns about the lack of inpatient rights. The Taskforce was 
particularly concerned about acce~ to the courts and to information about the 
patients' conditions, the use of seclusion and restraints such as straightjackets, and 
the use of patient labour in institutions. 
87 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', p 251 
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of 21 days before a Compulsory Treatment Order can be made, and is 
designed to protect the rights of persons alleged to be mentally 
disordered and to ensure that they are not made subject to the Act 
without a sufficiently rigorous assessment.88 The process approach will 
also help to ensure that persons who should be subject to a CTO do not 
"slip through the cracks", because the assessment was not long or 
thorough enough to detect signs of mental disorder 89. The process is as 
follows: 
(1) Application for Assessment (s 8) - Any person over the age of 18 
may apply to the Director of Area Mental Health Services for assessment 
of another person whom the applicant believes to be mentally 
disordered. The application must be in writing and accompanied by a 
medical certificate stating that the examining practitioner believes the 
person to be mentally disordered. 
The Director must then arrange for an examination to be conducted90 
and appoint an assessing practitioner to conduct the assessment 91 
(2) Preliminary Assessment (s 9) - The Director must notify the patient 
of the time and place of the examination and conduct the examination. 
The assessing practitioner must then decide whether there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the patient is mentally disorded and should 
undergo further assessment. He must record his findings in a certificate 
of preliminary assessment to be sent to the patient and a number of other 
people,92 and send full particulars of the decision to the Director of Area 
Mental Health Services. 
88 See comments of Helen Clark dwing the Second Reading of the Bill, 12 March 
1992, NZ Parliamentary Debates at p 6865: "It seems to me ... that [the Bill) may 
provide a better and more thorough process than we have at ixesent". See also 
'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn' at pp 56-57, in which the Taskforce advocates 
the "process" approach to committal. 
89 See comments of Helen Clark during the Third Re.ading of the Bill at p 8457: 
"In some ways the old committal process was far too quick but it also had the 
disadvantage that some people could slip through the cracks completely and not be 
committed when they should have been." 
90 Mental Health (Compulsory ~ment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 9 
9 l Ibid, s 9(3) 
92 Certificates at all three stages of the process must be sent to the applicant, the 
patient, any welfare guardian of the patient, the patient's JnllCipa} caregiver and the 
medical practitioner who usually attends the patient At the stages of further 
assessment the certificates must be sent to the District Inspector or Official Visitor 
(see SS 10, 12 & 14) 
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(3) Further Assessment for 5 Days - If the medical practitioner's finding 
is that there are reasonable grounds for believing the patient to be 
mentally disordered, the responsible clinician appointed under s 7 must 
conduct a further assessment for 5 days and then record his findings in a 
certificate of further assessment.93 At this stage the District Inspector in 
receipt of the certificate is under a duty to consider whether there should 
be a review of the patient's condition by a District Court Judge under s 
16 94 
( 4) Final Assessment for 14 Days - If the RC again finds evidence of 
mental disorder he or she must conduct a final 14 day assessment and 
record these findings in a certificate. If after the 14 days he or she still 
considers that there is convincing evidence of mental disorder he or she 
may apply to the Family Court for the making of a compulsory 
treatment order in respect of the patient.95 Once again the District 
Inspector must consider at this stage whether to apply for review of the 
patient's condition.96 The Family Court may make one of two kinds of 
Compulsory Treatment Order in respect of the patient in question; an 
inpatient order 97 or a community treatment order.98 There are 
a number of potential problems with the new assessment process: 
1. The Role or tbe Responsible Clinician 
First, the Director of Mental Health has been charged with appointing a 
'Responsible Clinician' ("RC") under s 7, to oversee every patient being 
assessed or treated under the Act. This person need not be a qualified 
psychiatrist; they can be some other kind of registered health 
professional who, in the opinion of the Director, is suitably qualified in 
the assessment, care and treatment of persons with mental disorder. In 
the writer's view the need for a clear and unambiguous criteria for 
compulsory treattnent necessitates either a much clearer statutory 
definition than the Act contains at present, or a high degree of control by 
the psychiatric profession over the assessment of mentally disordered 
93 The Act, s 12 
94 Ibid, SS 9 & 10 
95 Ibid, s 14(4) 
96 Ibid, s 14(6) 
97 Ibid, SS 28 and 30 
98 Ibid, SS 28 and 29 
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persons under the Act; whereby certain recognised standards are applied 
to determine whether a person is mentally disordered, rather than having 
different occupational groups with different standards assessing persons 
for mental disorder. Opening the process up to professions such as 
social workers and counsellors could result in a loss of specialist 
knowledge and expertise, and a deterioration in the quality of 
assessment and treannent of the mentally ill.99 
Secondly, although it is clear that a policy decision has been made to 
widen the range of professions able to participate in the treannent of the 
mentally disordered under the Act,100 doubts must arise as to whether 
RCs should conduct assessments singlehandedly, and whether this 
provides a sufficient safeguard against wrong diagnoses or mistaken 
interpretation of symptoms. RCs will be required to apply the 
behavioural criteria of dangerousness or inability to look after oneself in 
determining whether a person is mentally disordered, and to make 
predictions about the patient's behaviour in the community accordingly. 
This would seem to require more than simply the opinion of one person, 
and thus it is submitted that additional psychiatrists and the patient's 
family or caregiver should be involved in the assessment process to a 
greater degree. 
The ability of psychiatrists to make decisions on mental disorder has led 
to litigation in the United States, where the courts have held 
psychiatrists civilly liable when patients have been released and have 
subsequently harmed others.101 The RC should be obliged to consult 
families and caregivers prior to and during assessment 
99 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform at pp 46-48. The Taskforce 
recommended that a special register of qualified mental health professionals be set up 
to carry out the assessment process. These professionals would not necessarily need 
to hold a psychiatric qualification, but would require a relevant mental health 
qualification. 
In a recent unpublished article by Sylvia Bell, Legal Officer for the Mental Health 
Foundation (unable to be cited here) the comment is made that similar changes to 
both the definition of mental disorder and the persons responsible for treatment in 
other jurisdictions have met with considerable opposition from psychiatrists who see 
the changes as eroding their traditional therapeutic role. 
lOO See comments of Helen Clark during the Third Reading of the Bill, 2 June 1992, 
NZ Parliamentary Debates at p 8458: "the issue was to break the absolute dominance 
of psychiatry as the lead profession in the care and supervision of this particular 
category of mental health patients" 
lOl See for example~ v Psychiatric Institute of Washininoo DC 538 F 2d 121 
(1976) and Durt1initfr v .Artiks 673 P 2d 86 (Kan 1983) 
2. The Role or the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
The Act sets up a new multidisciplinary body to detennine appeals 
relating to the condition of patients subject to Compulsory Treatment 
Orders - the Mental Health Review Tribunal.102 
However, there is no right of appeal to this body during the assessment 
process; only a right of review by a District Court Judge. In view of the 
perceived inadequacies of the court structure in making responsible 
committal decisions, the Act should provide for a right to review by the 
Tribunal in the later stages of assessment There is no sensible reason to 
permit the Tribunal to assess a patient's condition after they have been 
committed, 103 but not at the assessment stage. The Tribunal is likely to 
develop and exhibit more expertise in dealing with the idiosyncratic 
problems associated with mental health care than a District or Family 
Court Judge who has to deal with a myriad of different issues daily. 
3. The District Inspector 
The inclusion of the District Inspector at the assessment stage is 
important. He will be required to discuss with the patient being assessed 
whether to apply for review, and thus he or she will be acting explicitly 
as an advocate for the patient prior to the patient being committed. 
Under the 1969 Act the involvement of District Inspectors was limited to 
patients who had already been hospitalised or committed.104 However 
while it is important that there be an advocacy service for patients at both 
the pre and post committal stages it is questionable whether District 
Inspectors are adequately resourced to effectively fulfill this function. 
They may not have the training or expertise in mental health law and 
practice, and may not be able to devote the time and energy required to 
the needs of individual patients.105 With the restructuring of the health 
system into health districts, District Inspectors may have to cover a wide 
area and a number of different hospitals. In these circumstances they 
102 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, ss 101-108. See also ss 79-83 for an outline of the review functions of the tribunal. 
103 Ibid, s 79 
104 See Mental Health Act ss 56-65 
105 The Oakley Committee of Inquiry made the following comment about District Inspectors, at para 17 .11 of their report: "there are limits to the impositions of time which can be placed on busy professional people; especially in a task such as this which is not adequately remunerated and which involves considerable burdens" 
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cannot be expected to provide a comprehensive advocacy service for 
each patient They now have a plethora of different functions under the 
Act. including acting in review proceedings106 and Mental Health 
Review Tribunal Proceedings107 and investigating breaches of patient 
rights under the Act, l08 in addition to their traditional function of 
visiting hospitals within their designated areas and investigating 
breaches of the Act.109 
The advocacy "hat" seems to have placed rather uncomfortably on 
District Inspectors in substitution a fulltime advocacy service and legal 
representation as of right as recommended by the Taskforce. 110 The 
appeal and review procedures may be rendered ineffective in 
safeguarding the rights of patients if adequate personal representation is 
not guaranteed under the Act Ideally legal counsel should be appointed 
by the Director at the stage when the decision to assess the patient is 
made. Neither the District Inspector nor the patient's family can really 
perform this function adequately. 
4. Compulsory Treatment Purine Assessment 
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the assessment regime from a civil 
rights perspective is that it enables patients to be compulsorily treated 
during the period of assessment as if they were a committed patient, 111 
whereas patients subjects to CTOs have the right to refuse treatment. 112 
This is particularly anomalous in that it effectively presumes that the a 
patient is mentally disordered and requires treatment. without them ever 
having appeared before a Judge. It also places the patient who is 
mentally disordered and subject to a CTO in a better position than a 
patient being assessed for mental disorder. There are some advantages 
in being able to treat patients during the assessment period; for instance, 
response to treatment may provide a better indication to the psychiatrist 
of what the condition is. However, it is submitted that the clinical 
advantages are outweighed by the jurisprudential objections to such a 
l06 The Act. s 14(6) 
107 Ibid, s 79(12) 
108 Ibid, s 75 
109 Ibid, SS 95 and 96 
110 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn' , chs 17 & 20. 
111 The Act. s 58 
l l2 Ibid, s 59. This is subject to a number of qualifications which are discussed 
below. 
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practice - it effectively constitutes a return to s 19 admissions under the 
old Act by which patients could be compulsorily treated before 
committal. 
The provision for compulsory treatment during the assessment process 
may be justified by the fact that the process leading up to committal is 
now much more protracted, and there is no provision for fast tracking 
the procedure in emergency situations where the patient may present an 
obvious threat to him or herself or others, and requires immediate 
treatment However it is submitted that the solution to this is to provide 
for the procedure to be truncated in emergency situations, so that the 
patient's legal status can be determined as quickly as possible and 
compulsory treatment can then (if necessary) be administered, rather 
than enabling compulsory treatment to be given to a person who 
technically has the same rights as a person of sound mind. While it is 
acknowledged that certain powers (such as the power to detain)113 may 
need to be conferred on assessing practitioners to enable them to 
conduct a proper assessment under the Act, this justification cannot be 
extended to compulsory treatment of people who are undergoing 
assessment. 
5. Overview of the New Assessment System 
The strength of the 3 stage system is that it enables the patient's 
condition to be assessed with a much greater degree of accuracy; 
effectively dividing the crucial decision about mental disorder into three 
parts and giving the RC an opportunity to at three different stages to 
rethink his decision, and to re apply the statutory criteria. This can only 
result in greater fairness for the patient, and increased public confidence 
in a responsible committal regime. However, the process caters very 
much for marginal cases in which it is difficult to detemine whether 
mental disorder is present One may inquire whether the period of 
assessment needs to be so prolonged; 114 at least in relatively clearcut 
113 Ibid, s 110. The medical practitioner carrying out an urgent asse~ent may call 
to his or her assistance a member of the police, who may detain the person on their 
premises to enable an assessment to be carried out, or escort them to some other 
place nominated by the practitioner for an assessment 
114 Where the responsible clinician has applied for a cro undez s 14, the period of 
further asssessment and treatment can be extended for up to 14 days pending 
detennination of the application (s 15(2)), thus introducing more delay into the 
process. 
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cases of mental disorder, and whether the "staggered" assessment 
process may be an overreaction to the problem of wrongful 
committal. 115 
Admittedly the fact of a person's mental disorder is not a matter upon 
which any person can be expected to adjudicate instantly, as effectively 
occurred under the previous legislation, but with the additional 
safeguards that have been provided for in the Act, such as a stricter 
definition of mental disorder, better rights of appeal and review for the 
patient, and judicial hearings in accordance with the principles of 
Natural Justice, patients who feel they have been the victims of injustice 
have sufficient avenues of redress.116 
The practical effect of the 3 stage approach may be that patients who are 
clearly mentally disordered and in need of treatment cannot be quickly 
dealt with under the Act - they could apply for judicial review 117 to 
forestall the making of a compulsory treatment order. Furthermore, it 
subjects patients to a long period of uncertainty, during which they have 
little or no control over his freedom or treatment - many may perceive 
this as a greater imposition than a relatively speedy process with 
adequate safeguards to ensure that decisions on mental disorder are not 
arbitrarily made. The U.K Mental Health Act provides that a person may 
be admitted to hospital either for assessment QI for treatment. ll8 The 
criteria for mental disorder are stricter in the case of admissions for 
treatment and thus provide a sufficient safeguard against wrongful 
committal. 
A better solution may be to have an initial 5 day assessment carried out 
by two psychiatrists or suitably qualified persons, and enable them to 
apply for a CTO at this stage if they consider that the person is mentally 
115 In this regard, see the comments of the Taskforce, 'Towards Mental Health Law 
Refonn' at p 55: 
"We wish to state at the outset that we do not believe that the powers under the 
Mental Health Act to commit persons to psychiatric hospitals in New Zealand are 
being significantly abused. .. [f]amilies and members of the community more 
commonly complain that psychiatric hospitals deny admission too frequently and 
discharge patients too soon" 
116 Note that the procedure is considerably more complex than that recommended by 
the Taskforce in its report. See'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', p 57. The 
recommendation was that there should be an initial committal on medical certificates, 
reviewable by the Mental Health Review Tribunal within 21 days to prevent lapse. 
This is not equivalent to a 21 day period of assessmenL 
117 Under s 16 of the Act 
l l8 Applications for admission for assessment are made under s 2, and for treatment 
under s 3. 
j () 
disordered. Another option would be to adopt the process in the 
Victorian Mental Health Act 1986 in which there is no period of 
assessment, but the patient is certified by a legally qualified medical 
practitioner, examined by a psychiatrist on admission to hospital and 
then examined automatically by the Mental Health Review Board of they 
do not apply for review of their condition. 119 Only if they are unsure as 
to whether the person is mentally disordered should further periods of 
assessment be necessary. 
IV. COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDERS - THE 
HEARING 
The new hearing procedures should be assessed in light of the degree to 
which they comply with the requirements of Natural Justice, and 
whether the Courts are the appropriate fora for making decisions on 
mental disorder. 
1. Certification 
The major change from the previous Act is that instead of two 
certificates by different medical practitioners being required, the 
committal hearing can proceed on the basis of only one 'certificate of 
final assessment' prepared by the RC assessing the patient. 
The advantage of this is that certification can no longer be performed by 
a general medical practitoner - the RC is required to have relevant 
qualifications in mental health care, and thus the danger of lack of 
expertise is reduced. Furthermore, the problems associated with cursory 
and superficial examinations will disappear - the assessment process 
must take 21 days at least 
However, the concern about inadequate information on certificates 
remains. The only information required to be recorded in the certificate 
is the RC's finding of mental disorder and the legal consequences of that 
finding. The RC must send full particulars of his decision to the Director 
of Area Mental Health Services, but does not have to send full 
particulars to the patient or the court. Section 14 should require the RC 
to record full particulars of the decision (including a diagnosis) in the 
119 See 'The Process of Civil Commitment under the Mental Health Act 1986', 
Neil Rees, for an outline of the Victorian legislation. 
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certificate, and to put this before the court. An actual form prescribed by 
the Act may assist the practitioner in performing his functions 
adequately. 
The other problem with having only one certificate is that there is no 
requirement for a second opinion as to whether the person is mentally 
disordered as there was under the 1969 Act.120 
The medical certificate accompanying the application (required by s 8) 
must state full particulars of the reasons the person is believed to be 
mentally disordered, but there is no requirement that the responsible 
clinician's final decision be checked by an independent practitioner. 
Unless the Family Court exercises its powers to order independent 
reports and call witnesses to attest to the mental condition of the patient, 
there will only be one medical viewpoint being presented at the hearing. 
Given the disagreement within the psychiatric profession relating to the 
diagnosis of certain conditions, it is submitted that where the RC' s final 
recommendation is that the person is mentally disordered, he or she 
should be obliged to obtain a second opinion from a suitably qualified 
practitioner. 
2. Family Court ,Jurisdiction 
A major change under the new Act is that applications for CTOs are to 
be heard wherever practicable by a Family Court Judge.121 This is a 
little disappointing in that the establishment of a new, multi discliplinary 
review tribunal could have enabled committal jurisdiction to be removed 
from the courts and conferred on the Mental Health Review Tribunal, 
with a right of appeal to the District Court. However, there are clearly a 
number of advantages in having committal decisions made by the 
Family Court rather than the District Court: 
First, the Family Court deals to a greater degree than the District Court 
with delicate family situations and severely emotionally distressed 
people, and thus is likely to demonstrate more sensitivity and 
understanding towards mentally disordered persons than the District 
Court. 
120 Mental Health Act ss 19 and 21 
121 The Act, s 17 
These qualities will be particularly important in the context of the 
examination of and interview with the patient required to be carried out 
by the Judge under s 18 prior to the hearing. 
Secondly, the rules of procedure and evidence in the Family Court are 
more relaxed; counsel are usually seated, and there is more scope for the 
Judge to inquire into matters of his own motion, rather than relying on 
counsel to adduce evidence.Tiris is particularly important in the mental 
health context where legal counsel will not always be present, and 
relevant information about the patient's condition may not automatically 
be put before the court by the applicant or the responsible clinician. The 
committal procedure is widely perceived as adversarial, with the Judge 
and the doctor pitted against the patient.122 The ability of the Judge to 
ask questions, commission independent reports on the patient's 
condition123, and call for further evidence124 and witnesses125 will 
minimise the adversarial nature of the proceedings. 
At the examination stage there is the additional safeguard that the Judge 
can discharge the patient if he or she considers that they are fit to be 
released from compulsory status.126 Tiris will ensure that the time and 
resources of the court and the responsible clinician are not wasted with a 
pointless hearing that will not result in a CTO being made, and that the 
patient is not subjected needlessly to the trauma of a hearing. However, 
it is submitted that the Judge at the examination should be under a duty 
to consult with the patient's usual doctor and his principal caregiver. 
Although he or she must consult with the Responsible Clinician and at 
least one other health professional involved in the case127 it is crucial 
that persons familiar with the history and behaviour of the patient be 
consulted at this stage. 
3. Natural ,Justice 
The Mental Health Taskforce considered that it was vital that hearings 
should comply with the rules of Natural Justice. The most important 
requirement in this regard is that the patient should be present and have 
122 'The Process of Committal', Dawson. 
123 Ibid, s 21 
124 Ibid, s 22 
125 Ibid, s 23 
l26 Ibid, s 17(5) 
127 Ibid, s 18(4) 
the right to be heard. 128 Patients are given this basic right under s 19, 
subject to a number of qualifications; namely that it would be in the 
patient's best interests not to be present,129 that he wholly lacks the 
capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings 130, that being 
present would cause him severe physical, mental or emotional hann,131 
or that he would cause such a disruption that it would be impractical to 
continue with the proceed.ings.132 The issue is whether these 
qualifications amount to a wholesale abrogation of the patient's right to a 
hearing held in accordance with Natural Justice. 
It is submitted that provided the patient's views are obtained at some 
stage prior to committal, and that he has the opportunity to rebut any 
evidence adverse to his cause, the requirements of Natural Justice are 
fulfilled. 133 This does not necessarily entail that the patient is present at 
the hearing. Indeed, some qualifications to this right are both necessary 
and desirable, and do not amount to a breach of Natural Justice. They 
are necessary and desirable because a hearing cannot be successfully 
conducted, and justice delivered to the patient, in a situation where his 
presence is deletarious to proper resolution of the issues (he or she is 
disrupting the court or exhibiting great distress). 
Similarly, the patient's own interests are not served by allowing him or 
her to be present at a hearing that may traumatise him or her, or worsen 
his condition, such that he is displaying more abnormal symptoms than 
usual, and thus is more likely to be committed. They do not constitute a 
breach of Natural Justice if the patient has already had the opportunity to 
put forward his view during the examination and interview by the 
Judge, and to convince the Judge that he or she does not require 
compulsory treatment. 
128 See 'Mental Health Law Reform', Dawson, p 325 and 'The Process of 
Committal', Dawson, pp 139-143. See also 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn', 
pp 327-328. The Taskforce states that this should include the right not to be overly 
sedated at the hearing, and the court being infonned if the patient has been sedated. 
l29 The Act, s 19(l)(a) 
130 Ibid, s 19(2) 
131 Ibid 
132 Ibid, s 19(3) 
133 See 'The Process of Committal'. Dawson, in 'Mental Health: A Case for 
Reform· at p 41-42 for an outline of the deficiencies of hearings: patients frequently 
receive no notice of them, and are not informed as to what the hearing is for. The 
word "committal" is never used by judges. Most patients are excluded from seeing or 
commenting on the medical evidence in favour of committal. No witnesses appear on 
the patient• s behalf. 
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However, it is important that Judges take the patient interviews 
seriously, and do not regard them simply as a procedural formality that 
must be complied with for the hearing to proceed. 
It is encouraging to note that the new Act particularises the matters a 
Judge must discuss with the patient during the interview. This will 
avoid the situation alluded to by Dawson, in which the patient interview 
simply consists of the Judge assuring the patient of the hospital's 
goodwill, and exhorting him or her to take the required medication.134 It 
is acknowledged that there may be situations in which a thoughtless 
exercise of the discretion to exclude may amount to a breach of Natural 
Justice. Two such situations are where the Judge who examined the 
patient is not the Judge conducting the hearing135 and where there are 
specific allegations made about the patient during the hearing which 
were not disclosed in any of the certificates of assessment, which he or 
she has not had the opportunity to rebut 136 
In such situations the Judge should either enable the patient to be present 
at the hearing, hold another conference with the patient or accept an 
affidavit from the patient deposing against the various allegations made. 
The duty of the responsible clinician to notify all persons specified in s 
14 of the legal consequences of the final assessment is a step forward, 
but there should also be specific notification of the hearing date, so that 
the patient and his family or caregiver know when the hearing is on.137 
The increase in the inquisitorial powers of the court in committal 
hearings will enable it to exercise a greater degree of independent 
judgment about whether mental disorder is present, rather than simply 
"rubberstamping" applications.138 It is particularly important that if the 
court commissions a report on the patient's condition, this will now be 
paid for out of the public purse.139 It is to be hoped that the court will 
134 Ibid, p 42 
135 Section 18(6) provides that hearings shall, wherever possible, be conducted by 
the judge who examined the patient, but there is nothing to ensure that this occurs. 
l36 It is likely that the medical evidence against the patient will consist primarily of 
the certifiates of assessment, which the patient will already have seen, but new 
evidence could be admitted pursuant to the court's power under s 22 to receive any 
evidence it thinks fit, whether medical or otherwise. 
137 Supra n 98 at p 41. Dawson states that many patients under the old Act did not 
know when the committal hearing was, or were informed immediately before the 
hearing. 
13 8 See 'The Process of Committal•. pp 124-126. 
l39 The Act, s 21 
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exercise its power to call further witnesses140 in favour of a patient 
where it is evident that the patient is not being adequately represented. 
There should be a duty on the court to call further witnesses or call for a 
report if it considers that the infonnation before it is inadequate. 
Although the requirements of Natural Justice are much more likely to be 
observed under the new Act, there are a number of respects in which the 
new procedure fails to comply. The most obvious of these is the 
absence of an automatic right to legal representation during committal 
hearings - there is merely a right to seek representation under s 70. The 
absence of legal representation will entail that psychiatrists or doctors 
presenting evidence will not be crass examined or challenged in any way 
on that evidence and thus the court is more likely to accept it without 
demur. Furthennore, although the District Inspector is entitled to be 
present at the hearing,141 and must discuss with the patient whether the 
Inspector should appear at the hearing142 there is nothing requiring him 
or her to be present Thus, the Act allows for the possibility not only 
that the patient may be unrepresented at the committal hearing, 143 but 
that there may be no witnesses called on his behalf. 144 Automatic legal 
representation is more likely to ensure that a more balanced view is 
presented to the court and that, wherever possible, witnesses in favour 
of the patient are called to present evidence. 
Secondly, the Act continues to allow for hearings to be held informally 
on hospital premises. 
These will occur where the patient has been transferred to a hospital 
during the assessment process.145 There is an argument in favour of 
greater formality in committal hearings, to ensure that procedural justice 
is complied with. As Dawson points out, hospital hearings are 
dominated by the environment in which they are held; often Judges sit 
opposite patients in cramped side rooms of hospital wards, and there is 
no stenographer to take a transcript of the proceedings. 
Witnesses are not sworn in nor subject to rigorous questioning, and 
doctors presenting medical evidence are often only seen "on the run" 
140 Ibid, s 28(4) 
141 Ibid, s 19(6) - any person to whom a certificate of final as~ment has been sent 
is entitled to be present at the hearing. 
142 Ibid, s 14(6). 
143 For a more extensive discussion of this problem, seep 44 below. 
144 Supra n 98, p 41: "With rare exceptions no witnesses appear on patients' behalf. 
Family members who attend usually favour committal" 
145 Under s 11 ors 13 
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between patients. 146 These hazards make hospital hearings highly 
unsatisfactory, and therefore it is submitted that hearings should be 
held, wherever practicable, in courtrooms. 
Thirdly, the Act does not specifically require all information adverse to 
the patient's interests to be disclosed to the patient or his representative 
prior to the hearing. 147 It is important that patients should not be 
required to assimilate and respond to complex medical evidence on the 
actual day of the hearing, and the requirement is crucial in situations 
where the patient is not present at the hearing. 
4. Criteria for a Compulsory Treatment Order 
Section 27 of the Act sets out the criteria guiding the court's jurisdiction 
to grant a Compulsory Treatment Order. The Court must not only be 
satisfied that the person is "mentally disordered",148 but that in all the 
circumstances of the case it is necessary to make a Compulsory 
Treatment Order. The factors relevant to the exercise of this discretion 
will be whether the patient's condition can be treated, whether the 
treatment provided is likely to be adequate, and whether it could be 
administered on a voluntary basis. The patient's social circumstances 
will be important, and in the case of inpatient orders, the ability of the 
hospital to care for and treat the patient in question. 
Although courts will undoubtedly have regard to these factors, and it is 
desirable that they be imbued with some discretion as to the relevant 
circumstances, there should nevertheless be greater specificity in s 27 as 
to the "circumstances" which may be relevant to the exercise of the 
discretion, so that the potential for arbitrariness is diminished, and a 
consistent jurisprudence for committal is able to develop. For instance, 
the requirement that it be necessary for a CTO to be made should refer 
specifically to a duty on the court to satisfy itself that treatment could not 
be administered on a voluntary basis. The Victorian Mental Health Act 
1986 specifically provides as one of the criteria for committal that the 
person has refused or is unable to consent to the treatment, 149 and in 
146 'The Civil Committal Process', John Dawson, in 'Mental Health: A Case for 
Reform', Legal Research Foundation Seminar, pp 41-42. 
147 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform, p 325. The Taskforce states that 
generally, information should only be withheld for exceptional reasons (for example, 
harm to the patient) 
148 See discussion in Part 1 as to the definition of 'mental disorder' 
149 Section 8. 
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California a person cannot have a petition filed against him unless he has 
refused voluntarily to undergo evaluation. 150 
Secondly, in considering whether to grant a Community Treatment 
Order151 a Judge must have regard to whether adequate care and 
treatment can be provided on an outpatient basis.152 This is important -
many commentators have expressed concerns about 
"deinstitutionalisation" on the grounds that there are insufficient 
resources in the community to ensure that treatment can be effectively 
carried out. 153 There is no such caveat attached to inpatient orders. It 
cannot safely be assumed that inpatient resources are any more adequate 
than community resources. Indeed the cynic's view would be that the 
lack of inpatient resources is the real impetus behind the pressure in 
recent years for community mental health care. The Act should require 
the court to consider whether treatment or care in the designated 
institution would be appropriate to the patient's needs. 
Section 28(2) provides a statutory presumption in favour of Community 
Treatment Orders, unless the person cannot adequately be treated as an 
outpatient. This presumption is also reflected in the fact that where an 
inpatient order has been made the responsible clinician can change it to a 
community treatment order automatically, 154 whereas in the case of a 
community treatment order, the patient must undergo reassessment and 
rehearing before an inpatient order can be made in respect of him.155 
There would seem little point in subjecting the patient to reassessment 
before an inpatient order is made - he has already been found to be 
mentally disordered, and the assessment process does not deal with the 
tm of order that should be made. 
Nevertheless, it is a welcome change from the previous legislation, in 
which the definition of mentally disorder effectively created a 
presumption against outpatient treatment - indeed there was no provision 
150 See discussion in 'Mental Health Law: Major Issues', Wexler, p 78 
151 Under s 29 
152 The Act. s 28 
153 See for example 'Community Treatment Orders', Dawson, p 412 and 420: "the 
Bill is not a funding statute and will not ensure that one extra dollar is channelled 
into community mental healh services"; 'The Future in Community Care', feature 
article by Helen Clark in the Dominion, 2 August 1989; comments of Helen Clark 
during the Second Reading of the Bill, 12 March 1992, NZ Parliamentary Debates; 
'The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992', Sylvia Bell 
(Mental Health Foundation). 
l 54 The Act, s 30 
155 Ibid, s 29 
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for it whatsover in the Act. The provision amounts to a ccxlification of 
the principle that any intervention with the rights of the mentally ill 
should be pursuant to the least restrictive alternative available to that 
person. 156 However as Dawson points out the jurisdiction to make 
Community Treatment Orders must be exercised with care; bearing in 
mind the need to ensure the safety of the community.157 
The fact that the Act does not address funding for community treatment 
is a deficiency in the writer's view; experience in the U.K has shown 
that the notions of community care and "revolving door policies" have 
not been met by increased provision of residential accommodation, 
hostels, trained social workers, community nurses or community care 
teams.158 However, perhaps a note of optimism should be sounded in 
the New Zealand context - the combination of an open market for health 
provision and a presumption in favour of community treatment may 
evoke a positive response in the market for mental health care; private 
half way houses and psychiatric nurses may be a reality in the future. 
s. Dischar2e from a Compulsory Treatment Order 
There are a number of ways in which a patient subject to a CTO can be 
discharged: 
(1) By automatic expiry of the CTO after six months.159 
The order may be renewed by the responsible clinician if he or she 
conducts a clinical review under 76, and then applies to the court for 
extension of the order for another six months. 
The court must conduct a further hearing in accordance with ss 17 to 
33.160 
l56 Supra n 45. 
157 See 'Community Treatment Orders', pp 423-424. Dawson points out that New 
Zealand should draw on the experience of other jurisdictions such as North Carolina. 
Ariwna and Hawaii in the United States which have had community treatment 
regimes in place for years in determining the clinical indicators for the use of 
community treatment in individual cases. See also 'Patient Rights and Public 
Hazard', Joseph Kirby at p 42 for some of the problems associated with community 
treatment orders in Victoria (enormous labour input involved in getting patients to 
accept medication, and lack of funding) Some community treatment orders have 
failed, and the police have become involved in restraining the patients. 
158 See The Recent Mental Health Act in the U.K', Blugrass, in Psychiatry, Human 
Rj~hts and the Law, Roth and Blugrass (eds), 21; 27. 
159 The Act. s 33 
l 60 Ibid, s 34 
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(2) By release from compulsory status by the responsible 
clinician.161 
If the responsible clinician considers at any time that the patient should 
no longer be subject to compulsory treatment, he or she is obliged to 
direct that the patient be released. 
Similarly, if following a six monthly clinical review the responsible 
clinican considers that the patient is fit to be released he or she must 
order release of the patient 162 
(3) By order of the Mental Health Review Tribunal.163 
The Tribunal may at any time, either of its own motion or pursuant to an 
application by any person to whom the certificate of clinical review has 
been sent, review the condition of any committed patient and discharge 
them if it thinks fit.164 
(4) By order of the District Court or the High Court. 
The patient may be discharged pursuant to an appeal to the District Court 
from a decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal,165 or an inquiry 
by a High Court Judge at any time.166 
This is a vast improvement on the previous Act, in which committal 
orders were indefinite and the only means of discharge were by the 
superintendant, 167 or by review by a District Court168 or a High Court 
Judge.169 
l6l Ibid, s 35 
162 Ibid, s 76(5) 
l 63 Ibid, s 79 
164 Ibid, s 79(8) 
l 65 Ibid, s 83 
l 66 Ibid, s 84 
167 Under s 55 of the Mental Health Act 1969 the superintendant was under a duty to 
review every committed patient "as often as practicable" and under s 73, was required 
to discharge a patient when he was fit to be discharged. See 'Tow~ Mental Health 
Law Reform' pp 310-311 for a discussion of the inadequacies of this duty - there were 
no guidelines regulating how the review was to be conducted, and no duty to actually 
examine the patient Review frequently did not occur due to staffing shortages. 
l68 Mental Health Act, s 73. This remedy required a petition to the Minister of 
Health, who could then decide (in his or her discretion) whether to pennit an inquiry. 
l69 Ibid, s 74. This section provided the Judge with an original power of review, but 
depended upon the patient persuading the Judge that a review should be conducted. 
4b 
(i) Pischaree by Expiry 
This is perhaps the most important change from the previous legislation 
- patients are no longer faced with indefinite committal and the onus is 
on the responsible clinician to seek renewal of the order, not on the 
patient to seek review of his status. The expiry of the CTO will coincide 
with the mandatory half yearly clinical review of the patient's condition 
under 76. 
However after the first 18 months expiry is not automatic, and the RC 
no longer has to apply to the court to extend the currency of the CTO. 
After 18 months the CTO is indefinite and the patient can only be 
discharged following a clinical review or pursuant to one of the review 
mechanisms. It is submitted that there is no justification for indefinite 
CTOs, whether during the first 18 months or thereafter. In all cases 
expiry of the CTO should occur automatically after 6 months and the 
onus should be on the institution to renew the CTO by application to the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal. The patient should not have to undergo 
another judicial hearing to determine his status. 
While this procedure may suffer from a certain degree of administrative 
inconvenience experience in Victoria indicates that automatic reviews of 
detention can be carried out on an infomal basis in the hospital or centre 
where the person is detained. Matters are resolved expeditiously, with 
input from family members and others.17° Such automatic review by the 
Tribunal should not derogate from the RCs obligation to discharge the 
patient if he or she considers that the patient is no longer mentally 
disordered. 
(ii) Pischaree by the Responsible Clinician 
The same arguments against enabling the RC to conduct assessments 
singlehandedly dictate that he should not be solely responsible for 
discharging a patient, for this involves a decision as to whether the 
patient is mentally disordered within the meaning of the Act - a decision 
which should only be made by a legally qualified person such as a 
Judge or by a multi disciplinary body such as the Tribunal. Enabling 
170 See 'Patient Rights and Public Hazard', Joseph Kirby, p 42 
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RCs to make discharge decisions creates a greater risk of wrong 
decisions being made, and the public being endangered.171 
Parkin argues that the reason for the ability of responsible medical 
officers in the U .K to discharge patients is that after the pateint has been 
in their care, they are likely to be in a better position than anyone else to 
assess whether the patient is mentally disordered.172 This may well be 
true, but it must be borne in mind that the definition of 'mental disorder' 
incorporates behavioural criteria which require predictions to be made 
about the patient's future conduct, not simply medical criteria, therefore 
the clinician is not equipped to adjudicate on mental disorder. This is not 
to say that his opinion should not carry considerable weight with the 
tribunal making the decision to discharge, but it should not be permitted 
to be decisive of the issue.173 
(iii) Dischar1:e by the Mental Health Review Tribunal 
The Tribunal's powers to review a patient's condition are governed by 
the First Schedule to the Act, and are virtually identical to the powers of 
the Court to conduct hearings under ss 17-24. 
The power to conduct reviews of its own motion is to be welcomed, and 
will help ensure that patients are released if they are no longer mentally 
disordered. However, there should be an automatic review by the 
Tribunal every 6 months, taking into account, but not being bound by, 
the recommendations of the responsible clinician following the clinical 
review. 
Only thus can justice be done to patients, who are in a relatively 
powerless position in relation to hospitals and community health care 
services.174 As the Taskforce stated, a patient's ability to invoke the 
171 See 'Discretion and Resources in Mental Health Provision', Allan Parkin. The 
author states that concerns have been expressed in the U.K about the powers of 
responsible medical officers to discharge patients. He cites an incident in Doncaster in 
1991 in which a woman was discharged by her psychiatrist and then bludgeoned to 
death a young girl in a shopping centre. 
172 Ibid, p 1454 
l 73 Research condocted into mental health review tribunals in the U.K revealed that 
tribunals were unlikely to differ from the opinion of the responsible medical officer 
in charge of the case, but where they did, the reasons related to the riskiness of the 
RMOs decision to release the patient - 'Mental Health Review Tribunals after the 
Mental Health Act 1983' , Peay J, Centre for Criminological Research, University of 
Oxford. 
174 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform' p 322, in which it is stated that the 
"burden of coming forward" should be on the party most able to bear it - the 
procedure may be hampered by lack of knowledge, illiteracy, the 
debilitating effects of mental disorder, isolation, apathy, and the 
possibility of sedation by drugs or other treattnent. 175 Similarly, it is 
submitted that the institutional environment itself militates against a 
patient seeking review of his condition - it may simply be more 
comfortable, convenient and safe for the patient to remain committed. 
Under s 68 of the U.K Mental Health Act 1983, the manager of a 
hospital to which a patient has been committed is under a duty to refer 
the patient's case to the Tribunal within 6 months of admission if the 
patient has not done so, and thereafter every 3 years. Although these 
time frames are not ideal, the U .K legislation at least provides for some 
form of automatic assessment by the Tribunal. 
(iv) Discharee by District or Hieb Court ,Tudee 
As stated previously in relation to review during the assessment 
process, in the writer's view there is no role for the courts in the review 
process except by way of appeal from. or judicial review of, the 
decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. The adversarial nature 
of the court structure is not suited to committal decisions, and Judges 
are not especially qualified or experienced in mental health law. 
Furthermore, in the case of a judicial inquiry under s 84 the Judge may 
inquire into such matters as he thinks fit There is a danger that the 
procedure adopted may not comply with Natural Justice.176. It is 
submitted that the Tribunal should be the body which determines 
whether a patient is mentally disordered and should continue to be 
committed, to avoid confusion and uncertainty for patients, and ensure 
that a well balanced decision is made and that Natural Justice is 
complied with. 
authorities, not the patient...(t]he justification for detention lapses when those 
conditions upon which it is premised are no longer present" 
175 Ibid, s 322 
l 76 Ibid, s 323 
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V. CONSENT TO TREATMENT 
The new regime is premised on the principle that no person is required 
to accept any form of treatment without that person's consent.177 This is 
perhaps the most significant ideological shift from historic mental health 
legislation, under which patients detained in hospitals could be given 
both medical and psychiatric treatment without their consent l 78 As with 
any provision which purports to lay down a principle of general 
application, there are a myriad of exceptions and qualifications to the 
rule. However it is probable that no patient will be required to undergo 
any form of medical treatment for a disorder unrelated to the mental 
disorder without their consent; 179 the exceptions relate to treatment for 
the mental disorder, not to all types of treatment. In this respect 
therefore, mental patients will be treated exactly like any adult of sound 
mind. 
1. Exceptions to the Ri2bt to Refuse Consent 
First, persons undergoing assessment shall be required to accept such 
treatment for mental disorder as the RC shall direct180 
As stated previously, there is no sensible rationale for this exception, for 
it effectively presumes that the legal status of the person as mentally 
disordered has already been determined. 
Secondly, patients are required to accept such treatment for mental 
disorder as the RC directs during the first month of the Compulsory 
Treatment Order.181 This is clearly a recognition that the first month of 
the CTO is the crucial period for treatment, and the lack of consent of 
the patient must not be permitted to impede the ability of the RC to treat 
the patient's mental disorder. However, it does not accord in 
177 See supra n 41 and the submission to Select Committee of the Porirua Hospital 
Residents' 
Association, p 2. The AuckJand District Law Society however recommended that 
hospitals be given the power to act in emergency situations. 
178 The definition of "treatment" in section 25 of the Mental Health Act did not 
differentiate between medical and psychiatric treatment; providing that the making of 
a reception order gave the hospital sufficient authority to detain and treat the person. 
179 See also s 11 Bill of Rights Act 1990 which provides for a right to refuse 
consent to medical treatment. 
180 The Act. s 58 
l8l Ibid, s 59 
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jurisprudential terms with the absolute principle of autonomy and self 
determination of mentally ill patients sought by the Mental Health Task 
Force, and supposedly reflected in the Act. 182 
After the first month patients have the right to refuse treatment for 
mental disorder 
unless they have had the treatment explained to them and have consented 
to it in writing, 183 or it is considered to be in the best interests of the 
patient by a psychiatrist (not being the Responsible Clinician) who has 
been appointed by the Tribunal for the purposes of the section. 184 It is 
submitted that in most cases where treatment is clearly required the 
assent of a psychiatrist appointed by the Tribunal will be a mere 
formality, given that the patient's need for compulsory treatment has 
already been established by the court, and the RC who supervised him 
or her throughout the entire assessment process considers that treatment 
is necessary. Thus, in practical terms the patient's right to refuse 
treatment is non-existent. 
A further qualification under s 62 is the preservation of the common law 
right of doctors to administer treatment that is immediately necessary to 
save a person's life or prevent serious damage to their health or to the 
health of another. 
It is noteworthy that the provisions are modelled largely on ss 56-63 of 
the U.K Mental health Act 1983, which e- ·ectively provide that the 
patient has the right to refuse consent to rreatment after the first 3 
months, unless the treatment has been authorised by the responsible 
medical officer in consultation with two other qualified professionals 
who have been involved in the patient's case. 185 The purpose of these 
provisions was to: 
"strike a balance between protecting the rights of the patient and providing for him to 
receive the treatment he needs"l86 
One may wonder at the logicity and equity of a right to refuse treatment 
that is so severely qualified as to be almost nugatory. There must 
182 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', eh 14. 
183 The Act, s 59(2)(a) 
l84 Ibid, s 59(2)(b) 
185 See in particulars 58(1) 
l 86 White Paper on ''Reform of Mental Health Legislation" (Cmnd 8405), Nov 1981 
at para 35 
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certainly be doubts as to whether these provisions achieve the 
appropriate balance between conflicting rights. The inevitable 
conclusion is that any notional right to refuse treatment is a nonsense, 
given that the obvious purpose of Compulsory Treatment Orders is to 
enable a person who is mentally disordered and fulfills the criteria in the 
Act to be compulsorily treated for that disorder: 
Section 29 (Community Treatment Orders) provides: 
(1) A Community Treaunent Order shall require the patient to attend at the patient's 
place of residence ... for treatment by employees of the specified institution or service, 
and to acc~t that treatment 
(emphasis added) 
Similarly, s 30 (Inpatient Orders) provides: 
(1) Every inpatient order shall require the continued detention of the patient in the 
hospital specified in the order, 
.... for the purposes of treatment. and shall rewiire the patient to accept that 
treatment (emphasis added). 
Thus, compulsory treatment orders not only have the purpose of 
allowing for compulsory treatment. they~ provide for it Giving 
patients an option to refuse treatment is renders the entire process of 
assessment and hearing superfluous, and treats patients subject to CTOs 
as though they were voluntary patients. The drastic nature of the 
qualification to the consent principle is testament to this paradox. 
It is submitted that there are good policy reasons for allowing mental 
patients to be treated for their disorder without their consent, and these 
are reflected in the criteria for committal which require that a person be 
dangerous to themselves or others before they can be committed. These 
social policy goals would be negated by giving patients a right to refuse 
consent. 
Removing a patient's right to refuse consent to treatment for mental 
disorder does not deny that the patient may be competent to consent 
(thus violating the presumptions of competence implicit in the Bill of 
Rights Act and the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act); it 
merely recognises that there in the case of committed patients there are 
policy goals outweighing the patient's right to refuse consent. As Roth 
points out: 
" The problem with principles and doctrines such as the right to refuse treatment is 
that they advance simplistic solutions to problems of a complex and obdurate nature . 
To take up just one thread in a whole web of causes and consequences, there are the 
human rights of dependent wives, children and parents to be considered as well as 
those of the patient." 
Given that these competing rights have been weighed up at the 
committal stage and found to militate against the patient's rights, there 
seems no sensible reason to give the patient the power to refuse 
treatment. Consequently, the consent provisions should be excised from 
the Act. leaving only s 59(4), requiring the RC, wherever practicable, to 
seek to obtain the consent of the patient to any treatment This is not to 
say however that there are sufficient safeguards in the legislation to 
ensure that the right to treat patients compulsorily is not abused. It is not 
enough to build checks and balances into the procedure of assessment 
and hearing - there must be an ongoing commitment on the part of 
mental health professionals to exercise their treatment powers 
responsibly in the interests of the patient This would entail rigorous 
adherence to the charter of patient rights set out in the Act, including 
infoming patients about treatment and its side effects, 187 providing 
patients with treatment appropriate to their condition, 188 enabling them 
to seek independent psychiatric advice189 and review of their condition, 
and ensuring that they are not subject to neglect or ill treatment.190 
Given that the entire responsibility of a patient's care and treatment is to 
be assumed by a single Responsible Clinician, rather than a team of 
qualified professionals, it may be desirable to include a provision in Part 
V to the effect that before administering any form of treatment to a 
patient for mental disorder, the Responsible Clinician must honestly 
believe, on reasonable grounds, that in all the circumstances the 
treatment is in the best interests of the patient 
187 Ibid, s 64 
188 Ibid, s 66 
l 89 Ibid, s 69 
l 90 Ibid, s 114. As ins 112 of the Mental Health Act 1969 it is offence to wilfully 
neglect or illtreat a patient 
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Breach of such a provision would enable the patient or his representative 
to seek legal recourse in the form of a civil action, provided that it did 
not result in a 'personal injury by accident' within the meaning of the 
Accident Compensation legislation.191 Furthermore, there should be 
provision for the patient or his representative to apply to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal or the Director of Mental Health Services to 
have the Responsible Clinician replaced if he or she is acting contrary to 
the best interests of the patient, such as failing to inform the patient 
about the side effects of treatment or administering inappropriate or 
outmoded treatment 
2. Special Provisions for Electro-Convulsive Therapy and 
Brain Sur~ery 
Section 60 provides that the patient's consent must be obtained before 
Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECI) is administered, unless the treatment 
is considered to be in the best interests of the patient by an independent 
psychiatrist appointed by the Tribunal.192 ECT is a treatment frequently 
administered for schizophrenia and depression, in which the patient is 
anaesthetised, electrodes are attached to his body and then he is given 
electric shocks which cause convulsions. 
The convulsions appear to be the therapeutic part of the treatment The 
dangerousness of ECT has been exaggerated - the main risk is from the 
anaesthetic, and ECT can cause transitory memory loss.193 Indeed, 
many psychotropic drugs have more serious side effects than ECT 194, 
therefore it may be doubted whether there is justification in having more 
rigorous provisions dealing with ECT than for ordinary treatment 
The most common type of psychosurgery is the 'frontal lobotomy' - a 
procedure designed to sever the connection between the frontal lobe -
the personality centre of the brain and the remainder of the brain. The 
operation often results in the patient having a 'flattened' personality, and 
l9l Accident Compensation (Rehabilitation and Insurance) Act 1992, s 3. 
192 The Act, s 60(b) 
193 Discussions with Graham Mellsop, Clinical School of Medicine. 
194 Ibid. For example, anti depressants can cause haedaches, stomach disorders and 
weight gain. A serious side effect of the anti psychotic drugs is a condition known as 
'Tardive Dyslcinesia', characterised by involuntary movements of the head, anns or 
legs. See Law. Behaviour and Mental Heahh: Poljcy and Practice, Smith and Meyer, 
p 100. 
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losing character and motivation. 195 In response to concerns about the 
dehumanising effect of psychosurgery, section 61 of the new Act 
provides that the patient must consent to brain surgery, and the MRHT, 
responsible clinician and an independent psychiatrist must consider that 
it would be in the patient's best interests. 196 This clearly provides a 
sufficient safeguard against the "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" 
scenario arising today, but creates a curious loophole in respect of 
patients who are legally incapable of consenting. Unless the Act permits 
a decision to be made by a welfare guardian appointed under s 12 of the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act it seems that patients 
who lack capacity to consent cannot be subjected to brain surgery. 197 
VI. RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 
Part VI of the Act is an important innovation in mental health legislation 
in New Zealand. For the first time a set of patient rights is provided for -
conferring on mental patients some of the civil rights the rest of us take 
for granted. Briefly some of these rights are: 
(1) To written infonnation about patient rights, including the right to 
know his legal status, the right to have his condition reviewed, the right 
to appeal from decisions of the Tribunal or seek a judicial inquiry, and 
the functions and duties of the District Inspector.198 
(2) To be treated with respect for the patient's cultural identity.199 
l95 Another procedure which has aroused concern is 'amygdalotomy' , which is used 
to treat aggessive disorders and hyperactivity and can also result in loss of motivation 
and permanent alteration of brain fW1ction. See 'Practical Medical Ethics', eh 10, p 
139. 
l 96 The inclusion of these provisions was the result of intense lobbying by mental 
health interest groups. See NZ Parliamentary Debates, Second Reading of the Bill, 
12 March 1992 at p 6862 and 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', eh 15 for 
concerns about ECT and brain surgery. 
197 This is certainly the position in the U.K; s 57 of the Mental Health Act 1983 
provides that the patient must consent to "irreversible procedures" . The Mental 
Health (Hospital, Guardianship and Consent to Treatment) Regulations 1983 (S I 
1983/893) can only be waived where the treatment is necessary to save the person's 
life. 
l 98 The Act, s 64 
l99 Ibid, s 65. See also s 5 of the Act which provides a more detailed outline of what 
those exercising powers under the Act must do to comply with s 65. 
(3) To treatment appropriate to the patient's condition.200 
(4) To be informed about treatment. Every patient is entitled to know the 
expected effects of any treatment.201 
(5) To seek independent psychiatric advice.202 
(6) To seek legal advice.203 
(7) To the company of others, except when the patient needs to be 
secluded.204 There are now strict guidelines for the use of seclusion.205 
(8) To receive visitors and make telephone calls.206 
(9) To receive letters and postal articles unopened, 207 and to send letters 
and postal articles unopened 208 
The general problem with these rights is that they are expressed as rights 
rather than duties upon the hospital or mental health service.209 
Although the patient can complain to the District Inspector and trigger an 
investigation, and the complaint can then be referred to the Director of 
Area Mental Health Services and finally the Tribunal if the patient is 
unsatisfied with the outcome, there should be a positive duty upon 
anyone exercising powers under the Act to comply with patient rights, 
breach of which would be an offence under the Act if committed 
200 Ibid, s 66 
20 1 Ibid, s 67 
202 Ibid, s 69 
203 Ibid, s 70 
204 Ibid, s 71 
205 For concerns sbout the use of seclusion under the Mental Health Act 1969 see 
'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn' at pp 257-259. There was particular concern 
about automatic seclusion of patients on arrival at Oakley Hospital - such treatment 
was likely to severely distress a patient and exacerbate their condition. The Taskforce 
recommended the promulgation of a national seclusion protocol. 
206 The Act, s 72. See 'Towards Mental Health Law Refonn' at p 252. The 
Taskforce stated that as the Mental Health Act had no specific provisions enabling 
hospitals to refuse visitors or telephone calls, any such unreasonable refusal would be 
unlawful. 
207 The Act, s 73 . This is subject however to s 123 of the Act which prescribes the 
circumstances in which mail can be vetted in the interests of the patient 
208 Ibid, s 74. 
209 This problem is also alluded to be Sylvia Bell in 'The Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992', unpublished version 
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deliberately and subject to civil action if a negligent breach. Several of 
the rights are worthy of more specific comment: 
1. Le2a1 Representation 
One of the most serious concerns about the previous legislation was its 
lack of any reference to a right to legal representation. Most patients 
were not represented at committal hearings, and therefore judges placed 
an inordinate emphasis on medical evidence led by certifying 
doctors. 21 0 
Although there have been positive indications in recent years that the 
level ofrepresentation is in fact increasing,211 the new Act does little to 
address the fundamental problem - lack of money to enlist the aid of a 
lawyer. The 1987 Mental Health Bill was roundly criticised for not 
including provision for an advocacy service,212 and yet nothing has 
been done to rectify this in the 1992 Act It is submitted that instead of 
just an ineffectual right to seek legal representation and have access to a 
lawyer, every patient undergoing further assessment under s 11 should 
have a lawyer appointed by the Director of Mental Health Services to 
represent them, paid for out of the public purse or by Legal Aid under 
the Legal Services regime. 
The RC should be required to state on the Certificate of Further 
Assessment that a solicitor has been appointed to represent the patient 
District Inspectors, who are required to visit a number of hospitals and 
attend to dozens of patients, cannot be expected to perform advocacy for 
individual patients effectively. However as Wexler points out, even 
21 0 See Submission to the Auckland District Law Society and 'The Process of 
Committal' at pp 116-117. 
According to Dawson in The Process of Committal' at pp 117-118 in only two of 
the cases he surveyed in 1984 were the patients legally aided, and the general attitude 
of the Auckland Legal Aid Committee was hostile to legal aid applications by 
mentally disordered patients. 
211 For example, the Wellington Community Law Centre now runs a roster of 
solicitors to advise mental patients at Porirua Hospital, and represent them at 
committal hearings. This often entails the solicitor meeting with the patient and his 
or her family or caregiver to determine how the patient can best be represented. 
Similarly, a roster system has been set up by the Auckland District Law Society to 
provide representation in committal hearings for patients at Carrington Hospital. 
212 See for example the Westport News, 2/9/87, 'Mental Health Rights Extended', 
in which reference is made to a criticism of the Psychiatric Survivors Group that the 
changes to the Bill failed to provide an advocacy service, and that the Official Visitor 
System had fallen into disrepute and did nothing for patients. 
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jurisdictions which require legal representation of patients cannot 
guarantee effective representation - frequently counsel's lack of 
specialist knowledge in mental health law and the absence of any 
financial incentive in taking on committal cases can result in the patient 
being poorly represented.213 A solution to this in the New 2.ealand 
context may be to place a duty on the Director of Area Mental Health 
Services to establish and maintain a register of lawyers qualified or 
experienced in the mental health area, from which counsel would be 
appointed upon receipt of an application for assessment 
A vexing issue which has arisen overseas in relation to legal 
representation is whether the appropriate role of counsel is as a zealous 
advocate for the patient, arguing strenuously for the liberty of the 
'client', or whether the advocate is simply an officer of the court; 
appointed to assist the court in reaching a correct legal outcome.214 The 
answer to the question depends primarily upon whether the proceedings 
are viewed as adversarial or inquisitorial - if they are adversarial then the 
advocate must necessarily argue for the liberty of the patient, even if the 
patient is clearly mentally ill and in need of treatment If the proceedings 
are inquisitorial then the role of the advocate is in assisting the court to 
reach a just decision based on as much information as can reasonably be 
gathered. Under the new system the preponderence of medical evidence 
will be in favour of committal. Although the aim of court proceedings is 
to gather as much information as possible about the patient's condition 
and translate this into an accurate decision either to commit or not to 
commit, it is submitted that the evidence is weighted heavily against the 
patient from the outset - from family, doctors and the RC, and therefore 
the adversarial approach is more likely to lead to a balanced presentation 
of evidence; counsel will be required to produce evidence against mental 
illness or against dangerousness rather than simply taking the easy 
option of concurring with the applicant's case. 
2. Riebt to Information about Treatment 
The right to information about treatment and to appropriate treatment are 
important innovations in the Act, and reflect the emphasis of the Act on 
treatment rather than incarceration. 
213 See 'Mental Health Law: Major Issues', p 95. 214 Ibid, pp 96-97. 
However there should be a specific right of access to medical records, 
to ensure that the information being provided to the patient accords with 
the information being recorded about him or her. The patient should not 
have to rely on the District Inspector's powers to access medical 
records215 - his compulsory status should entitle him to know about and 
question the treatment being administered, in the spirit of "glasnost" in 
which the Act is intended. 
The need for such a right is particularly important now that patients can 
be treated by private psychiatric institutions and services216 rather than 
just Gazetted hospitals, which are subject to the Official Information 
Act There is no reason why patients who are being treated in the pubhc 
sector should have the right to request access to medical records, 
whereas patients in the private sector cannot The right to be informed 
about proposed treatment is not an adequate substitute for this. 
3. Riebt to Respect for Cultural Identity 
Section 65 provides that every patient is entitled to be dealt with in a 
manner which accords with the spirit and intent of s 5 of the Act 
Section 5 provides (inter alia): 
" Every court or tribunal that conducts any proceedings and any court, tribunal or 
person that or who exercises any power under this Act in respect of any patient shall 
do so-
(a) With proper respect for the patient's cultural and ethnic identity, language and 
religious or ethical beliefs; ... " 
This right is an innovation in mental health care, and is extremely 
important in the context of the exercise of compulsory treatment powers 
under the Act, for according to Dawson it may effectively preclude the 
ad.ministration of compulsory treatment where such treatment was 
directly contrary to an important cultural or spiritual value.217 
215 The Act, s 97(2)(a) 
216 Sees 2 of the Act 'Hospital' includes a private hospital licensed as a psychiatric 
hospital pursuant to Part V of the Hospitals Act, and 'Service' includes a service 
provided by or managed by a private hospital licensed under Part V of the Hospitals 
Act. 
217 Comments of John Dawson at a seminar on the new Act held at Buddle Findlay, 
29 September 1992 
At face value it would seem that "proper respect" for a cultural value 
may in some circumstances require the RC or other person exercising 
powers to take no action. However it is submitted that the provision is 
more akin to setting out considerations which must be taken into 
account In the end the decision must be made by the mental health 
professional. This is reflected in the wording of s 5 which provides that 
the powers are to be exercised; it does not provide that the person shall 
refrain from exercising the power (for example the power to treat) if 
such exercise would not constitute proper respect for cultural values. 
However, given the large proportion of Maoris and Pacific Islanders in 
the mental health system RCs will not be able to exercise their new 
powers responsibly without familiarising themselves with the cultural 
and spiritual values of these ethnic groups. Indeed it would be sensible 
for Directors of Area Mental Health Services to adopt a policy of hiring 
RCs who can display particular experience and sensitivity in dealing 
with other cultures. 
4. Independent Psychiatric Advice 
The purpose of this provision was to ensure that a patient could receive 
independent advice if he were dissatisfied with a decision of the 
responsible clinician. However, no such assurance is available - the 
right is simply to m independent advice, not to receive paid 
independent advice on request. Given that the RC has sole responsibility 
for the treatment of the patient there is a strong case for paid independent 
advice on demand. 
4. Biebt to Send and Receive Mail Unopened 
The Taskforce commented that the Mental Health Act contained an 
unfairly wide discretion to vet incoming and outgoing mail of patients, 
based on the likelihood that mail would interfere with the treatment of 
the patient or cause him or her unnecessary distress.218 It recommended 
that New Zealand adopt provisions similar to those in the U.K, in which 
mail should not be withheld unless the patient has requested that it be 
withheld, or the superintendent considers that it would cause harm to the 
218 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', pp 252-253. 
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patient 219 However, the provisions of the 1969 Act have been re 
enacted in the new Act; mail can be withheld if there are: 
"reasonable grounds for believing that the receipt of the letter or postal article by the 
patient could be detrimental to the interests of the patient and to his treaunent"220 
Although the responsible clinician must obtain the approval of the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services to withhold mail, it is submitted 
that these provisions are too wide - there only needs to be a reasonable 
possibility of detriment before the mail can be withheld. The provision 
is an anachronism from a past era in mental health legislation in which 
the underlying ethos was paternalism. It not sit well with the emphasis 
of the Act on patient autonomy and therefore ought to be removed. 
s. Enforcement 
Despite the best intentions of the drafters in relation to the new patient 
rights regime, it is doubtful whether there are adequate mechanisms in 
place to enable a patient or his representative to enforce these rights. 
Although the Act sets up a formal complaints procedure under s 75, 
there are considerable deficiencies in this procedure. For instance it fails 
to specify what remedies can be sought if a complaint is referred to the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services or the Tribunal. The section 
simply provides: 
"the [Director] shall talce all steps as may be necessary to rectify the matter" 
The Director's action would probably involve issuing some kind of 
warning to the person concerned or perhaps removing them from 
employment, but he or she probably could not order a pecuniary penalty 
or injunction. Dawson is of the view that this provision places a duty 
upon the Director to comply with any recommendations of the District 
Inspector or the Tribunal, and thus represents a significant power of 
enforcement of patient rights. That view is, with respect, incorrect. The 
Director is in no way obliged to follow the recommendations of the 
219 Mental Health Act 1983, s 134; Mental Health (Hospital Guardianship and 
Consent to Treatment) Regulations 1983, regs 17-18. 
220 The Act, s 123 
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Tribunal or District Inspector - his view of what constitute necessary 
steps may differ significantly from that of the District Inspector or 
Tribunal, and may include taking no steps at all and letting the parties 
resolve the situation themselves. The strength of the system will depend 
ultimately on the good faith and competence of Directors, and this is 
not, in the writer's view, sufficient. 
Neither does the Tribunal have the power to order sanctions - it can 
merely conduct an investigation. Section 102(1) provides that the 
primary function of the Tribunal is to conduct reviews of the condition 
of committed patients - little thought seems to have been given as to the 
powers of the Tribunal in relation to breaches of rights. 
Breach of a right does not create an offence under the Act. The only 
offences which may be relevant in respect of a breach of rights is that of 
wilfully obstructing a District Inspector during an investigation,221 or 
including false information in a certificate.222 It is submitted that to 
receive monetary compensation under the Act the patient would have to 
bring an action for negligence or breach of statute. An action for breach 
of statute would require the patient to establish that the right in question 
created a positive, correlative duty on the person alleged to have 
breached the duty, but would probably have the advantage of not 
requiring the plaintiff to prove loss. An action in negligence would 
require proof of loss, and would not be available for personal injury 
covered by the Accident Compensation legislation.223 
In more general terms, abuse of the committal power could create civil 
liability in negligence, assault, battery or false imprisonment, as there 
are no longer procedural barriers to such actions. 
However, it is submitted that is required is either a provision which 
creates an offence for breaching a patient right, punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment, depending upon the seriousness of the breach, or an 
augmentation of the powers of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, so 
that it can order fines, injunctions· or other remedies. Only thus can the 
patient rights in the Act have any real effect. 
Section 135 provides that the Governor General may make regulations 
for the purpose of, inter alia: 
221 Ibid, s 117 
222 Ibid, s 118 
223 Sees 3 of the Accident Compensation (Rehabilitation and Insurance) Act 1992. 
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" ... (b) Prescribing the powers and duties of District Inspectors and Official 
Visitors .. " and, 
U) Providing for such matters as are contemplated by or necessary for giving full 
effect to this Act and for its due administration" 
These provisions could allow for the promulgation of regulations setting 
out the powers of the Director, the District Inspectors and the Tribunal 
in relation to breaches of patient rights. 
It is to be hoped that they will be used for this purpose, as the current 
enforcement provisions are unhelpfully vague and lacking in "teeth". 
VII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
There are several provisions which are worthy of comment and 
criticism: 
1. Police Powers 
Sections 109 and 110 of the Act prescribe police powers in relation to 
patients sought to be committed, and have been taken from ss 35 and 36 
of the Mental Health Act 1969 with virtually no change. A major 
concern of the Taskforce was that police powers under the 1969 Act 
were too wide, and that police did not have an appropriate role in 
apprehending persons believed to be mentally disordered and taking 
them to a medical practitioner for examination. The main reasons for this 
view were that it was felt the Police did not have enough expertise in 
mental health care to be able to determine whether a person was mentally 
disordered, and that mentally ill people should not be treated like 
criminals when they had committed no crime, and locked up in police 
cells until they could be assessed.224 Furthennore, police sometimes did 
not adhere to the terms of s 35, which provided that they could only 
apprehend persons found wandering at large, and arrested people on 
private property.225 
Despite these reservations s 35 has been re enacted ins 109 of the new 
Act, substantially unchanged. It is submitted that the Police should not 
224 See 'Towards Mental Health Law Reform', pp 48-50. See also 'The Process of 
Committal', Dawson in 'Mental Health: A Case for Reform', pp 23-26. 225 See for example Hastwe!l v ~. M 49/83, High Court Nelson, Ongley J, 20 
Nov 1984. 
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have the power to apprehend people "believed to be mentally 
disordered", without an application first being made to the Director for 
an assessment. This effectively treats mentally disordered persons like 
criminals, in situations where no crime has been committed. There is no 
appropriate role for the police in making determinations about mental 
disorder. 
The same comments apply to s 110 of the Act, which retains the power 
of medical practitioners to call to their assistance a member of the police 
if they believe a person to be mentally disordered and to have them taken 
by the police to a place for assessment. This provision is both outmoded 
and inappropriate. There is no reason why the police should be involved 
when an application is made by a doctor, but not when it is made by 
anyone else. The provision is inappropriate for the same reasons that 
police should not be involved in apprehending people. Being placed in a 
police cell, even for 24 hours, 226 is traumatic for the patient, who may 
in some cases be placed with hardened criminals. 
It is submitted that the solution is to allow the provisions of Part ill of 
the Act (which set out the powers of Duly Authorised Officers to 
assist caregivers in applying for committal) to govern the extent of 
compulsion which may be exerted on the patient to get them to be 
assessed. 
The new role of Duly Authorised Officers is an important one in the Act, 
and has been established specifically for the purpose of assisting 
families and other applicants to get a person suspected of being mentally 
disordered certified and assessed. There is no need to involve the Police 
who have no particular expertise or sensitivity on this area In Dawson's 
view there is a danger that the Police will shift the burden of 
apprehending and transporting mentally ill people onto Duly Authorised 
Officers. Such an outcome would surely be desirable, and would reflect 
a welcome move to "de criminalise" the committal process. 
Section 41 provides that a Duly Authorised Officer attempting to 
exercise his powers may call to his assistance a member of the police. 
However, this should be a last resort to be invoked if all else fails; the 
Act should make this clear. 
226 Sections 109 and 110 provide that a patient may only be detained by the police 
for 24 hours. 
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2. Transfer and Removal of Patients 
Section 127 of the Act enables committed patients to be transferred 
within New Zealand to any hospital or service upon the direction of the 
Director of Mental Health. This provision does not accord with the spirit 
of the Act; any decision to transfer a patient should be made by the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal or by the court, after reconsideration of 
whether the patient needs to remain committed and whether adequate 
care or treatment can be provided in the new environment. Section 127 
does not require the Director to give any consideration to these matters. 
Transfer of a patient without their consent is a considerable infringement 
of their civil liberties - they may be removed from family and friends, 
and from surroundings in which they have grown up. Such a decision 
should not be made lightly, and proper regard should be given to the 
social and psychological consequences of such transfer. 
Section 128 is even more drastic in its effect; providing that a patient 
may be removed from New Zealand upon the direction of the Minister 
of Health. Furthermore, the section provides that the expenses of travel 
and relocation can be paid for out of the patient's funds if the Minister 
directs.227 The decision to remove a patient should be made by the 
Tribunal or the Court after submissions by the patient, his family or 
caregiver and other interested persons. Ministerial approval should then 
be sought, and in no case is payment out of the patient's funds without 
his consent justified. Since the repeal of Part VII of the Mental Health 
Act in 1988 and the enactment of the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act, mental patients have had the right to deal with their 
property as they see fit, unless they are incompetent, in which case a 
welfare guardian can be appointed under the PP&PR Act.228 This right 
must not be eroded by outdated transfer and removal provisions. 
VIII. THE COMMITTAL PROCESS AND THE 
NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
An interesting issue arises as to the relationship between the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Some guidance may be derived from 
227 S 128(2)(b). 
228 s 12 
b) 
two recent High Court decisions under the old Act - Re M 229 and Re 
S,.230 In Re M, an application under s 74 of the Mental Health Act for 
judicial review of the patient's condition, it was contended that the 
continued detention of M was 'arbitrary' under s 22 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights (NZBOR) Act, because M had never been violent. 
Gallen J, citing s 4 of the Act which provides that no provision of any 
enactment shall be impliedly repealed or invalid by reason only that it is 
inconsistent with any provision of the Act, held that the provisions of 
the Mental Health Act stood on their own, but were to be interpreted as 
far as possible in the light of the NZBOR Act. This view was affirmed 
by Barker Jin the later case of Re S, in which Barker J cited s 6 of the 
NZBOR Act, which provides that wherever an enactment can be given a 
meaning that is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act that meaning 
should be preferred to any other meaning. 
The effect of these decisions will be that the committal criteria in the new 
mental health Act will be interpreted strictly - wherever there is doubt as 
to whether a person is mentally disordered the presumption will be 
against such a finding. In the writer's view, the qualifications in Part V 
of the Act to the right to refuse consent to treatment are inconsistent with 
s 11 of the NZBOR Act, which provides that everyone has the right to 
refuse to undergo medical treatment. As stated previously the writer 
does not support a right to refuse consent to treatment for mental 
disorder, but in view of s 11 the restrictions on the right to refuse 
consent to treatment will have to be interpreted strictly, and s 11 will 
create an implied duty on mental health professionals to seek consent at 
all times. The considerable ambiguity in the Act (such as in the reference 
to "whether in all the circumstances of the case it is necessary to make a 
compulsory treatment order")231 , will necessitate interpretations which 
accord with the NZBOR Act 
CONCLUSIONS 
The compulsory treatment regime in the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act is undoubtedly a giant step forward in 
the jurisprudence and practice of mental health care in New Zealand, and 
229 [ 1992) 1 NZLR 29 
230 (1992)1 NZLR 363 
231 The Act. s 27(3) 
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mirrors reforms that have been occurring throughout Commonwealth 
jurisdictions in the perception and treaunent of the mentally ill. 
The Act is certainly cause for celebration amongst civil libertarians, in 
that it moves decisively away from a purely 'medical' model of 
committal and places patient rights at the forefront of the mental health 
system, but in substantive terms it may have tipped the balance too far in 
favour of patient rights; both in the procedure leading up to compulsory 
treatment and in the ability of patients to refuse treaunent There is little 
evidence that committal powers have been abused in New 2.ealand as 
they were in the fonner Soviet Union under the Stalinist regime. The 
new rights based approach may result in patients being deprived of 
necessary treatment and families being subjected to considerable 
expense and inconvenience in getting a patient committed. As Mason 
McCall and Smith point out: 
" An unequivocal commitment to the consensual rights of the mentally ill may result 
in their being denied treatment on civil libertarian grounds. It may also lead to 
unnecessary suffering by the families of those afflicted; calls for the recognition of 
the psychiatric patient's right to reject treatment may well sound hollow to those 
struggling to cope with their demands in a domiciliary situation"232 
There is a lack of clarity in the crucial definition of mental disorder 
under the Act, and there will be a loss of control over the committal 
process by enabling professions outside psychiatry to be be involved in 
decisionmaking. In procedural terms, the system may be so complex 
and protracted that it frustrates the interests of patients, psychiatrists and 
the community. 233 
New 2.ea1and could well learn from the considerable backlash in the 
States to the civil libertarian approach, resulting in calls for a 
reintroduction of compulsory paternalistic treatment 234 In its anxiety to 
correct the iniquities of the previous regime the Legislature may have 
created a system which is both unwieldy and which prevents patients 
232 'Law and Medical Ethics', p 394. 
233 See 'Patient Rights and Public Hazard', Joseph Kirby, p 43 in which the author 
comments that the Victorian Mental Health Act 1986 has erred too far on the side of 
civil liberties; in practice letting mentally ill patients fall through the cracks and cause harm to others. 
234 See 'Deciding for Others' (1989), Buchanan and Brock, at p 312 for a discussion 
of this backlash, and the 1982 report of the American Psychiattic Association -
'Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalisation of Adults'. 
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from receiving the very treatment the law has determined that they 
require. The deficiencies in the Act must not be permitted to override 
the strengths, and the legislature in consultation with the profession and 
patient rights groups must continue to strive for the crucial balance 
between the mentally ill and the community. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LAW 
I. The Definition of Mental Disorder 
To be lawfully committed a person must be' mentally disordered'. This is defined 
in section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1: 
Section 2: 'Mentally disordered', in relation to any person, 
means suffering from a psychiatric or other disorder, 
whether continuous or episodic, that substantially impairs 
mental health, so that the person belongs to one or more of 
the following classes; namely: 
(a) Mentally ill - that is, requiring care and treatment for 
mental illness: 
(b) Mentally infirm - that is, requiring care and treatment 
by reason of mental infirmity arising from age or 
deterioration of or injury to the brain: 
(c) Mentally subnormal - that is, suffering from 
subnormality of intelligence as a result of arrested or 
incomplete development of mind. 
There is no further definition of 'mental illness' or 'mental health'; but it is a closed 
definition in the sense that people who are committed should 'suffer' from one or other 
of the three named classes of disorder. There is no reference to personality or 
psychopathic disorders, alcoholism or drug addiction. Persons suffering the latter 
conditions may be committed under the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966. 
II. The A venues of Committal 
There are four committal processes, each invoking a different section of the act: 
sections 16,192, 21 and 42. 
A. Section 16: Committal of Informal Patients 
Under section 16 an application may be made for the committal (under section 21) of a 
person who has entered hospital as an informal patient. The application 
must be made by the superintendent or a medical officer of a psychianic hospital . It is 
directed to a District Court judge or two justices 3. Sending a completed application to 
the registrar of the court provides legal authority to detain the patient until the 
application is determined at a hearing. It provides no power to treat patients without 
consent in the interim. Before the hearing two doct9rs examine the patient to decide if 
they should be cenified. 
Section 16 is frequently invoked at Carrington Hospital, rarely elsewhere. 
Some patients admitted on remand from the criminal couns are also subject to 
applications under this process. 
The Process of Section 16 
Informal admission to 
psychiatric hospital 
+ 
Application by hospital doctor, 
authorising 'detention' 
+ 
Certification 
+ 
Judicial hearing 
B. Section 19: Committal Directly To Hospital 
Under section 19 a request may be made directly to a psychiatric hospital for 
the 'reception' of a patient The request is directed to the superintendent It should be 
accompanied by the certificates of two doctors who have recently examined the person 
and certified they are 'mentally disordered' within the meaning of the Act. One 
certificate is adequate if the doctor who signed it has completed the Optional 
Addition stating the admission is an emergency. This is defined in section 19( 4) as 
any situation in which following the usual procedure: 
Section 19(4) ... would expose that person or any other 
person to hardship or danger, and that it has been 
impracticable, since the expediency of immediate admission 
became apparent, for any other medical practitioner to be 
consulted. 
The second certificate must be obtained by the hospital within 72 hours. 
Section 19 itself grants no power of arrest. but it is linked to section 3S, which 
grants a power to the Police or Medical Officers of Health to arrest patients found 
'wandering at large' and apply for their committal under section 19 or 21 in the 
usual way . 
Upon receiving the required documents hospital staff may admit. detain and treat the 
patient. Unless the patient is sooner discharged the hospital must notify the court of 
their admission within 21 days. As soon as practicable a judge must hold a hearing at 
the hospital to determine their need for continued detention. 
11 
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The Process of Section 19 
Application to superintendent 
of psychiatric hospital 
t 
Certification 
t 
Admission to 
psychiatric hospital 
t 
Second cenificate completed 
(if ad.mission under Optional Addition) 
t 
District Coun notified 
of admission within 21 days 
t 
Judicial hearing 
C. Section 21: Committal Thr0ugh The District Court 
Under section 21 the application is made directly to a judge at the District 
Court. The judge then reviews the application, and may interview the applicant, to 
determine whether a warrant to arrest the patient should be issued to ensure their 
examination by two doctors. If a warrant is issued it is given to the Police who arrest 
the patient and take them to the doctors for cenification or the doctors are called in to 
examine them at the court or Police station. Alternatively, one or both certificates may 
be arranged by the applicant and handed to the judge. The patient may also be brought 
to the coun so no arrest is required. 
When the cenification process is complete the judge reviews the certificates and 
examines the patient to determine whether a reception order should be made. An 
order authorises detention and treatment until the patient is discharged. If the order is 
made the patient is transponed to the nearest psychiatric hospital, usually by the Police. 
The Process of Section 21 
Application to 
District Coun judge 
+ 
Judge reviews application 
and may examine applicant 
+ 
Warrant to arrest issued 
+ 
Arrest by Police 
+ 
Certification 
+ 
Judicial hearing 
+ 
Transponation: to 
psychiatric hospital 
D. Section 42: Committal or Prisoners 
Section 42 authorises the committal or prisoners and persons detained in 'licensed 
institutions' for the treattnent of alcoholism or drug addiction. The superintendent of the 
institution may apply to a District Coun judge for a reception order. This authorises 
transfer of the patient to a psychiatric hospital. People committed in this way have the 
status of 'special patient' until their sentence or period of detention expires. Their 
status is then automatically changed to committed patient 
After the application under section 42 the patient is examined by two doctors for the 
purposes of certification. A judicial hearing is then held. at the coun or prison. The 
documents are reviewed. the patient examined and the need for a reception order 
determined. There is no need for a process of arrest as people subject to applications 
under this section are already detained. 
Committals under this section have decreased markedly since 1983. This is a 
result of changed admission policies at Oakley Hospital following the report of the 
Oakley Committee of Inqwry4. During the study only one man was committed under 
this section, from Paremoremo Maximum Security Prison to Oakley Hospital. His 
admission is treated throughout the study as a committal under section 21. 
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An Act to redefine the circumstances in which and the 
conditions under which persons may be subjected to 
compulsory psychiatric assessment and treatment, to 
define the rights of such persons and to provide better 
protection for those rights, and generally to reform 
and consolidate the law relating to the assessment and 
treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder 
115 June 1992 
BE IT ENACTED by Lhe Parliamenl of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement-( I) This Acl may be 
cited as Lhe Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the I st <lay of 
November 1992. 
2. Interpretation-( l) In this Act, unless the COHLext 
otherwise requi,-es,-
"Board" means an area health board: 
"Clinician" means a person who holds a professional 
qualificaLion relevant to the assessment, treatment, 
and care of patients with mental disorder: 
"Coun" means a District Coun: 
"Deputy Director" means the person who for the time 
bemg holds the office of Deputy Director of Mental 
Health pursuant to section 91 of this Act: 
"Director" means the person who for the time being holds 
the office of Director of Mental HealLh pursuant to 
~,-.,,inn QI nftl,i~ i\, ·r· 
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"Director of Area Mental Health Services", in relation to a 
Board, means the person appointed by the Board 
pursuant to section 92 of this Act to be the Board's 
Director of Area Mental Health Services for the 
purposes of this Act: 
"District inspector" means a person appointed pursuant to 
~ection 94 of this Act ~o be a district inspector; and 
includes a person appointed pursuant to that section 
to be a deputy district inspector: 
"Duly authorised officer" means a person who is 
designated and authorised by a Board under section 
93 of this Act to perform the functions and exercise 
the powers conferred on duly authorised officers by 
or under this Act: 
"Fit to be released from compulsory status", in relation to 
a patient, means no longer mentally disordered and 
fit to be released from the requirement of assessment 
or treatment under this Act: 
"Hospital" means-
(a) A hospital managed by an area health board; 
and 
(b) A private hospital licensed as a psychiatric 
::rital pursuant to Part V of the Hospitals Act 195 7; 
(c) An institution that was, immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, a licensed institution 
under section 9 of the Mental Health Act 1969: 
"Medical officer" means a medical practitioner, other than 
a medical superintendent, employed by a Board: 
"Medical practitioner" means a person registered as a 
medical practitioner under the Medical Practitioners 
Act 1968: 
"Mental disorder", in relation to any person, means an 
abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or 
an intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or 
by disorders of mood or perception or volition or 
cognition, of such a degree that it-
(a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of 
that person or of others; or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person 
to take care of himself or herself;-
and "mentally disordered", in relation to any such 
person, has a corresponding meaning: 
"Minister" means the Minister of Health: 
0 
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"Official visitor" means a person appointed pursuant to 
section 94 of this Act to be an official visitor: 
"Patient" means a person who is-
(a) Required to undergo assessment under section 
11 or section 13 of this Act; or 
(b) Subject to a compulsory treatment order made 
under Part II of this Act; or 
(c) A special patient: 
"Penal institution" has the same meaning as it has in 
section 2 of the Penal Institutions Act 1954; and in 
section 45 of this Act includes a police station while it 
is deemed by section 14 of that Act to be a penal 
institution: 
"Principal caregiver", in relation to any patient, means the 
friend of the patient or the member of the patient's 
family group or whanau who is most evidently and 
directly concerned with the oversight of the patient's 
care and welfare: 
"Psychiatric security institution" means a hospital, or part 
of a hospital, declared under section I 00 of this Act to 
be a psychiatric security institution: 
"Psychiatnst" means a medical practitioner registered as a 
psychiatric specialist under regulations made 
pursuant to section 39 of the Medical Practitioners 
Act 1968: 
"Registrar" means the Registrar of a District Court: 
"Responsible clinician", in relation to a patient, means the 
clinician in charge of the treatment of that patient: 
"Restricted patient" means a patient who is dedart>d to be 
a restricted patient by the Court wider section 55 of 
this Act: 
"Service" means a se1-vice for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of persons with mental disorder, being 
a service provided by, or managed by,-
(i) A board; or 
(ii) A private hospital licensed as a psychiat1·ic 
institution pursuant to Part V of the Hospitals Act 
1957;or 
(iii) An institution that was, inunediately Lefore the 
commencement of this Act, a licensed inslitution 
under section 9 of the Mental Health Act 1969: 
"Special patient" means a person who is-
(a) Subject to an order made under section 115 or 
section 121 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, or to an 
6 Mmtal Health (Compulsory 
Asu.1Jment and Treatment) 
1992, No. 46 
order for the detention of that person in a hospital 
made under Lhe proviso to section 171 (3) or the 
Summary Proceedings Act 195 7; or 
(b) Is detained in a hospital pursuant Lo section 
45 (4) (d) or section 46 of this Act and has not ceased, 
by virtue of section 48 of this Act, to be a special 
patient: 
"Welfare guardian" has the same meaning as it has in 
section 2 of Lhe Protection of Personal and Property 
RighLs Act 1988. 
(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the 
expression "Lhe statutory definiLion of mental disorder", in 
relation to any r,erson, means Lhe definition of the term 
"mental disorder ' given in subsection ( 1) of this section in 
relation to persons of the age of that person. 
Cf. 1969, No. 16, s. 2; 197 2, No. 22, s. 2; 1982, No. 84, s. 2 
(l ); 1985, No. 22, s. 2 
S. Act to bind Crown-This Act shall bind Lhe Crown. 
4. General rules relating to liability to assessment or 
treatment-The procedures prescribed by Parts I and II of this 
Act shall not be mvoked in respect of any person by reason 
only of-
(a) That person's poliLical, religious, or cultural beliefs; or 
(b) That person's sexual preferences; or 
(c) That person's criminal or delinquent behaviour; or 
(d) Substance abuse; or 
(e) Intellectual handicap. 
Cf. Mental Health Act 1983 (U.K.), s. l (3) 
5. Powers to be exercised with proper respect for 
cultural identity and personal beliefs-Every court or 
tribunal that conducLs any proceedings, and every court, 
tribunal, or person that or who exercises any power, under this 
Act in respect of any paLient shall do so-
(a) WiLh proper respect for the patient's cultural and eLhnic 
identity, language, and religious or ethical beliefs; and 
(b) With proper recogniLion of the importance and 
significance lo the patient of the patient 's ties with his 
or her family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group, 
and the contribution those ties make to the patient's 
well-being. 
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6. Interpreters to be provided- Where-
(a) Any court or tribunal is conducting any proceedings, or 
any court, tribunal, or person is exercising any power, 
under this Act in respect of any patient; and 
(b) The first or preferred language of the patient is Maori or 
any other language other than English, or the patient 
is unable, because of physical disability, to 
understand English,-
it shall be the duty of the court or tribunal, or that person, Lo 
ensure that the services of an inLei-preter are provided for the 
paLient wherever practicable. 
7. Obligation to assign patient to responsible 
clinician-For the purposes of Lhis An, the Director of Area 
Mental Health Services shall ensure that at all times there is 
assigned in respect of each patient a responsible clinician, who 
shall be-
(a) A psychiatrist approved by the Director of Area Mental 
Health Services; or 
(b) Some other registered health professional who, in the 
opinion of the Director of Area Mental Health 
Services, has undergone training in, and is competent 
in, the assessment, treatment, and care, of persons 
with mental disorder. 
PART I 
COMPULSORY ASSESSM ENT AND TREATMENT 
8. Application for assessment- ( l) Any person (in this 
section referred Lo as the applicant) who has attained the age of 
18 years may at any time apply co the DirecLor of Area Mental 
Health Services for assessment of another person (ref erred Lo in 
this section and in sections 9 and l O of this Act as the proposed 
patient) whom the applicant believes to be mentally disordered. 
(2) The application shall be made in writing, and shall include 
a statement-
(a) Of the grounds on which the applicant believes the 
proposed patient to be mentally disordered; and 
(b) Of the relationship or association of the applicant with the 
proposed patient ; and 
(c) That the applicant has personally seen the proposed 
patient within the 3 days immediaLely preceding the 
date of the application. 
(3) The application shall be accompanied by a certificate 
given by a medical practitioner, who JS related neither to the 
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applicant nor to the proposed patient, and who has examined 
the proposed patient within the 3 days immediately preceding 
the date of the application, slating-
(a) That he or she has examined the proposed patient, and 
the date of the examination; and 
(b) That he or she considers that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the proposed patient may 
be mentally disordered; and 
(c) Full particulars of the reasons for that opinion, explaining 
rn what way he or she believes that the proposed 
patient's condition may come within the statutory 
definition of mental disorder; and 
(d) That he or she is not related to the applicant or to the 
proposed patient. 
(4) Where the apr,licant is a medical practitioner, he or she 
may give the certificate required by subsection (3) of this 
section. 
9. Assessment examination to be arranged and 
conducted-( I) Where an application is made under section 8 
of this Act, the Director of Area Mental Health Services, or a 
duly authorised offi.::er acting with the authority of that 
Director, shall make the necessary arrangements for the 
propos~d patient to undergo an assessment examination 
forthwith. 
(2) The arrangements required by subsection (I) of this 
section shall include the following: 
(a) Nominating, in accordance with subsection (3) of this 
section, the person by whom the assessment 
examination is to be conducted: 
(b) Determining, in consultation with the person by whom 
the assessment examination is to be conducted, the 
time and place at which it is to be conducted: 
(c) Giving to the proposed patient a written notice-
(i) Requiring the proposed patient to attend at the 
specified place and time for the purposes of the 
assessment examination; and 
(ii) Explaining the purpose of the assessment 
examination; and 
(iii) Stating the name of the person who is to 
conduct the assessment examination: 
(d) Ensuring that the purpose of the assessment examination 
and the requirements of the notice given under 
paragraph (c) of this subsection are explained to the 
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proposed patient in the presence of a member of the 
proposed patient's family, or a caregiver in relation to 
the proposed f atient or other person concen1e<l with 
the welfare o the proposed patient : 
(e) Ensuring, where necessary, that appropriate 
arrangements are made lo convey the patient at the 
required time to the place where the assessment 
examination is to be conducted, and, where it is 
necessary or desirable that the proposed patient be 
accompanied on the journey, ensuring that an 
appropriate person is available to do so. 
(3) Every assessment examination shall be conducted by a 
medical practitioner (whether or not employed by the Board 
but not being the medical practitioner who gave the certificate 
referred to in section 8 (3) of this Act), being-
(a) A psychiatrist approved by the Director of Area Mental 
Health Services for the purposes of the assessment 
examination or of assessment examinations 
generally; or 
(b) If no such psychiatrist is reasonably available, some other 
medical practitioner who, in the opinion of the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services, is suitably 
qualified to conduct the assessment examination or 
assessment examinations generally. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (l) of this ~c<.L1u 11, an 
application shall be deemed to have been made in respect of 
any person if notice of it has been received, whether by 
telephone or otherwise, from a medical practitioner who has 
given a certificate in respect of that person for the purposes of 
section 8 (3) of this Act; but the assessment examination shall 
not take place until the wriuen application and that cenif1eale 
have been received by the Director of Area Mental Health 
Services or a duly authorised offICer, or by the medical 
practitioner who is to conduct the examination. 
I 0. Certificate of preliminary as~essment-( I) After 
completing the assessment examination, the medical 
practitioner shall record his or her findings in a certificate of 
preliminary assessment, stating-
(a) Thal he or she has carefully considered the slatuto,-y 
de~tion of mental disorder and the proposed 
patient's condition in relation to that definition; and 
JO 
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(i) In his or her opinion the proposed patient is not 
mentally disordered; or 
(ii) That there are reasonable grounds for believing 
that the proposed patient is mentally disordered and 
that it is desirabf e that the proposed patient be 
required to w1dergo further assessment and 
treatment. 
(2) The medical practitioner shall send to the Director of 
Area Mental Health Services-
(a) The certificate of preliminary assessment; and 
(b) Full particulars of the reasons for his or her opinion of the 
proposed patient's condition, and any relevant 
reports from other health professionals mvolved in 
the case; and 
(c) A copy of any notice given to the proposed patient under 
section 11 ( 1) of this Act; and 
(d) The application for assessment made under section 8 of 
this Act, and the supporting medical certificate, if 
these are in the possession of the medical 
practitioner. 
(3) If the medical practitioner is of the opinion that the 
proposed patient is not mentally disordered, the proposed 
patient shall be free from further assessment and treatment 
under this Part of this Act (without prejudice to the making of a 
further application under section 8 of this Act in respect of the 
patient at some time in the future). 
(4) Where the medical practitioner considers that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the proposed patient is 
mentally disordered and that it is desirable that the proposed 
patient be required to undergo further assessment and 
treatment, the medical practitioner shall-
(a) Give or send a copy of the certificate of preliminary 
assessment to each of the following: 
(i) The patient: 
(ii) Arly welfare guardian of the patient: 
(iii) The applicant for assessment: 
(iv) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(v) The medical practitioner who usually attends 
the patient; and 
(b) Give or send, to each of the persons specified in 
paragraph (a) of this subsection, a statement of the 
legal consequences of the finding set out in the 
certificate of preliminary assessment, and of the 
t 
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recipient's right to apply to the Court for a review of 
the patient's condition; and 
(c) Otherwise deal with the case in accordance with section 
11 of this Act. 
ll ·. ~u~er as~ess~ent for 5 days-( I) If the medical 
practitioner s findmg is of the kind described in section 
_I O ( l )_ (?) (ii) of this ~et, the medical practitioner shall, by notice 
m wntmg to the patient, requii·e the patient to undergo further 
assessment and treatment in accordance with the terms of the 
notice and t~e succeeding provisions of this section throughout 
the first penod_ of assessment and treatment, being a period 
commencmg wllh the date on which the patient receives the 
notice and ending with the close of the 5th day after that date. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, in the notice the 
me?ic~ practitioner _shall require the patient to auend at the 
patient s place of residence, or at some other place nominated 
lil the notice, for the purposes of assessment and treatment 
throughout the first period of assessment and treatment. 
(3) If the medical practitioner considers that the patient 
cannot_ be further assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpauent, the medical practitioner shall, in the notice, direct 
that the patient be admitted to and detained in a specified 
hospital for the purposes of assessment and treatment 
throughout the first period of assessment and treatment. 
. (4) Notwit~standin& anything in subsection (2) of this section, 
if, at any time dunng the first period of assessment and 
treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the patient 
cannot_ continue t? _b~ assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpati~nt, that cl~oan may, by n<?tice ~1 writin~, direct that 
the patient be admitted to and detamed m a specified hospital 
for the purposes of assessment and treatment during the 
remainder of the first period of assessment and treatment. 
. (5) Notwitl~standin& anything in subs~ction (3) of this section, 
if, at any time durmg the first penod of assessment and 
treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the patient 
can c~ntinue to ?~ _assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpauent, that clinician shall, by notice in writing,-
(a) Dire~~hat the patient be discharged from the hospital; 
(b) Direct _the patient to attend at the patient's place of 
residence, or at some other place nominated in the 
notice, for the purposes of assessment and treatment 
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during the remainder of the first period of assessment 
and treatment. 
(6) If, at any time during the first period of assessment and 
treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the patient is 
fit to be released from compulsory status, that clinician shall 
direct that the patient be released from that status forthwith. 
(7) Without limiting any of the foregoing provisions of this 
section, at any time during the first period of assessment and 
treatment, the patient, or any person specified in 
subparagraphs (ii) to (v) of section 10 (4) (a) of this Act, may 
apply lo the Court to have the patients condition reviewed 
under section 16 of this Act. 
12. Certificate of further assessment-( l) Before the 
expiry of the first period of assessment and treatment, the 
responsible clinician shall record his or her findings in a 
certificate of further assessment, stating-
(a) That he or she has carefully considered the statutory 
definition of mental disorder and the patient s 
condition in relation to that definition; and 
(b) That, in his or her opinion,-
(i) The patient is not mentally disordered; or 
(ii) There remain reasonable grounds for believing 
that the patient is mentally disordered and that it is 
desirable that the patient be required to undergo 
further assessment and treatment. 
(2) The responsible clinician shall send to the Director of 
Area Mental Health Services-
(a) A copy of the certificate of further assessment; and 
(b) Full particulars of the reasons for his or her opinion of the 
patient's condition, and any relevant reports from 
other health professionals involved in the case; and 
(c) A copy of any notice given lo the patient under section 
13 (I) of this Act. 
(3) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion that the 
patient is nol mentally disordered, that clinician shall direct 
that the patient be released from compulsory status forthwith 
(but without prejudice to the making of a further application 
under section 8 of this Act in respect of the patient at some 
time in the future). 
(4) If the responsible clinician considers that there remain 
reasonable grounds for believing that the patient is mentally 
disordered and that it is desirable that the patient be required 
to undergo further assessment and treatment, that clinician 
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shall_ ?eal with_ the ~ase in accordance with the succeeding 
proV1s1ons of this section and section 13 of this Act. 
(5) If the responsible clinician's finding is of the kind 
described in subsection (I) (b) (ii) of this section, that clinician 
shall forthwith give or send a copy of the certificate of further 
assessment lo each of the following: 
(a) The patient: 
(b) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(c) The applicant for assessment: 
(d) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(e) The !11edica:1 practitioner who usually attended the patient 
1mmed1ately before the patient was required to 
undergo assessment and treatment under this Part of 
this Act: 
(~ A district inspector: 
(g) An official visitor. 
(6) T<;> each of th~ pers<;ms specified in paragraphs (a) lo (e) of 
s':'bsecuon (5) of this section, the responsible clinician shall also 
give or send a statement of the legal consequcn,c':; of the 
finding set out in the certificate of further assessment, and of 
the recipient's right to apply to the Court for a review of the 
patient's condition. 
(7) Any person specified in paragraphs (,1) lo (e) of subsection 
(5) of this section may, on receiving a copy of the certificate of 
tw-th~: asses~ment, apply to the Court lo have the patient's 
condition reviewed w1der section 16 of I his Act. 
(8_) The district inspector who receives a copy of the 
cert1~cate ?f further ass~ssrnent shall, subject lo subsection ( 11) 
of l_his ~ecw:m, aft~r talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
pau~nt s wIShes m the matter (whe1 e that can be done), 
consider whether or not an application should be made lo have 
the patient's condition reviewed under section 16 of this Act. 
(9) If the district inspector considers that such an applica1ion 
should be made, the district inspector shall tale whatever 
rea_sonable sl~ps he or she thinks nec_essa1y lo encourage or 
aSSISl the pa~1ent, Or anr pers~m specified in paragraphs (b) lO 
(e) of subs~ct1on (5) of this sec_uon, to male such an application. 
( I 0) If, m any case to which subsection (8) of this section 
applies, the district inspector considers that an application 
should be made to have the patient's condition reviewed wider 
secti?n l ~ of this Act, but neither the patient nor any person 
~pecified m paragraphs (b) to (e) ~f subsect~on _(5) of this section 
mtends to male such an application, the d1stncl inspector may 
report the matter lo the Court; and, in such a case, a Judge 
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may, of his or her own motion, review the patient's condition 
under section 16 of this Act as if an appropriate application for 
such a review had been made to the Court. 
( 11) Instead of performing personally the functions specified 
in subsections (8) to ( I 0) of this section, the district inspector 
may in any particular case arrange for an official visitor to 
perform them. 
( 12) Notwithst":nding ~y of the foregoing_ provisions of this 
section, at any time dunng the second penod of assessment 
and treatment (as so defined), the patient, or any person 
specified in paragraphs (b) to (e) of subsection (5) of this section, 
may apply to the Court to have the patient's condition 
reviewed under section 16 of this Act. 
18. Further assessment and treatment for 14 days-( I) If 
the responsible clinician's finding is of the kind described in 
section 12 (I) (b) (ii) of this Act, that clinician shall, by notice in 
writing to the/atient, require the patient to undergo further 
assessment an treatment in accordance with the tenns of the 
notice and the succeeding provisions of this section throughout 
the second period of assessment and treatment, being a period 
commencing with the date on which the patient receives the 
notice and ending with the close of the 14th day after that date. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) of this section, in the notice the 
responsible clinician shall require the patient to attend ~t the 
patient's place of residence, or at some other place nommated 
Ul the notice, for the purroses of assessment and treatment 
throughout the second penod of assessment and treatment. 
(3) If the responsible clinician considers that the patient 
cannot be further assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpatient, that clinician shall, in the notice, direct that the 
patient be admitted to and detained in a specified hospital for 
the purposes of assessment and treatment throughout the 
second period of assessment and treatment. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (2) of this section, 
if, at any time during the second period of assessment and 
treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the patient 
cannot continue to be assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpatient, that clinician may, by notice in writin9, direct that the patient be admitted to and detained in a specified hospital 
for the purposes of assessment and treatment for the 
remainder of the second period of assessment and treatment. 
(5) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (3) of this section, 
if, al any time during the second period of assessment and 
I 
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treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the patient 
can continue to be assessed and treated adequately as an 
outpatient, that clinician shall, by notice in writing,-
(a) Direct that the patient be discharged from the hospital; 
and 
(b) Direct the patient to altend al the patient's place of 
residence, or at some other place 11orninated in the 
notice, for the purposes of assessment and treatment 
during the remamder of the second period of 
assessment and treatment. 
(6) If, at any time during the second period of assessment 
and treatment, the responsible clinician considers that the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status, that 
clinician shall direct that the patient be released from that 
status forthwith. 
14. Certificate of final assessment- ( I) Before the expiry 
of the second period of assessment and treatment, the 
responsible clinician shall record his or her fi11di11gs in a 
certificate of final assessment, stating-
(a) That in his or her opinion the patient is fn Lo be released 
from compulsory status; or 
(b) That in his or her opinion the patient is not lit to be 
released from compulsory status. 
(2) The responsible clinician shall send Lo the Direcwr of 
Area Mental Health Services-
(a) A copy of the certificate of final a!>sessment; a11d 
(b) Full particulars of the reasons for his or her opinion of the 
patient's condition, and any I elevant reports from 
other health professionals involved in the case; and 
(c) Where appropriate, a notice to the di ect that he ur she is 
applying to the Court for a compulsory treatment 
order in respect of the patient. 
(?) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion that the 
patient is fit to be released f, om compulsory status, that 
clinician shall direct that the patient be released from that 
status forthwith (but without prejudice to the making of a 
further application under section 8 of this Act in respect of the 
patient at some time in the future) . 
(4) If the responsible clinician is of the opuuon that the:: 
patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status, th,H 
clinician shall, before the expiry of the second p~riod of 
assessment and treatment, -
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(a) Apply to the Court for the making of a compulsory 
treatment order under Part II of this Act; and 
(b) Send a copy of the certificate of final assessment to each 
of the following persons: 
(i) The patient: 
(ii) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(iii) The applicant for assessment: 
(iv) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(v) The medical practitioner who usually attended 
the patient immediately before the patient was 
required to undergo assessment and treatment under 
this Part of this Act: 
(vi) A district inspector: 
(vii) An official visitor. 
(5) To each of the persons specified in subparagraphs (i) to (v) 
of subsection ( 4) (b) of this section, the responsible clinician shall 
also send a statement of the legal consequences of the finding 
set out in the certificate of final assessment, and of the 
recipient's right to appear before the Court and be heard in 
respect of the application for a compulsory treatment order. 
(6) The district inspector who receives a copy of the 
certificate of final assessment shall, subject to subsection (7) of 
this section, after talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
patient's wishes in the matter (where that can be done), 
consider whether or not to appear before the Court to be heard 
in respect of the application for a compulsory treatment order. 
. (7) Inste~d of perfor_ming personally _ th~ f~nctions specified 
m subsect10n (6) of this secuon, the d1stnct inspector may in 
any particular case arrange for an official visitor to perform 
them. 
15. Status of patient pending determination of 
application-( I) Where the responsible clinician applies to the 
Court for the making of a compulsory treatment order, the 
patient shall remain liable lo assessment and treatment in 
accordance with the terms of the notice given under subsection 
(I) of section 13 of this Act and the succeeding provisions of 
that section until the expiry of a period of 14 days after the 
date on which the second period of assessment and treatment 
would othe1wise have expired. 
(2) If, after examining the patient under section 18 of this 
Act, the Judge is of the opinion that it is not practicable to 
determine the application within the period of 14 days referred 
to in subsection (I) of this section, the Judge may, Ly interim 
' -
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(3) If the application is not fmally dete1 mined l..Jt"fore the 
ex_pi.ry o_f the perJo~ of 14 <lays refeITed lo in subsection (I) of 
tlus section, or w1tlun the last extension of that period ordered 
under subsection (2) of this section, the application shall be 
dismissed, and the patient shall be released from compulsory 
stat~s (?ut without prejudice ~o the_ mak.i11g of a further 
application under sect10n 8 of tlus Act m respect of the patient 
at some time in the future). 
16. R~vi~w <:>f patient's condition by Judge-( I) Where 
an ~pplicat10n 1s ma_de to the Court under section 11 (7) or 
secuon 12 ( 7) or section 12 ( 12) of this Act for a review of the 
patient's condition, a Judge sha.11 examine the patient a., \ 1H,11 as 
practicable. 
(2) The examination shall be conducted-
(a) At the patient's place of residence, the 
other place where the patient 
assessment and treatment; or 
hospital, or the 
is undergoing 
(b) Where that is not practicable, at the nearest practicable 
place. 
(3) Before examining the patient, the Judge shall (wherever 
and so far as practicable)-
(a) Identify himself or herself to the patient; and 
(b) Explain to the patient the purpose of the visit; and 
(c) Discuss with the patient the patient's siLUation, the 
proposed course of assessment and treatment, and 
the patient's views on these matters. 
_(4) As well as examining the patient, the Judge shall consult 
with the responsible clinician, and with at least I other health 
professional involved in the case, and may consulr with such 
othe~ persons as the Judge thinks fit, concerning the patient's 
cond1uon. 
(5) If the Judge is satisfied that the/Mtient is fH to be released 
from compulsory status, the Judge s 1all order that the patient 
be released from that status forthwith. 
(6) Every review under this section of a patient's condition 
shall, wherever practicable, having regard to the time in which 
that review is required Lo be conducted, and to the availability 
of J u<lges and other personnel and I esources, be conducted by 
a Family Court Judge. 
(7) Where it is not p1 acticable for a review under this section 
of a patient's condition lo be cunduued by .i Falllily Cou11 
18 Mental Health (Compu/Jory 
AjUJJme11t and Treatme11t) 
1992, No. 46 
Judge, that review may be conducted by any District Court 
Judge. 
PART II 
COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDERS 
17. Applications t<;> be heard and determined wh~re~er 
practicable by Farmly Co_urt Judge-(l) Every application • 
under section 14 (4) (a) of this Act for a compulsory t_reatment 
order and every application under section 34 (2) of this Act for 
an extension of the currency of a compulsory treatment order 
shall, wherever practicable, having regard to the tiz?e in which 
the application 1s required to be heard and deterrruned, and to 
the availability of Judges and other personnel and resources, be 
heard and determined by a Family Court Judge. 
(2) Where it is not p_racticable fo~ an application of the kind 
referred to in subsection ( l) of this section to be heard and 
determined by a Family Court Judge, that application may be 
heard and determined by any District Court Judge. 
18. Judge to examine patient where compulsory 
treatment order sought-( l) Where an application is made 
under section 14 (4) (a) of thi_s Act for_a c_ompulsory treatment 
order in respect of any patient, a ~1stnct Co~rt Judge shall 
examine the patient as soon as practicable and in no case later 
than 14 days after the application is filed in the Court. 
(2) The examination shall be conducted-
(a) At the patient's place of residence, . the 
other place where the patient 
assessment or treat1nent; or 
hospital, or the 
is undergoing 
(b) Where that is not practicable, at the nearest practicable 
place. 
(3) Before examining the patient, the Judge shall (wherever 
and so far as practicable)-
(a) Identify himself or herself to the patient; and 
(b) Explain to the patient the purpose of the visit; and 
(c) Discuss with the patient the patient's situation, the 
proposed course of assessment and treatment, and 
the patient's views on these matters. 
(4) As well as examining the patient, the Judge shall consult 
with the responsible clinician, and with at least I other health 
professional involved in the c~se, and may c'?nsult with. suc!1 
other persons as the Judge thinks fit, concerning the patients 
condiuon. 
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(5) If the Judge is satisfied that the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory status, the Judge shall order that the patient 
be released from that compulso1y status forthwith. 
(6) The Judge who examines the patiern under subsection (I) 
of this section shall, wherever possible, conduct any hearing of 
the application under the succeeding provisions of this Part of 
this Act; and in no case shall any hearing of the application be 
held until the patient has been visited by a Judge in accordance 
with that subsection. 
19. Attendance of patient and other persons-( l) The 
patient shall be present throughout the hearing by the Court of 
an application for a compulsory treatment order unless-
(a) The Judge who examines the patient in accordance with 
section 18 ( l) of this Act certifies that it would be in 
the best interests of the patient to excuse the patient 
from attending the hearing; or 
(b) The patient is excused or excluded by the Court under 
subsection (2) or subsection (3) of this section. 
(2) The Court may excuse the patient if it is satisfied that the 
patient wholly lacks the capacity to understand the nature and 
purpose of the proceedings, or that auendance or continued 
attendance is likely to cause the patient serious mental, 
emotional, or physical harm. 
(3) The Court may exclude the patient if it is satisfied that 
the patient is causing such a disturbance that it is not 
practicable to continue with the hearing in the presence of the 
patient. 
(4) The Court may exercise, at any stage of the hearing,-
(a) The discretion confeJTed on it, oy subsection (2) of this 
section, to excuse a patient; or 
(b) The discretion co11ferred on it, by subsection (3) of this 
section, to exclude a patient. 
(5) The patient shall be presern while the Court makes a11y 
order upon the application unless-
(a) The patient has been excused or excluJeJ uuder 
subsection (2) or sub~ection (3) of this section; or 
(b) There are exceptional circu1mtances justifying the Cuu1 t 
making an order in the absence of the patient. 
(6) Any other person to whom a copy of the certificate of 
final assessment 1s sent under section 14 (4) (b) of this Act shall 
be entitled to be p1 esent throughout the hearing, except as the 
Judge may otherwise 01der. 
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20. Right of patient and otl ,...:r persons to be heard and 
call evidence-( I) The patient shall be entitled lo be heard by 
the Court, whether in person or through a barrister or solicitor 
or through some other person nominated by the patient, and to 
call witnesses, and to cross-examine any witness called by any 
other party to the proceedings. 
(2) Without limiting anything in subsection (I) of this section, 
where the patient is present and appears capable of addressing 
the Court, the Court shall give the patient an opportunity to do 
so; and, in any such case, the Court may, if it thinks it desirable 
to do so, require any parent or guardian of the patient, or any 
other person with whom the patient is living, or any barrister or 
solicitor representing any such parent, guardian, or other 
person, Lo withdraw from the Court while the patient is 
addressing the Court. 
(3) Any person referred to in section 19 (6) of this Act shall be 
entitled Lo be heard by the Court, whether in person or through 
a barrister or a solicitor, and Lo call witnesses, and to cross-
examine any witness called by any other party to the 
proceedings. 
21. Court may call for report on patient-(!) On an 
application for a compulsory treatment order, the Court may, if 
it is satisfied that it is necessary for the proper disposition of the 
application, request any person whom it considers qualified to 
do so to prepare a report on any relevant aspect of the patient's 
condition. 
(2) In deciding whether or not to request a report under 
subsection (I) of this section, the Court may ascertain and have 
regard to the wishes of the patient and any other party to the 
proceedings. 
(3) A copy of any report obtained under this section shall be 
given by the Registrar of the Court to the baJTister or solicitor 
for the patient and for each of the other parties to the 
proceedings or, if any party is not represented by a barrister or 
solicitor, to that party. 
(4) The Court shall order that a copy of a report given to a 
barrister or solicitor under subsection (3) of this section shall not 
be given or shown to the person for whom the barrister or 
solicitor is acting if the Court has reason to believe that such 
disclosure of the contems of the report may pose a serious 
threat to the health or safety of the patient or of any other 
person. 
t 
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(5) Where any person prepares a report pursuant to a request 
under subsection ( l) of this section, the fees and expenses of 
that person shall be paid by such party or parties to the 
proceedings as the Court shall order or, if the Court so decides, 
shall be paid out of public money appropriated by Parliament 
for the purpose. 
(6) Any party lo the proceedings may tender evidence on any 
matter referred to in any such report. 
(7) The Court may call the person making tlw 1 ( jJOl t as a 
witness, either of its own motion or on the application of any 
party to the proceedings. 
22. Evidence-In any proceedings on an application for a 
compulsory treatment order, whether by way of hearing in the 
first instance or by way of appeal or otherwise, the Court may 
receive any evidence that it thinks fit, whether it is otherwise 
admissible in a court of law or not. 
23. Power of Court to call witnesses-( l) Without limiting 
anything in section 22 of this Act, on any application for a 
compulsory treatment order, the Court may, of its own motion, 
call as a witness any person whose evidence may in its opulion 
be of assistance to the Court. 
(2) A witness called by the Coui l under this section shall have 
the same privilege lo refuse to answer any question as the 
witness would have if the witness had been called by a party to 
the proceedings. 
(3) A witness called by the Court under this section may be 
examined and re-examined by the Court, and may be cross-
examined by or on behalf of any party to the proceedings. 
(4) Sections 20, 38, and 39 of the Summary Proceedings Act 
195 7, so far as they are applicable and with the necessary 
modifications, shall apply with respect to every person called as 
a witness by the Court under this section as if that person had 
been called by a party to the proceedings. 
(5) The expenses of any witness called by the Coun wider 
this section shall be paid u1 the first u1stance, in accordance 
with the prescribed scale of witnesses' expenses, out of public 
money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
24. Proceedings not open to public- ( I) No person shall 
be present during the hearing of any prncee<lmgs on a.it 
application for a compulsory treatment order except the 
following: 
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(c) Parties Lo the proceedings and their barristers and 
solicitors, and any other person nominated by the 
patient: 
(d) Witnesses: 
(e) Any other person to whom the certificate of final 
assessment was sent under section 14 (4) (b) of this 
Act: 
(D Any other person whom the Judge pennits to be present. 
(2) Any witness shall leave the courtroom if asked to do so by 
the Judge. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall limit any other power of the 
Court to hear proceedings in private or to exclude any person 
from the Court. 
26. Restriction of publication of reports of 
proceedings-( 1) No person shall publish any report of 
proceedings under this Part of this Act except with the leave of 
the Court that heard the proceedings. 
(2) Every person who contravenes subsection ( 1) of this 
section commits an offence against this Act and is liable,-
(a) In the case of an individual, to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 3 months, or to a fine not exceeding 
$1,000: 
(b) ln the case of a body corporate, to a fine not exceeding 
$2,500. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall limit-
(a) The provisions of any other enactment relating to the 
prohibition or regulation of the publication of reports 
or particulars relating to judicial proceedings; or 
(b) The power of any court to punish any contempt of court. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall aprly to the publication of 
any report in any publication that is o a bona fide and relevant 
professional or technical nature. 
26. Court may dispense with hearing in certain 
circumstances-Notwithstanding any of the preceding 
provisions of this Part of this Act, the Coun may detennine an 
application for a compulsory treatment order without a formal 
hearing if it is satisfied that no person wishes to be heard in 
respect of the application. 
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27. Court to consider patient's condition- ( I) On an 
application for a compulsory treatment order, the Court shall 
determine whether or not the patient is me11tally disordered. 
(2) If the Court considers that the patient is not mentally 
disordered, it shall order that the patient L>e released from 
compulsory status forthwith. 
(3) If the Court considers that the patient is mentally 
disordered, it shall determine whether or 11ot, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the case, it is necessary to make a 
compulsory treatment order. 
28. Compulsory treatment orders- ( I) Every compulsory 
treatment order shall L>e either-
(a) A commw1ity treatment order; or 
(b) An inpatient order.-
and on making a compulsory treatment order the Cow t shall 
specify the kind of order it is. 
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the Court 
shall make a community treatment order unless the Cou1 t 
considers that the patient cannot be treated adequately as an 
outpatient, in which case the Court shall make an inpatient 
order. 
(3) The Court shall not make an inpatient order if, at the time 
of making the order, the patient is undergoing assessment and 
treatment as an outpatient; but in such a case, the Judge may, 
instead of making a conununity treatment order, order that the 
patient be re-assessed in accordance with sections 1 I and 12 of 
this Act, and the provisions of those senions, senions 13 to 2 7 
of this Act, and this section shall apply with any necessary 
modifications. 
(4) Before making a community treaunent order, die Coun 
shall satisfy itself that-
(a) The Board provides through the imtitution 01 service 
na1ned in the order care and treatment on a 
outpatient basis that is app1 opriate to the needs of 
the patient; and 
(b) The social circumstances of the patient a1 e adequate for 
his or her care within the community . 
(5) When the Court makes an order under this sectio11, it shall 
give or send a copy of the 01 der to the patient. 
29. Community treatment orders - (1) A community 
treatment order shall require the patient to atr end :ir Lhe 
patient's place of residence, or at some olher place specified i11 
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the order, for treatment by employees of the specified 
institution or service, and to accept that treatment. 
(2) Every employee of the institution or service specified in 
the order who is duly authorised to treat the patient may, at all 
reasonable times, enter the patient's place of residence or other 
place so specified for the purpose of treating the patient. 
(3) If, at any time during the currency of the community 
treatment order, the responsible clinician considers that the 
patient cannot continue lo be treated adequately as an out· 
patient, the. responsible clini~ian m~y direct that the patient be 
re.assessed m accordance with sections 11 and 12 of this Act, 
and the provisions of those sections, and sections 13 Lo 2 7 of 
this Act shall apply with any necessary modifications. 
80. Inpatient orders-( 1) Every inpatient order shall 
require the continued detention of the patient in the hospital 
specified in the order, or (where the patient is being detained at 
some other hospital) the admission of the patient and his or her 
detention in the hospital so specified, for the purposes of 
treatment, and shall require the patient to accept that 
treatment. 
(2) lf, at any time during the currency of the inpatient order, 
the responsible clinician considers that the patient can continue 
to be treated adequately as an outpatient, that clinician shall, 
by notice in writing,-
(a) Direct that the patient be discharged from the hospital; 
and 
(b) Direct the patient to attend at the patient's place of 
residence, or at some other place nominated in the 
notice, for the purposes of treatment;-
and, in such a case, the inpatient order shall thereafter be 
deemed to be and to have effect as a community treatment 
order as if the terms of the notice were the tenns of the order. 
8 I. Leave for inpatients-( l) Th.is section shaU apply to 
every patient, other than a special patient, who is in a hospital 
in accordance with an inpatient order. 
(2) The responsible clinician may from tin1e to time grant to 
any pati~nt to whom this .section applies _leave of absence from 
the hospllal for such peno<l not exceedmg 3 months, and on 
such terms and conditions, as that clinician thinks fit. 
(3) The responsible clinician may from time to time extend 
any such penod of leave for a further period not exceeding 3 
t 
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months at any one time; but no patient shaU be on leave w1der 
this section for a continuous period of more than fi months. 
. (~) The responsible clinician ~nay, _at any time during the 
penod of leave granted under tlus section to any patient, cancel 
the leave by notice in writing to the perso11 who has undertaken 
to tak~ care of the patient du~ing. the p~riod of leave, or, if 
there 1s no such person, by notice m wnt111g to the patient. 
(5) Where leave is cancelled, the patient may be taken to the 
hospital, or to any other hospital, by any duly authorised officer 
acting under the authority of the Director of Area Mental 
He~th Services, or by any person to whom the charge of the 
pallent has been entrusted during the period of leave. 
8~. Absence _witho ut )~ave-( l) Any patient to whom 
section 31 of this Act applies who becomes absent without 
leave from the ?ospital in which he or she is detaiI1ed may, on 
t~e ?ay on wluc.h such absence commences, or at any time 
with.in 3 months unmediately following that day, l>e retaken by 
any person. 
(2) An)'. suc.h pati.ent who is so retaken may be returned to 
the hospital 111 which the patient was detained immediately 
before such absence, or may be taken to any other hospital . 
(3) Any suc~yati~nt who is not retaken within the period of 3 
months spec1hed 111 sul>section (I) of this section shall be 
dee~ne~ to have been released from compulso1y status on the 
expirat10n of that period. 
_(4) No~withstanding anythiug in the preceding provisions of 
this section, any patient who is absent without leave fiom a 
hospital may at any time while the patient is so ab~ent L>e 
released from compulsory status in accordance with this Act. 
(5) Willlin 24 hours after the commencement of eve1y such 
absenc_e, and after s~ch return or I elease, an ent1y sha.U be 
made 111 the appropriate register. 
(6) Every patient who l_eave_s his ?r her escort while l>eing 
rem<;>ved from any hosp1tal m wluch the patient has l>ce11 
detamed to any other hospital to which the patient is l>eing 
lawfully transfen-ed shaU be deemed to l>e absent without 
leave, with.in the meaning of this section, from the fust-
mentioned hospital, and on Lieing rt'takcn in ,tccordauce with 
this Act may l>e conveyed to the l_1ospital to which the patie11 t 
was . l>emg removed, notwnhstand~1g tl~at the time limited by 
section 127 of tlus Act for complymg wnh an order of transfer 
may have elapsed. 
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88. Compulsory treatment order to expire after 6 
months-Subjecl lo section 34 of this Act, every compulsory 
lreatment order shall continue in force for a period of 6 months 
co~mencing with the day on which it is made, and shall then 
expire. 
84. Court may extend order-(l) Within 14 days 
immediately preceding the date on which a compulsory 
lreatment order is Lo expire, the responsible clinician may 
cause the case Lo be reviewed under section 7 6 of this Act. 
(2) If, following that review, the responsible clinician is 
satisfied that the patient is not fit to be released from 
compulsory slatus, that clinician may apply to the Court for an 
extension of the currency of lhe order for a further period of 6 
months cornmencin~ with the day after the date on which the 
order would otherwise have expired. 
(3) The Court shall treat the application as if it were an 
application made pursuant to section 14- (4-) (a) of this Act; and 
the provisions of sections I 7 to 33 of this Act, with any 
necessary modifications, shall apply accordingly. 
(4) If, on any such application, the Court extends the 
currency of the order for a further period of 6 months, on the 
expiry of that period the foregoing provisions of this section 
shall apply except that, if the Court then further extends the 
order, the extension shall have effect indefinitely and the 
patient shall remain subject to the order unless and until he or 
she is released from compulsory status. 
85. Release from compulsory status-( l) If, at any time 
during the cuJTency of a compulsory treatment order, the 
responsible clinician considers that the patient is fit to be 
released from compulsory status, that clinician shall direct that 
the patient be released from that status forthwith. 
(2) If the responsible clinician considers that the patient is not 
fit to be released from compulsory status but a district 
inspeclor or an official visilor, or a friend or relative, is of lhe 
contrary opinion, the inspector or official visilor shall, or the 
friend or relative may, refer the case to the Review Tribunal for 
consideralion under section 7 9 of this Act. 
(3) Where a patient is directed to be released from 
compulsory stalus under lhis section, the compulso1y trealment 
order shall be deemed Lo expire on the date specified in that 
behalf in the <lireclion. 
t 
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86. Compulsory treatment order to cease to have effect 
in c~?"tain cases-( I) Notwilhslan<ling any of tl~e prece_<ling 
provisions of this Part of Ll11S Act, 1f, at any tune while a 
compulsory treatment order is in force in respect of any 
person, that person becomes subject to an order ma<le by a 
Court under subsection (2) (b) (ii) or subseclion ( 11) of section 
12 l of the Criminal J us Lice Act 1985, the compulso7 treatrnent 
order shall be suspended <luring lhe currency o that other 
order. 
(2) Notwithstanding any of the prece<ling provisions of this 
Part of this Act, a compulsory treatment or<ler in respect of any 
person shall cease to have eflecL if that person-
(a) Becomes subject Lo an order made under section 115 or 
section 118 of the Criminal Justice Acl 1985; or 
(b) Is s~nt~nc~<l by a court to be detained in a penal 
msutution. 
PART III 
ASSISTANCE FOR CARJ:.GJVERS ANO SUPERVISION OF 
0UTPA TI 1, NTS 
87. Advice and assistance of general nature- So far as 
practicable, duly aul~10rised officers ~hall act as a ready point of 
contact for anyone m the comrnunuy who has any wony or 
concern aboul any aspect of llus Acl, or aboul services available 
for those who are or may be suflering from mental disorder; 
an~, at the r~quest of anyone, they shall provide all such 
assist'."1ce, advice, and reassurance as may be appropriale in 
the circumstances. 
88. Assistance where person may need assessment-
( l) Anyone who is co~cemed in any way with lhe care of any 
person and wh? believes that that person may be suflering 
from mental disorder may requesl lhe assistance of a duly 
authorised officer. 
(2) On any such requesl, a duly aulhorised officer-
(a) Shall ir~vesli~ale lhe mall er _ to the ex lent necessa1y to 
satisfy lumself or herself lhal lhe concern expressed 
by the person making lhe reyuesl is valid, and ll1al 
lhere are reaso11able 1,1 ounds for belining I lial the 
person to whom the requesl relales may be memally 
disordered; and 
(b) May, ~ addition, lake any of the following steps: 
(1) Arrange or assist in ananging for a medical 
practitioner to examine the person with a view 10 tht' 
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Services, or by a duly authorised officer, or by any member of 
the Police, or by any person to whom the charge of the patient 
had been entrusLed during the period of leave, and returned to 
the hospital from which the patient escaped or was on leave or 
to any other hospital specified by the Director. 
Re5lricted Patu:nt5 
64. Patients presenting special difficulties may be 
drawn to Director's attention-(!) If, on making any 
inpatient order under Part II of this Act, a Judge considers-
(a) That the patient presents special difficulties because of the 
danger he or she poses to others; and 
(b) That, for that reason, it may be appropriate that an order 
be made under section 55 of this Act declaring the 
patient to be a restricted patient,-
the judge may direct that the case be referred to the Director 
for consideration. 
(2) If the Director of Area Mental Health Services 
considers-
(a) That any patient who is subject to an inpatient order 
presents special difficulties because of the danger he 
or she poses to others; and 
(b) That, for that reason, it may be appropriate that an order 
be made under section 55 of this Act declaring the 
patient to be a restricted patient,-
the DireCLor of Area Mental Health Services may refer the case 
Lo Lhe Director for consideration. 
(3) If Lhe Director, whether from his or her own information 
and in9uiries, or on reference of the case to him or her under 
subsection ( l) or subsecLion (2) of this section, considers-
(a) That any patient who is subject to an inpatient order 
presenls special difficulties because of the danger he 
or she poses to olhers; and 
(b) That, for Lhat reason, it would be appropriate that an 
order be made under section 55 of this Act declaring 
the patient to oe a restricted patient,-
the Director may apply to the Coun for an order under section 
55 of this Act declaring the patient to be a restricted patient. 
55. Court may male order declaring patient to be 
re_stricted patient-( l) Every application under s~ction 54 of 
tl11s Act shall be made to, and heard and deterrruned oy, the 
Court. 
t 
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(2) S_ections l 9 to 25 of thi~ _Act'. so far as they are applicaole 
and _wnl_1 any necessary_ mod1ficallons, shall apply in respect of 
applications under section 54 of Lhis Act. 
(3) <?n any suc_h application, the Court may malc.e an order 
declanng Lhe patient to be a restricted patient if it is saLisfied-
(a) Thal the patient presents special difficulties because of the 
danger he or she poses to others; and 
(b) That, for that reason, iL is approp1·iaLe that the order oe 
made. 
56. Effect of application and order in respect of leave-
While ~ application un_der secti<:>n 54_ of this Act is awaiLing 
deterrrunauon, and while a pauent 1s a resLricted patienL, 
sec_tions 50 to 53 of Lhis Act shall apply in respeCL of Lhe patient 
as 1f he or sh~ were a special pa_tient, and nOLhing in secL10ns 3 l 
and 32 of lius Act shall apply m respect of that patient. 
PART V 
COMPULSORY TRI:.ATMl:.NT 
67. No compulsory treatment except as provided in 
th_is Part-Ex_cepl as provided in the succeeding provisions of 
lius Pan of this Act, no person who is undergoing assessment 
and treatmenL under Pan I of this Act, or is subject to a 
compulsory treatme~t order, shall oe rel1uired to accept any 
form of treatment wllhout that person's consent. 
58. Trea~ent w~ile undergoing assessment- Every 
person who 1s undergomg assessment pursuant to section I I or 
section 13 of_llus ACL shall be requi1 ed to accept such treatmenL 
for mental disorder as the responsiole c.linician shall direct. 
59. Treatment while subject to compulsory treatment 
order-( l) Every patient who is suoject to a compulsory 
treatment order sha_ll, during the first month of the cuITency of 
the order, oe required to accept such treatment for mental 
disorder as the responsiole clinician shall direc.t. 
(2) Except during the period of I rnonth refeJTed to in 
subsection (I) of this section, no patient shall be required to 
accept any treatment unless-
(a) The patic:m, having had the 11 eatment explai.t1ed to him 
or her in acco1 dance with section 6 7 of this Act 
consents in writing to tlte treatment; or ' 
(b) The treatment is comidered to be in the inte1ests of !lie 
patient by a psychiat1 ist (1101 bei11g the rnpomiblt· 
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clinician) who has been appoimed for Lhe purposes of 
this section by the Review Tribunal. 
(3) Where, during the pe_riod of I month_ refen:e? . to ~ 
subsection (I) of this section, the responsible clinioan 1s 
satisfied-
(a) That the patient will need further treatment of a 
particular kind beyond the expiry of that period; and 
(b) That the patient is unlikely to consent to that 
lreatment,-
Lhe responsible clinician may, notwithstanding that the period 
has not expired, ref er the case to the psychiatrist ref erred to in 
subsection (2) (b) of this section for consideration, so as Lo 
ensure that the opinion of that psychiatrist is available on the 
expiry of that period. 
(4) The responsible clinician shall, wherever practicable, seek 
to obtain the consent of the patient to any treatment even 
though that treatment may be authorised by or under this Act 
without the patient's consent. 
60. Special provision relating to electro-convulsive 
treatment-Notwithstanding anything in section 58 or section 
59 of this Act, no patient shall be required to accept electro-
convulsive treaLment for mental disorder unless-
(a) The patient, having had the treatment explained to him 
or her in accordance with section 6 7 of this Act, 
consents in writing to the treatment; or 
(b) The treatment is considered lo be in the interests of the 
patient by a psychiatrist (not being the responsible 
clinician) who has been appointed for the purposes of 
this section by the Review Tribunal. 
61. Special provision relating to brain surgery-
Notwithstanding anything in section 58 or section 59 of this 
Act, no patient shall, for mental diso1 der, be subjected to any 
surgery or other treatment intended to destroy any part of the 
brain or brain function unless-
(a) The patient consems in writing lo that surgery or other 
treatment; and 
(b) The Review Tribunal has considered the case and is 
satisfied that the patient gave that consent freely, and 
in giving that consent, understood the nature, 
purpose, and likely effect of that surgery or other 
treatment; and 
t 
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(c) That surgery or other treatment is considered to be in the 
interests of the patient by-
(i) The responsible clinician; and 
(ii) A psychiatrist who has been appointed for the 
purposes of Lh.is section by the Review Triuunal and 
wh? has consulted with at least 2 health professionals 
(neither of whom is a medical practitioner) currently 
concerned in the patient's care. 
62. Urgent treatment-Nothing in section 59 (2) of this Act 
shall apply lo any treatment that is immediately necessa1y-
(a) To save the patient's life; or 
(b) To prevent serious damage to the health of the patient; or 
(c) To prevent the patiem from causing serious inju1y to 
himself or herself or others. 
~S. Withdrawal of consen!-Any consent give11 Ly the 
patient for the purposes of sect10n 59 or section 60 or section 
61 of this Act may be withdrawn at a11y time by the patient; 
and thereafter any further treatment given to the patie111 shall 
be deemed (unless the patient gives fresh consent) to be given 
without the patiem's consent. 
PART VI 
RIGHTS OF PATllcNTS 
64. Gene~al rights to information-( I) Eve1y person, 
upon beconung a patient, shall receive a wriuen statement of 
his or her rights as a patient. 
. (2) Every patient is entitled to be kept infonned of his or her 
nghts as a patiem, and, in particular,-
(a) Of his or her legal status as a patient; and 
(b) Of his or her right, al any time du1 ing the first period of 
assessment and treatment or the second period of 
assessment and treatment, to have his or her 
condition reviewed by a Judge under sect ion 16 of 
this Act; and 
(c) Of his or her right, while detained in a hospital, to have 
his or ~er condition _reviewt'd from time to time by 
the Review Tnbunal 111 accordance with section 79 or 
section 80 of this Act; and 
(d) Of his or her right to appeal u11der section 83 of this At t 
where the Review Tribunal decides under section 79 
of this Act that he or she is not fil to be released from 
compulsory status; and 
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(e) Of his or her righL Lo seek a judicial inquiry under secLion 
84 of this Act; and 
(f) Of all orders made by a Court or the Review TriuW1al u1 
respect of his or her case; and 
(g) Of the functions and duties of district inspectors and 
official visitors appointed under section 94 of this Act. 
65. Respect for cultural identity, etc.-Every patient is 
entitled Lo be dealt with in a manner that accords with the 
spirit and intent of section 5 of this Act. 
66. Right to treatment-Every patient is entitled to 
medical treatment and other health care appropriate to his or 
her condition. 
67. Right to be informed about treatment-Every 
patient is entitled to receive an explanation of the expected 
effects of any treatment offered to the patient, including the 
expected benefits and the likely side-effects, before the 
treatment is commenced. 
68. Further rights in case of visual or audio 
recording-( I) Every patient is entitled LO be informed where 
it is intended to make or use a videotape or other visual or 
audio recordu1g of any interview with, or any other part of the 
treatment of, the patient. 
(2) Nothing ref erred to in subsection (I) of this section shall 
be done without the prior consent of the patient or (where the 
patient is not capable of givin~ consent) the prior consent of the 
patient's personal representative (within the meaning of section 
50 (7) of the Area Health Boards Act I 983). 
69. Right to independent psychiatric advice-Every 
patient is entitled to seek a consultation with a psychiatrist of 
his or her own choice, and, if Lhe psychiatrist agrees to die 
consulLation, he or she shall be permiued access Lo the patient 
upon request. 
70. Right to legal advice- Every patient is entitled Lo 
request a lawyer to advise the patient on his or her status and 
rights as a patient, or any other mauers on which persons 
customarily seek legal advice, and, if the lawyer agrees lo act 
for the patient, he or she shall be pennilled access Lo the 
patient upon request. 
t 
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~I. Right to company, and seclusion- ( I) Every patient is 
entitled to the company of -others, except as provided in 
subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) A patient may be placed u1 seclusion in accordance with 
the following provisions: 
(a) Seclusion shall lie used only where, and for as long as, it is 
necessary for the care or treatmem of the patiem, or 
the protection of other patients: 
(b) A patient shall be placed u1 seclusion only u1 a room or 
other area that is designated fur the pUI-poses l>y or 
with the approval of the Director of Area Mental 
Health Services: 
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection, 
seclusion shall be used only with the authority of the 
responsible clinician: 
(d) In an e_mer~ency, a nurse or other health professional 
havmg urune~iate _responsibility for a pati~nt may 
place the patient m seclusion, buL shall forthwith 
bring the case Lo the auention of the responsible 
clinician: 
(e) The dura~ion and circumstances of each episode of 
seclusion sh~ be r~corded in the register kept m 
accordance with sect10n 129 (I) (b) of this Act. 
72. Right to receiv_e vi~itors and make telephone 
calls-( I) Every patient 1s entllled, at reasonable times and at 
reasonable u1tervals, lo receive visitors and Lo make telephone 
calls, ex~~pt where, in the opution of Lhe responsible clinician, 
such a v1s1t or call would be det1-i.Jnental Lo the ullerests of the 
patient and lo his or her LreaLment. 
(2) Notb..iug u1 Lhis seCLion shall limiL or affn.L ~myd1ing m 
section 69 or seCLion 70 of Litis Au. 
78. Right to rec~ive letters and postal articles- Subject 
to section 123 of Lius Act, every patienL is entitled to receive 
W1opened any letter or oLher postal article addressed to the 
patient. 
7~. Right to s_end letters and postal articles- Subjec..l tu 
s~cuon 124 of lhis Act, every patient is emilled to the prompt 
dispatch unopened of any letter or other postal article put out 
by the patient for posting. 
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15. Complaint of breach of rig}_its-(1) Where_ a 
complaint is made by or on beh~f of a pat1ei:it that any nght 
conferred on the patient by this Part of this Act has been 
denied or breached in some way, the matter shall ~e r~ferred 
to a district inspector or an official visitor for invest1gat1on. 
(2) If, after talking with the patient, the _compl~ant (where 
that is not the patient), and everyone else m~ol~ed. m the case, 
and generally investigating the matter, th_e d1stnct inspector or 
official visitor is satisfied that the complaint has substance, the 
district inspector or official visitor shall_ report the matt~r to the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services, together with such 
recommendations as the district inspector or official visitor 
thinks fit and the Director of Area Mental Health Services shall 
take all ;uch steps as may be necessary to rectify the ~atter. 
(3) On concluding any_ inv~~tigation unde: this secuon, _the 
district inspector or offic1~ v1s1tor shall _also rnform the patient 
or other complainant of his or her findrngs. 
(4) If the patient or other complainant is not satisfied with 
the outcome of the complaint to the district inspector or _the 
official visitor, he or she may refer the case to the Review 
Tribunal for further investigation; and, in any such case, the 
provisions of subsection (2) of this section, with any necessary 
modifications, shall apply. 
PART VII 
REv11:.ws AND JUDICIAL INQUIRIES 
76. Clinical reviews of persons subject to compulsory 
treatment orders-( 1) The responsible clinician shall conduct 
a formal review of the condition of every patient, other than a 
restricted patient, who is subject to a compulsory treatment 
order-
(a) Not later than 3 months after the date of the order; and 
(b) Thereafter at intervals of not longer_ than 6 months .. 
(2) For the purposes of any such review, the responsible 
clinician shall-
(a) Examine the patient; and . . . 
(b) Consult with other health profess1o~als mvolved m th_e 
treatment and care of the pauent, and take the!f 
views into account when assessing the results of his or 
her review of the patient's condition. 
(3) At the conclusion of any such review, the responsible 
clinician shall record his or her findings in a certificate of 
clinical review in the prescribed form, stating-
l :,fl 
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(a) That in his or her opinion the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory status; or 
(b) That in his or her opinion the patient is not fit to be 
released from that status. 
( 4) The responsible clinician shall send lo the Di.rector of 
Area Mental Health Services-
( a) The certificate of clinical review; and 
(b) Full partiwlars of the reasons for his or her opinion of the 
patient's condition, and any relevant reports from 
other health professionals involved in the case. 
( 5) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion that the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status, the patient 
shall be released from that status accordingly, and the 
compulsory treatment order shall be deemed to have been 
revoked. 
(6) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (5) of this section, 
if the patient is a special patient he or she shaLJ be dealt with in 
accordance with subsection (I) of section 4 7 of this Act, and 
subsections (3) and (5) of that section shall apply. 
(7) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion thac the 
patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status, that 
officer shall send a copy of the certificate of clinical review to-
(a) The Review Tribunal; and 
(b) Each of the following per.sons: 
(i) The patient: 
(ii) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(iii) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(iv) The medical practitioner who usually .tl tended 
the patient immediately before the patient was 
required to undergo assessment and treatment w1der 
Pan 1 of this Act: 
(v) A district inspector: 
(vi) An official visitor. 
(8) To each of the persons specified in subparagraph.s (i) to 
(iv) of subsection (7) (b) of this section the responsible clinician 
shall also send a statement of the legal consequences of the 
finding sel out in the cenificate of clinical review, and of the 
recipient's right lO apply Lo the Review Tcibunal for a review of 
the patient's condition. 
(9) Subject to subsection ( 12) of this section, the disll iu 
inspector who receives a copy of the cen ificate of clinical 
review shall, after talking to lhe patient and asce1 taining the 
patient's wishes in the matter, con~ider whecher or 1101 an 
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(iii) Each of the persons specified m section 
76 (7) (b) of this Act: . . . . . 
(c) In any case where the re~po~sible c~oan 1s of the 
opinion that the patient s condition no longer 
requires, either in _the patient's own interest or for _the 
safety of the public, that he or she s~ould ~e subject 
to the order of detention as a special patient, that 
clinician shall also send a copy of the certificate of 
clinical review to the Minister of Health for the 
purposes of section 11 7 of the Criminal justice Act 
1985: 
(d) Notwithstanding anything in_ s~ction 11 7 of the Cr~minal 
justice Act 1985, on rece1vmg a copy of the certificat_e 
of clinical review pursuant to paragraph _(c) of this 
subsection, the Mmister of Health may, mstead of 
exercising the powers ~onf erred by th~t section, 
apply to the Review Tnbwial for a review of the 
patient's condition. 
78. Clinical reviews of restricted patie~ts-( I) The 
responsible clinician shall con~uct a formal review of the 
condition of eve1-y restricted pat1ent-
(a) Not later than 3 months after the ?ate of _the order 
declaring the patient to be a restncted patient; and 
(b) Thereafter at intervals of ~ot longer than 6 months. 
(2) The provisions of subsections_ (2), (4), and (8) to (12)_ of 
section 7 6 of this Act shall apply m respect of every review 
wider this section as if it were a review wider that section. 
(3) At the conclusion of the review, the respon~i~le clini~ian 
shall record his or her findings in a certificate of clinical review, 
stating-
(a) That in his or her opinion the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory status; or 
(b) That in his or her opinion the patient is not fit to be 
released from compulsory status but it is no longer 
necessary that the patient should be declared to be a 
restricted patient; or 
(c) That in his or her opinion the patient is not fit t~ be 
released from compulsory status and should contmue 
to be declared to be a resti-icted patient. 
(4) The responsible clinician shall send a copy of the 
certificate of clinical review to-
(a) The Review Tribunal; and 
(IJ) The Director; and 
l 
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(c) Each of the persons specified in section 76 (7) (b) of this 
Act. 
(5) In any case where the responsible clinician is of the 
opinion that the patient is fit to be released from compulsory 
status, the Director shall either-
(a) Direct that the patient be released from that status 
forthwith; or 
(b) Apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's 
condition. 
(6) In any case where the responsible clinician is of the 
opmion that the patient is not fit to be released from 
compulsory status but it is no longer necessary that the patient 
should be declared to be a restricted patient, the following 
provisions shall apP.ly: 
(a) The responsible clinician shall send a copy of the 
certificate of clinical review to the Minister of Health: 
(b) The Minister of Health shall, after consultation with the 
Attorney-General, either-
(i) Revoke the declaration that the patient shall be a 
restricted patient; or 
(ii) Apply to the Review T,-ibunal for a review of the 
patient s condition. 
79. Tribunal reviews of persons subject to compulsory 
treatment orders-( I) Any person to whom a copy of a 
certificate of clinical review is sent under section 7 6 of this Act 
may apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's 
condition. 
(2) Without limiting anything in subsection (I) of this 
section,-
(a) The Review Tribunal may at any time, of its own motion, 
review the conditiou of any patient who is subject to a 
compulsory treatment order: 
(b) On receiving a copy of a certificate of clinical revit'w 
under section 76 of this Act, the Review Tribunal 
shall consider whether or not it should, of its own 
motion, review the patient's condition. 
(3) Where it appears that for any I eason a formal I eview of a 
patient who is subject to a compulsory treatment order has not 
taken place as required by section 7 6 of this Act, the Review 
Tribunal may review the patient's condition, either of its own 
motion or on application by any person to whom a copy of a 
certificate of clinical review would have been required to have 
been sent if the review had been held. 
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(4) Every application lo the Tribunal under this section shall 
be addressed to the convener of the Review Tribunal. 
(5) Subject to subsection (6) of this section, on receipt of such 
an application the convener shall arrange for the Review 
Tribunal lo review the patient's condition as soon as practicable 
and in no case later than 14 days after the receipt of the 
application. 
(6) Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of this 
section, the Review Tribunal may refuse to consider an 
application for review-
(a) If il has considered an application for review of the 
patient's condition within the preceding 3 months, 
and the certificate of clinical review states that there 
~as bee~ no ch~ge in the patient's condition in the 
mterverung penod; or 
(b) In the case of an application made by a relative or friend 
of the patient, the Tribunal is satisfied that the 
applica~ion is made otherwise than in the interests of 
the pauenl. 
(7) At the conclusion of any such review, the Review Tribunal 
shall set out its findings in a certificate of Tribunal review in the 
prescribed form, stating whether or not, in its opinion, the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status. 
(8) If the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is fit to 
be released from compulsory status, the patient shall be 
released from that status accordingly. 
(9) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (8) of this section, 
if the patient is a special patient he or she shall be dealt with in 
accordance with subsection ( 1) of section 4 7 of this Act, and 
subsections (3) and (5) of that section shall apply. 
( 10) If the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is not 
fit to be released from compulsory status, the convener shall 
send a copy of the certificate of Tribunal review to each of the 
following: 
(a) The DireClor: 
(b) The Director of Area Mental Health Services: 
(c) The responsib1e clinician: 
(d) The patient: 
(e) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(D The patient's principal caregiver: 
(g) The medical practiuoner who usually attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required lo 
undergo assessment and treatment under Part I of 
this Act: 
t 0 
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(h) A district inspector: 
(i) An official visitor. 
51 
( 11) To each of the persons specified in paragraphs (d) LO (g) 
of subsection ( 10) of this section, the convener shall also send a 
statement of the legal consequences of the decision, and of the 
recipient's right to appeal to the Court against the decision. 
( 12) Subject to subsection ( 15) of this section, the district 
inspector who receives a copy of the certificate of Tribunal 
review shall, after talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
patient's wishes in the matter, consider whether or not an 
apr.eal should be made to the Court against the Review 
Tnbunal's decision. 
( 13) If lhe district inspector considers that such an appeal 
should be ~ade, the district inspector shall take whatever steps 
he or she thinks necessary to encourage or assist the patient, or 
any person specified in paragraphs (e) lo (g) of subsection ( I 0) of 
this section, to make such an appeal. 
( 14) If, in any case to which subsection ( 12) of this section 
applies,. the di_stricl ~spe~t?r considers that an appeal against 
the Review Tnbunal s dec1s1on should be made, but neither the 
patient nor any person specified in paragraphs (e) to (g) of 
subsection ( 10) of this secuon intends to make such an appeal, 
the district inspector may report the matter to the Court; and, 
in such a case, a Judge may, of his or her own mor:011 , review 
the patient's condition as if an appropriate appeal had been 
made to the Court. 
. ( 15) Ins~ead of performing personally the functions specified 
m su~sect1ons ( 12) to ( 14) of this section, the district inspector 
may m any particular case an-ange for an off1eial visitor to 
perform them. 
80. Tribunal reviews of certain special patients -
( I) Any person to whom a copy of a certificate of clinical review 
is ~ent under secti_on 7 7 of this Act may apply to the Review 
Tnbunal for a review of the patient's condition. 
(2) W~thout ~miting anrthii~g in subsec_tio1: (I) of ~!~is section, 
the Review Tnbw1al shal review the patients cond1uon on the 
applitation of the Attomey·Gene, al pursuant to subsection 
(3) (d) of section 7 7 of this Act or of the Mi.Juster of Health 
pursuant LO subsection (4) (d) of that section. 
(3) The provisions of subsections (2) to (6) of section 7 9 of this 
~et shall apply _in respect of every review under this section as 
1f il were a review under that section. 
I' 
•I 
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(a) The convener of the Review Tribunal shall send a copy of 
the certificate of Tribunal review to the Minister of 
Health: 
(b) The Minister of Health shall, after consultation with the 
Attorney-General, either-
(i) Revoke the declaration that the patient shall be a 
restricted patient; or 
(ii) Decline to revoke that declaration. 
8.2. Procedural provisions-The provisions set out in the 
First Schedule to this Act shall apply in respect of a review of a 
patient's condition by a Review Tribunal under this Part of this 
Act. 
8S. Appeal against Review Tribunal's decision in 
certain cases-(1) Where, on a review under section 79 of this 
Act, the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is not fit to 
be released from compulsory status, any f erson specified in 
paragraphs (d) to (g) of subsection ( l 0) o that section may, 
within l month aTter the date of the Review Tribunal's 
decision, appeal to the Court against that decision. 
(2) On any such appeal, the Court shall review the patient's 
condition Lo deterrrune whether or not the patient is fit to be 
released from compulsory status; and the provisions of section 
16 of this Act shall apply, with any necessary modifications, Lo 
every such appeal. 
84.Judicial inquiry-(!) A judge of the High Court may 
whenever the judge thinks fit, whether of the judge's own 
motion or on the application of any person, make an order 
directing a district inspector or any one or more/ersons whom 
the judge may select in that behalf to visit an examine any 
person who the judge has reason to believe is being detained in 
a hospital as a patient and to inquire into and report on such 
mauers relating to that person as the judge thinks fit. 
(2) A Judge of the High Court may whenever the Judge 
thinks fit, whether of the Judge's own motion or on the 
application of any person, and whether any order under 
subseCLion (I) of this section has been made or not, make an 
order directing the responsible clinician to bring any person 
who is being delained as a patient in the hospital before the 
Judge in open Court or in Chambers, for examination at a tinw 
to be specified in the order. 
t ·o 
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(3) If, on the examination of the person so ordered to be 
brought before the judge, and on the evidence of any medical 
or other witnesses, the Judge is satisfied-
(a) That the person is detained illegally in the hospital as a 
patient; or 
(b) That the J.erson is fit to be discharged from the 
hospit ,-
the Judge shall, unless the person is a special patient or is 
legally cfetained for some other cause, order that the person be 
discharged from the hospital forthwith. 
(4) If the person has been found to be under disability and is 
detained as a special patient by virtue of section l 15 of the 
Criminal justice Act 1985, and it appears to the satisfaction of 
the judge that the person is capable of being tried or 
committed for trial on the charge or indictment against him or 
her, the Judge shall (without prejudice to subsection (5) of this 
section) have the same powers as the Attorney-General has 
under section 116 of that Act to direct that the person be 
brought before a Court under that section. 
(5) If the person has been found to be under disability anJ is 
detained as a special patient by virtue of section 115 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, the ·Judge may, if in the 
circumstances of the case the Judge considers it proper to do so 
and if the interests of justice so permit (whether or not the 
person is capable of being tried or committed for trial), direct 
that the charge or indictment be dismissed. 
(6) On giving any direction w1der subsection (5) of this 
section, the judge may order that the person be relea~ed from 
compulsory status; but if it appears to the Judge that theJ)erson 
is not fit to be released from that status, the judge sha order 
that the person be_ funher detained in a hospital under this Act, 
and the last-menuoned order shall have effect as an inpatient 
order made under Part II of this Act. 
(7) For the purposes of any examination under this section, 
the judge shall have power-
(a) To summon any medical or other witnesses to testify 011 
oath in respect of any matter involved in the 
examination, and to produce any relevant 
documents; and 
(b) To call for any report on the person's condition by the 
Review Tribunal. 
(8) The jud!$e may in any case, if the Judge lb.inks fit, report 
his or her opmion to the Minister, with such comments and 
recommendations as the judge thinks fit. 
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(9) Nothing in lhis section shal prevenl the exercise of any 
other remedy or proceeding available by or on_ behalf of any 
person who is or is aleged to be unlawfuly detamed, confined, or imprisoned. 
PART VII 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CHILDREN 
AND YOUNG PERSONS 
85. Application-In respect of any patient or P~<:>posed 
patient who is under the a~e of l 7 years, ~~ other pr?v1s10ns of this Act shal be read subject to the provisions of this Part. 
86. Assessment examination-Wherever practicable, an 
assessment examination of a person who is under the age of 17 
years shal be conducted by a psychiatrist practising in the field of child psychiatry. 
87. Age of consent-Notwithslanding anything in section 
25 of lhe Guardianship Act 1968 or any other ~nactment or 
rule of law lo lhe conlrary, in respect of a palent who has 
atained the age of 16 years, the consent of a par~nt or 
guardian to any assessment or treatment for ment~ disorder 
shal nol be sufficient consent for the purposes of this Act. 
88. Brain surgery-NOLwithstanding anylhing in Part V or 
section 8 7 of lhis Act, brain surgery shal not be performed for 
mental disorder on any person who is under the age of 17 years. 
89. Membership of Review Tribunal-Wherever 
praClicable, for lhe purposes of a_ review by a Review Tribunal 
of the condilion of a pauenl who 1s unde~ th~ age of _l? ye_ars, 1 
member of lhe Tribunal shal be a psycluatnst pract1smg m the field of child psychialry. 
90. Review of patient about to attain age _of 17_ years-
( 1) This section applies to every palient who 1s subJeCl lo a 
compulsory treatment order and who wil atain the age of 1 7 
years before the expiry of the compulsory treatment order. 
(2) Nol earlier lhan 2 months '.111d n?l late~ than 1 month 
before the date on which lhe patient wil auam the age of I 7 
years, the responsible clinician shal review the patient ·5 condition. 
{ 
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(3) The provisions of subsections (3) lo (9) of section 7 6, and 
the succeeding provisions of Part VI, of lhis Act, so far as they 
are applicable and with any necessary modifications, shal apply in respect of every review under this section. 
PART IX 
ADMINISTRATION 
Olficza/.J 
91. Director and Deputy Director of Mental Health-
( 1) There shal from time to time be appointed w1der the Stale 
SecLOr Act 1988 the folowing officers in the Department of Health: 
(a) A Director of Mental Healh, who shal be responsible for 
the general administration of this Act under the 
direction of lhe Minister and the Direclor-General of Health: 
(b) A Deputy Director of Mental Health, wlto :,J1J.il, u11der the 
control of the Director, perform such general oficial 
dulies as the Director may from time to time I ec1uire. 
(2) On lhe occurrence from any cause of a vacancy i.i1 the 
office of Director, whether by reason of death, resignation, or 
olherwise, and in case of lhe absence from duty of l1e Director 
from whalever cause arisi.i1g, and so long as the vacancy or 
absence continues, the Deputy Director shal have a11d may 
exercise and perform al the powers, duties, and functions of the DireClor. 
(3) The facl lhat the Deputy Di1 euoi-exercises or pe1 fonns 
any of lhe Director's powers, duties, and f unctio11s shal be 
conclusive evidence of die Depuly Di1 ector's authority to do so, 
and no person shal be concerned Lo LIHjuire whether the 
occasion has arisen rec1uiring or authorising the Deputy Director lo do so. 
(4) The Director may from lille Lo time delegate to any 
person employed in the Departme111 of Heald1 al or any of die 
powers, duties, and functions {.011f erred or imposed on the 
Director by dus Act, to l>e exercised by that person whenever, 
or on any specified occasion wht'11, there is not presem in 
Welington a person holding or acti.i1g i.i1 the office of Director or of Depuly Di1 ector. 
(5) Every delegation under subsection (4) of this section shaU have effect according to its tenor. 
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